MAO VERSUS BUDDHA: RELIGIOUS POLICY TOWARDS TIBETAN SANGHA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE YEARS 1950–19651

Martin Slobodník (Comenius University)

“Tibet in the past only had the freedom to believe in religion, and did not have the freedom not to believe in religion; since democratic reform, Tibet has had ample freedom not to believe in religion, and has not had the freedom to believe or has only had a trace of it.” 10th Panchen Lama Chökyi Gyaltshen in 1961 (Anon. 1997: 58)

The incorporation of Tibet into the newly founded socialist state, which was fi nally confi rmed by the “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,”2 signed on May 23, 1951 in Beijing, represented a new challenge for China. For the fi rst time in the 1300-year long history of Sino-Tibetan relations Tibet became an integral part of the administrative structure of the Chinese state and the Beijing government was granted most of the powers in the fi eld of internal and foreign policy, economy and defense. The traditional Tibetan state, where the approximately 110 thousand monks (about 26% of the male population—Goldstein 1989: 21; Tsering Shakya 1999: 253) played an important political and economic role, suddenly became an administrative region of the People’s Republic, which had to formulate its political strategy in this western part of China. The aim of this contribution is an analysis of the status of Tibetan Buddhism in the context of Chinese religious policy, primarily in relation to the policy towards Chinese Buddhism in the period after the foundation of the PRC: on one hand I will focus on the distinctive situation in Tibet and on the other on the general measures adopted by the state in its policy towards various religious groups. While discussing the periodization of Chinese religious policy a Western Sinologist

he paper was written with the kind support of a fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (Germany). 2 For the English translation of this agreement see Tsering Shakya 1999: 449–452. It is also known as the 17-Point Agreement.

(Malek 1996: 200) as well as Chinese authors (Luo 1991: 143–146; Ciwang 2001: 163)—despite certain differences—consider the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 as a turning point in the developments of the implementation of religious policy in China (including Tibet). Therefore the focus of this study is this formative period during which fundamental strategies and policies towards religion were promulgated by the central government. A necessary precondition for the successful solution of the “religious issue” (Chin. zongjiao wenti ᅫᬭ䯂乬)3 in Tibet was a comprehensive understanding of the status of religion – due to the marginal infl uence of Bön (bon) the situation of Tibetan Buddhism was of primary interest – in traditional Tibet: especially the distinctive socio-political system characterized by the close relationship between religious authority and political power in Tibet which was at the core of Tibetan polity until the end of the 1st half of the 20th century. From the 13th century the dignitaries of various Buddhist schools began to play an infl uential role in Tibetan politics and

this tendency reached its height with the assumption of political power by the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lozang Gyatsho (ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, 1617–1682) in 1642 in Central Tibet (Tib. dbus gtsang) (Shakabpa 1988: 61–124). The traditional political system of Central Tibet in the years 1642–1950 is often described in Tibetan as “having two (powers): religious and political” (Tib. chos srid gnyis ldan) which refl ected the fact that the supreme political and religious power was in the hands of the successive reincarnations of the Dalai Lama (Phuntsog 1975: 78–81). The ecclesiastical elite of Tibetan society played an important role in the government and therefore Tibetan polity is often characterized as theocratic. The infl uence of Buddhist clergy in Tibet is also obvious from the structure of government agencies, where the so-called monk offi cials from the biggest Gelugpa (dge lugs pa) monasteries occupied crucial posts (Michael 1982: 51–60; Goldstein 1989: 6–19). Due to this position the Buddhist clergy successfully asserted its political and economical priorities in traditional Tibet and in fact they perceived the role of the state as the protector of their interests and the Buddhist faith. The economic infl uence of religious institutions can be

illustrated by the fact that they accounted for 37% of arable land in Tibet (Goldstein 1989: 3) and that the population in the vicinity of the monasteries had to pay taxes to these religious institutions and provide them with various services. After 1951 the political role and economic power of Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs represented a specifi c problem of Chinese religious policy in Tibet. In order to understand the status of religion in Tibet it is necessary to note that Tibetan Buddhism is considered to be the most important element in the identity of Tibetans by both Tibetan (e.g. Karmay 1994: 114) and foreign authors (Stoddard 1994: 128).4 Any attempts to alter the traditional model of the status of religion, religious institutions and dignitaries in restrictions and limits imposed by the Chinese authorities on the religious

3 In Chinese sources this term describes the various political, legal, administrative and economic issues related to the relationship between the state and religious groups. 4 The importance of religion in the self-identifi cation of Tibetans can be further illustrated by the fact that it serves as a criterion for the inclusion/exclusion of a particular individual from the Tibetan community: one is either an “insider” (Tib. nang pa, i.e. believer in Tibetan Buddhism) or an “outsider” (Tib. phyi pa, i. e. non-believer in Tibetan Buddhism) (Sagaster 1999: 185).

practice on the individual and collective level are perceived by both the clergy and the laity as unacceptable infringements, which touch the core of “Tibetanness.” In order to comprehend the background of religious policy towards Tibetan Buddhism in the PRC it is important to mention a brief sketch of a broader historical framework: the Manchu-Chinese Qing ⏙ Dynasty (1644–1911) was involved in both Tibetan politics and religious affairs. In the course of the Western expansion of the Qing the Imperial government in 1791–1793 issued a number of decrees and regulations with the aim of regulating the status and powers of religious institutions and dignitaries (Su 2001: 160–182; Yu 1999: 134–146). Note that after 1949 some of these measures and regulations designed by the Imperial bureaucracy have also been repeatedly referred to by the government of the People’s Republic as an important part of its Tibet policy.5 However, the role of Tibetan Buddhism in Qing policy towards Inner Asia was not limited to Tibet proper as the Qing emperors also used Tibetan religion as a tool of their policy

towards Mongolia (Dabringhaus 1997). Moreover, some Qing emperors— especially Qianlong ђ䱚 (r. 1736–1796) had shown deep personal interest in Tibetan Buddhist teachings and the presence of high-ranking Tibetan lamas and exposure to Tibetan culture had also infl uenced art production at the Qing court (Berger 2003). The fundamental standpoints of the religious policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were formulated during the 1930s and 1940s and they were primarily infl uenced by two sources: a) the Marxist attitude towards religion and the fi rsthand experience of Soviet Russia in the implementation of religious policy in a socialist state; b) policy towards traditional Chinese religions and Christianity in the Republic of China after its foundation in 1912. The period after the foundation of the Republic of China was characterized by a negative approach towards religion that culminated during the antireligious and anti-Christian campaigns in the 1920. Especially after the May Fourth Movement in 1919 that propagated a program for the modernization of Chinese society under the slogan

democracy and science that in the eyes of Chinese intellectuals represented progressive aspects of Western civilization, the traditional Chinese religions became the object of harsh criticism and refusal. In the eyes of young intelligentsia they represented a relict from the past, an obstacle to modernization, an antithesis of a rational and scientifi c way of thinking (Chan 1955: 189). This line of thought resulted in the antireligious and anti-Christian movement during the years 1922–1927. The Great Federation of Anti-Religionists (Chin. Fei zongjiao da tongmeng 䴲ᅫᬭ໻ৠⲳ) established by Chinese students in 1922 characterize religion as a poison, a non-scientifi c Weltanschauung, and a hindrance of progress. The criticism of this movement focused mainly on Christianity, that was perceived as a Western tool for the exploitation of China, and missionaries who were pictured as agents of imperialism (Yamamoto – Yamamoto 1953; Chan 1955: 192–194; Duara 1995: 103–104; Welch 1968: 151). The refusal of Christianity formed a part of Chinese nationalism which was defying itself in opposition towards the West. This critical position to religion was

5 Especially the system of identifi cation of the successive reincarnations of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, so-called “drawing lots from a gold urn” (Chin. jinping cheqian 䞥⫊᥷ㅒ, Tib. gser bum skrug pa) – e.g. see Jing 1989: 13–14.

also adopted by Guomindang ೟⇥咼. In 1928 and 1929 representatives of the left wing of Guomindang launched a vigorous campaign against religion and “superstition” (Chin. mixin 䗋ֵ)—most radical nationalists refused to distinguish between the two categories (Duara 1995: 99)—in southern China. The aim of the religious policy of the Guomindang government was to strengthen the state’s administrative control of religious groups, while the authorities attempted to distinguish between various local deities from the pantheon of folk religion labeled as “superstitions,” which should be eliminated, and those religious traditions (Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism) which should be preserved and protected (Duara 1995: 109). This administrative control of religion included the approval of the Regulations for the Supervision of Monasteries and Temples in December 1929 (Welch 1968: 138–139), which should have provided legal guarantees, for instance in regard to the protection of monastic property. Political instability and the weak authority of the central government did not enable the full implementation of these regulations, while due to the de facto independent status of Central Tibet in the years 1912–1950 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries were not subordinated to the jurisdiction of the Chinese government. The ideologists of the CCP adopted the Marxist criticism of religion as an “opiate for the people,” which conceals the exploitative character of the social system and causes a false feeling of happiness, thus depriving the exploited classes of their revolutionary zeal. The

perception of religion as a tool of the despotic ruling class is refl ected in the earliest writings of Mao Zedong ↯⋑ϰ (1893–1976): in a paper written in 1927 Mao identifi ed religious authorities, together with political rulers and the clan system, as the three systems of authority that an individual is subjected to and he supported those peasants who proposed the prohibition of religious practices and the destruction of religious “idols,” which Mao interpreted as a part of the revolutionary movement for the emancipation of the Chinese peasantry (MacInnis 1972: 7–10). According to the Marxist interpretation of Chinese authors the historical process will inevitably lead to the weakening and fi nal extinction of individual religious traditions. The fi rst document in which the Chinese

Communist movement tried to defi ne the scope of religious freedom is the “Constitution of the Soviet Republic” promulgated on November 7, 1931 which was the basic document for the Chinese Soviet under the administration of the CCP authorities in the southern part of the Jiangxi ∳㽓 Province (Spencer 1990: 376–379). This Constitution in its 13th article guarantees “true religious freedom to the workers, peasants, and the toiling population. Adhering to the principle of the complete separation of church and state, the [[[Wikipedia:Chinese|Chinese]]] Soviet state neither favors nor grants any fi nancial assistance to any religion whatsoever. All Soviet citizens shall enjoy the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda. No religious institution of the imperialists shall be allowed to exist unless it shall comply with Soviet law” (MacInnis 1972: 19; Luo 1991: 135; Gong 2003: 154). This brief passage illustrates some crucial principles of Chinese religious policy, which were adhered to after the foundation of the PRC: the principle of the separation of politics and religion (Chin. zheng jiao fenli de yuanze ߭ॳⱘ⾏ߚᬭᬓ), equal guarantees for religious practice and for the promotion of an antireligious campaign and the perception of religion as a tool of imperialist forces. This approach is repeated in Mao’s article “On Coalition Government” (1945), where

he stated: “All religions are permitted in China’s Liberated Areas, in accordance with the principle of freedom of religious belief. All believers in Protestantism, Catholicism, Islamism, Buddhism, and other faiths shall enjoy the protection of the people’s government as long as they are abiding by its laws. Everyone is free to believe or not to believe; neither compulsion nor discrimination is permitted” (MacInnis 1972: 14). During the expansion of territories under the jurisdiction of the CCP authorities in northern China, the people’s government encountered for the fi rst time a community of followers of Tibetan Buddhism in today’s Inner Mongolia.6 In 1940 the Central Committee of the CCP promulgated the “Program of Mongolian Nationality Problems During the War of Resistance” which pledged to “respect the customs, religion, language, and written language of the Mongolian nationality, protect the Lamaist temples, encourage young lamas to take part in productive labor” (Luo 1991: 136; Coll. 2002: 215–216) and these guarantees are listed also in the legal documents formally pronouncing the

establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in May 1947,7 which explicitly mentioned the principle of the separation of politics and religion as well as the goal to engage the lamas to participate in productive labor (Gong 2003: 156). After the foundation of the PRC on October 1, 1949 the socialist state strived to create an administrative, legal and institutional framework for the implementation of religious policy. On the eve of the foundation, in September, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference adopted the “Common Program” (Chin. Gongtong gangling ݅ৠ㒆乚) which served as the provisional constitutions and the text declares fundamental political, economic and social characteristics of the new regime. Article 5 guarantees, among other freedoms, the freedom of religious belief, however on the other hand Article 3 declares the goal of requisitioning the land belonging to ancestral shrines, temples, monasteries and

churches.8 Article 53 of this constitution guarantees to the national minorities “the right to develop the language and the writing system, to maintain or modify their customs, habits and religion” (MacInnis 1972: 21; Gong 2003: 159; Ciwang 2001: 161). Religious freedom was also guaranteed in the fi rst Chinese Constitution adopted in 1954, which in Article 88 briefl y states: “Every citizen of the PRC shall have freedom of religious belief” (MacInnis 1972: 21; Luo 2001: 99). Liu Shaoqi ߬ᇥ༛ (1898–1969), the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in a speech commemorating the approval of the Constitution, offered a more detailed understanding of religious freedom provided by

6 From a comparative point of view it is interesting to compare the Chinese policy towards Tibetan Buddhism with the religious policy of the Japanese Empire during World War II. Numerous priorities of the Chinese religious policy (e.g. limits imposed on the number of monks, economic productivity of Buddhist monasteries) played an important role also in the Japanese policy towards Tibetan Buddhism – see Li 1998. 7 The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was established on territories under the control of the Chinese Communist Party even before the foundation of the PRC and thus it was the fi rst autonomous region for national minorities in China. The territory of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region was originally smaller than its current boundaries. The aim of the CCP was to enlist the support of Mongolians in the confl ict with Guomindang in the years 1945–1949. 8 The law on land reform issued in 1950 explicitly mentioned “confi scation of land of temples, churches, schools” (Luo 1991: 65).

the Constitution: “… our state will, …, effectively safeguard freedom of religious belief for its citizens. But safeguarding freedom of religious belief is quite a different matter from safeguarding freedom of counterrevolutionary activities; these two just cannot be mixed up. Nor, similarly, will our constitution and laws ever provide the slightest facility for those elements who engage in counterrevolutionary activities under the cloak of religion” (Bush 1970: 16–17). The understanding of religion as a tool for the erosion of social stability is still present today in the offi cial discussion on religions in China. Shortly after the approval of the Constitution the Central Committee of the CCP prepared the document “A Summary of Major Experiences in the Carrying Out of Party’s Work among National Minorities in the Resent Years” (Gong 2003: 165–168). This document includes a fundamental characteristic of religion as worked out by Chinese

authorities, which has been until now repeated in offi cial Chinese documents and analysis related to religious policy: Marxist theoreticians suggested “fi ve natures” (Chin. wu xing Ѩᗻ) of religion: its mass nature (Chin. qunzhongxing 㕸ӫᗻ), longlasting nature (Chin. changqixing 䭓ᳳᗻ), complex nature (Chin. fuzaxing ໡ᴖᗻ), international nature (Chin. guojixing ೑䰙ᗻ) and minority nationalities nature (Chin. minzuxing ⇥ᮣᗻ) (Luo 1991: 10). This document discusses in detail the issue of the close linkage between religious policy and the policy towards national minorities (Gong 2003: 165–166) and in regard to the process of

formulating the religious policy it is noteworthy that it was a result of the experience of the cadres’ work in areas inhabited by national minorities. Chinese authors repeatedly state (e.g. Wang 2002: 235; Coll. 2002: 209–213) that there is a direct connection between the solution of the religious and nationalities issues and they stress the high degree of religiosity in areas inhabited by non-Hans. Up until the late 1990s when the religious movement Falun gong ⊩䕂 ࡳ gained massive support mainly among the Han-Chinese, the implementation of religious policy was primarily aimed at non-Han ethnic groups, especially Tibetans and Uighurs, followers of Sunni Islam. Due to the fact that Tibet was incorporated into China in a unique way9 Tibetan Buddhism played a specifi c role in offi cial Chinese discourse on religious policy. In June 1950, as part of the preparation for a military advance to Tibet later that year, the CCP leadership prepared a document which served as a blueprint in the following negotiations with Tibetan representatives, in which the Chinese side – among other issues – guarantees to “implement the freedom of religious belief, protect lama monasteries, respect the religion, customs and habits of the Tibetan people” (Jiang

9 Tibet was the only one of the Chinese peripheral regions inhabited by a distinctive ethnic group with a specifi c religious tradition (e. g. Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia) which concluded a special agreement with the central government, which illustrates that,despite the claims of the Chinese propaganda, the existence of the 17-Point Agreement proves the peculiar status of Tibet in the period between the decline of the Qing Dynasty and the foundation of the PRC.

1996: 94).10 The basic principles of this document were refl ected in the 17-Point Agreement, as its 7th provision stipulates that “the policy of freedom of religious belief … shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect any change in the income of the monasteries” (Tsering Shakya 1999: 451). The 17-Point Agreement in its 4th, 5th and 6th provisions guarantees to maintain the status of the highest Buddhist dignitaries, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama and the Chinese authorities committed themselves not to alter the traditional political system. All these guarantees related to Tibetan Buddhism stipulated by the 17-Point Agreement refl ect the overall intention of the document to offer a large degree of autonomy to Tibet within the political borders of the PRC. With regards to the status of

religious dignitaries and the economic functioning of monasteries, the Chinese authorities offered a larger scope of religious freedom as was the case with religious communities in other parts of the PRC. Despite the restrained approach and a quite tolerant—in the context of a socialist state-policy towards Tibetan Buddhism in Central Tibet, the document “Directive on the Implementation of Religious Policy” written in 1954 by the Tibet Work Committee (Chin. Xizang gongwei 㽓㮣Ꮉྨ; this authority represented the interests of the Central Government in Tibet) stated, that there occurred several problems in the implementation of the religious policy: as far as the propaganda work is concerned, the document warns Chinese cadres against promoting the freedom to renounce religion, against placing too much stress on the atheism of the CCP members, and against the persuasion of lamas to renounce their monk’s status or to join the army. The directive repeatedly stressed the necessity to respect the religious traditions, to restrict from disdainful comments about lamas and believers, it prohibited to quarter in monasteries and temples without prior approval, as well as to use words in newspapers, textbooks and propaganda materials, which could offend religious

feelings of Tibetans (Jiang 1996: 97–101), thus it indirectly illustrates various confl icts and problems which resulted from the implementation of the religious policy in Tibet. The early period of the Chinese religious policy included the creation of an institutional framework that should serve as an intermediary between the central government and local authorities as well as religious communities. With regards to Tibetan Buddhism the establishment of the Chinese Buddhist Association (Chin. Zhongguo fojiao xiehui Ё೑ԯᬭणӮ, hereafter CBA) in May and June 1953 in Beijing (Luo 1991: 68; Luo 2001: 81–82) played a crucial role. The goal of the CBA was to unite all of the country’s Buddhists under the leadership of the People’s

10 The tolerant attitude and respect towards Tibetan religion is emphasized also in the document entitled “Rules for the army advancing (to Tibet)” (Chin. jin jun shouze ߭ᅜݯ䖯), which was prepared by the political department of the People’s Liberation Army. The document stresses the protection of monasteries, prohibition of anti-religious propaganda, prohibition of the entrance into monasteries without the approval of monks, prohibition of touching the Buddhist statues in temples, prohibition of fi shing and hunting in the vicinity of monasteries, etc. (Coll. 1995: 23–24). According to the testimonies of Tibetans from this period the Chinese army in general abided by these rules of conduct while arriving to Eastern Tibet in the years 1950–1951.

Government and to help fully carry out religious policy (Welch 1972: 20). The government used the CBA as an instrument for remoulding Buddhism to suit the needs of the government, i.e. limiting religious activities, mobilizing Buddhists to participate in national campaigns and purging the critics of the CCP policy among Buddhists (Welch 1961: 7). The CBA was responsible for overseeing religious life, transmitting government directives downwards, disbursing fi nances provided by the state, etc. At the same the CBA has represented Buddhist interest in offi cial unifi ed manner vis-à-vis state authorities.11 The important role of Tibetan sangha within the community of Chinese Buddhists is refl ected by the fact that shortly after the establishment of the CBA the Tibetan lama Sherab Gyamtsho (shes rab rgya mtsho, 1884–1968) was elected its president and that three of four honorary presidents represented the Tibetan Buddhist tradition (Welch 1972: 18–19).12 The fi rst—and in the 1950s the sole one—provincial branch of the CBA was established in October 1956 in Tibet (Welch 1961: 6; Luo 2001: 126–129) which

strengthened the role of the CBA as a crucial instrument of religious policy especially in Tibet. The creation of the institutional framework for the implementation of religious policy included the formation of the Religious Affairs Bureau (Chin. zongjiao shiwu ju ᅫᬭџࡵሔ, hereafter RAB) in 1954.13 This offi ce was under the direct authority of the State Council, but it retained its confi dential status as an organ of the CCP (Welch 1972: 29–30), as the formulation and implementation of religious policy was until the 1990s mainly the task of the CCP apparatus. Successively the branches of the RAB were created at lower administration levels. The Tibet Branch of the RAB was established in October 1956 (Bush 1970: 311). The goal of the RAB has been to control religious

activities, to carry out the religious policy on the local level and to propagandize believers concerning religious policies (Bush 1970: 31). Political, legal and administrative changes in 1950s primarily infl uenced the religious life of Chinese Buddhists and only later were they were fully implemented into Tibet proper. The infringements of state into religious matters—in the offi cial language termed as democratic reforms (Luo 1991: 64)—were in the fi rst phase focused on the economic aspects of the functioning of Chinese Buddhist monasteries. In the course of the land reform, which was launched in 1950, the monasteries’ land 11 The Establishment of the CBA was part of the process of the creation of religious association loyal to the socialist government. In May 1953 the Chinese Islamic Association was founded, in August 1954 representatives of Protestant churches established the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches in China, in April 1957 the Chinese Daoist Association was established and in 1957 several Catholic organizations established the Chinese Catholic

Patriotic Association (Luo 1991: 58, 62–64, 68, 72; Chan – Karlson 2005: 13–14). 12 Two of the honorary presidents were Tibetans—the 14th Dalai Lama Tendzin Gyamtsho (bstan ‘dzin rgya mtsho, 1935 – ) and the 10th Panchen Lama Chökyi Gyaltshen (chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 1938–1989). A tulku (Tib. sprul sku, “incarnation”) from Inner Monogolia Chagan gegen ᶹᑆ㨯ḍ (1887–1957, on him see Delege 1998: 392–394) was also elected honorary president (Welch 1961: 5; Luo 2001: 82). Tibetan delegates accounted for a third of the members of the Executive Council of the CBA. Thus there were far more Tibetans than could be justifi ed by their percentage of the population. 13 A Religious Affairs Department (Chin. zongjiao shiwu chu ᅫᬭџࡵ໘) was established on a lower administrative level already in January 1951. In fact it was subjugated to the CCP Central Committee.

was requisitioned and redistributed to the peasantry while the individual monks were also allocated some plots (Welch 1961: 2; Welch 1972: 42–45). The campaign under the slogan “lay equal stress on farming and meditation” (Chin. nong chan bingzhong 䞡ᑊ⽙ݰ) forced monasteries to establish production units in the fi eld of agriculture, handicrafts and services and the monks and nuns were obliged to work in these units (Luo 1991: 65–66). These measures were adopted with the aim to increase the economic autonomy of Buddhist monasteries and thus shift the fi nancial burden in the form of voluntary donations from the laity and at the same time to reduce the size of monastic communities.14 Some monasteries were converted into factories, warehouses, schools or housing (Birnbaum 2003: 132). Despite the offi cially guaranteed religious freedom the social and economic reforms of the central government dramatically changed the character of Chinese Buddhism, limited religious activities and minimized the scope of Chinese sangha. Due to the specifi c provisions of the 17-Point Agreement, until 1958–1959 these reforms only slightly infl uenced the functioning of Tibetan monasteries. The Chinese leadership strived to respect the guarantees stipulated by this agreement and to

safeguard the status of monks and monasteries, as well as their traditional, pre-1951 economic privileges (Goldstein 1997: 52). Mao was well aware of the fact that the Tibetan aristocracy, high offi cials and Buddhist dignitaries rejected the incorporation of Tibet into China and the Chinese policy in this region (Mao 2001: 110),15 but did not attempt to speed up the economic integration of Tibet, which was refl ected also in the pledge of the Chinese leadership in 1956 not to implement any of the reforms carried out in China (e.g. land reform, collectivization) in Tibet during the next six years (Mao 2001: 154). Tibetans loyal to the Central Government also repeatedly stressed the necessity of implementing the religious policy in Tibet with great patience. In June 1956, during a report delivered at the Third Session of the First National People’s Congress, the president of the CBA, Sherab Gyamtsho, warned against the plans to engage Tibetan monks into agricultural works and demanded to enable the Tibetan laity to fi nancially support the religious activities of monasteries (MacInnis 1972: 222–223).16 His criticism refl ected the experience of the Tibetan sangha in the peripheral regions of Tibet, Amdo and Kham, adjacent to Chinese provinces. According to the interpretation of the Chinese side the guarantees stipulated by the 17-Point Agreement referred only to Central Tibet,17 i.e. the territory that was under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa government before 1951. However, the peripheral regions were inhabited

14 According to H. Welch (1972: 61) in 1952 ca 70% of the monks in the northern part of the Anhui Province were carrying on agricultural work and similar fi gures are reported for the monks dwelling in city, who were engaged in light industry. In southern Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces the number of monks and nuns dropped about 90% in 1950s (Welch 1972: 81). 15 Mao shared these views also during his meeting with the 14th Dalai Lama and the 10th Panchen Lama during their visit in Beijing in February 1955. In 1952 while analyzing the situation in Tibet, Mao mentioned only small groups which were in opposition to the Beijing policy (Mao 2001: 62). 16 In April 1957 during the Fourth Session of the National People’s Congress Sherab Gyamtsho presented his critical views on the impact of collectivization on monastic communities (Luo 2001: 150–152). 17 I.e. today’s Tibetan Autonomous Region which was established in 1965. Amdo (a mdo) is part of the Qinghai and Gansu Provinces; Kham (khams) forms part of the Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces.

by approx. 50% of the Tibetan population and in the understanding of the Lhasa government the guarantees of the 17-Point Agreement included these territories. In the mid-1950s the land reform and collectivization were launched in Kham and Amdo, which speeded up the escalation of the confl ict (Goldstein 1997: 53). These economic reforms had a negative impact on the traditional model of the functioning of Tibetan monasteries and thus were perceived as a threat to the very

existence of Tibetan Buddhism. The government policy provoked an armed rebellion of the local population and the subsequent migration of Tibetans from Kham and Amdo triggered the March 1959 uprising in Lhase which resulted in the escape of the 14th Dalai Lama to India (Tsering Shakya 1999: 139–142; Dawa Norbu 2001: 217–219). In summer 1958 the Central Government launched a campaign for the establishment of people’s communes (Chin. renmin gongshe Ҏ⇥݀⼒) in all Chinese provinces (with the exception of Central Tibet), which again worsened the situation of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Amdo and Kham, as monks were also expected to join working units. This campaign resulted in an armed anti-Chinese uprising and its suppression18 marked the beginning of the fi rst phase of the destruction of

Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, as they were pinpointed by Chinese authorities as the centers of anti-Chinese resistance (Mao 2001: 203). In December 1958 the CCP Central Committee approved a report prepared by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission that was analyzing the religious policy towards Islam and Tibetan Buddhism (Chen 2002: 26). This document launched the “democratic reform of the religious system” (Chin. zongjiao zhidu minzhu gaige ᅫᬭࠊᑺ⇥Џᬍ䴽), which regarding the situation in Tibet as focused on fi ve tasks: a) abolishment of feudal privileges of monasteries such as the judicial authority of high incarnations, the appointment of the chieftains of Tibetan tribes, establishment of armed units; b) abolishment of the feudal system of exploitation, i.e. confi scation of land, forests and other real property of the monasteries, abolishment of tax collection by monasteries; c) prohibition of the intervention of monasteries in the

economy, especially the prohibition to accept fi nancial alms from the laity; d) prohibition to force young novices to join the monastery and to enable monks to renounce monastic vows; e) abolishment of the feudal administration of the monasteries, i.e. to replace the traditional administrative organs with the so-called Monastery Democratic Management Committees (Chin. siyuan minzhu guanli weiyuanhui ᇎ䰶⇥Џㅵ⧚ྨਬӮ, Tib. dgon pa’i do dam u yon lhan khang) which should include members loyal to Chinese government and approved by the local RAB (Gong 2003: 175–176). These changes represented an infringement on the traditional self-rule of Tibetan monastic institutions. The socialist state renounced the relatively tolerant policy adopted in the early period and after the armed rebellion decided to enforce its authority also in those fi elds (e.g. economy, judiciary, political power on the local level), which in pre-1958 Amdo and Kham remained under the traditional authority of Buddhist incarnations and clan chieftains. Due to the suppression of the armed rebellion in Lhasa in March 1959 these “democratic reforms” were carried out also in Central Tibet as the Beijing government

18 Offi cial Chinese documents label the suppression of rebellion an “anti-feudal movement” (Chin. fan fengjan yundong ডᇕᓎ䖤ࡼ).

renounced the provisions stipulated by the 17-Point Agreement (Mao 2001: 203–204) as well as the pledge declared in 1956 not to implement any of the reforms carried out in China in Tibet during the next six years. Already in the end of March 1959 the CCP Central Committee worked out the “Directive on the political measures regarding the implementation of democratic reforms in Tibet after the suppression of the rebellion” (Jiang 1996: 104–105; Li 2003: 62–63). This document outlined two major goals of the democratic reforms: on one hand it focused on economic reforms in rural and nomad areas (land reform, collectivization, establishment of people’s communes) and on the other it dealt with the political strategy towards monasteries which repeated the measures outlined in the above mentioned document from December 1958 adopted in Amdo and Kham. This directive laid stress on the principle of the separation of politics and religion and it

emphasized the necessity to distinguish between those monasteries which played an active role in the anti-Chinese rebellion and those which did not participate. The campaign for the implementation of these “democratic reforms” was carried out until 196019 and it represents a turning point in the modern history of Tibet: the traditional political system was abolished and Chinese administrative bodies substituted for it, the traditional economic model was replaced by the central planned economy and the role of Tibetan Buddhist institutions and dignitaries was marginalized. Up until now Chinese authors state that the implementation of the “democratic reforms” was in general correct, although they acknowledge certain “leftist mistakes” which occurred during this period, e.g. the fact that the authorities did not distinguish between loyal monasteries and those which were in opposition to the socialist state, and the dramatic decline of the number of monks (Jiang 1996: 105; Li 2003: 64; Ciwang 2001: 168). However a completely different picture of this process is preserved by Tibetan testimonies. The secret report of the 10th Panchen Lama Chökyi Gyaltshen20 handed to central and CCP authorities in May 1962 offers a comprehensive picture of the impact of democratic reforms on the Tibetan population in Central Tibet, Amdo and Kham. The document critically evaluated the economic and social impacts of the reforms and it also

focused on the status of religious bodies. The 10th Panchen Lama criticized the large-scale destruction of monasteries, the forced expulsion of monks and nuns, the personal composition of Monastery Democratic Management Committees, the interruption of the traditional monastic education (Anon. 1997: 51, 53–55). According to the 10th Panchen Lama in Central Tibet after the “democratic reforms” out of the 2,500 monasteries only 70 were kept in existence, the number of monks 19 Mao’s comment from May 1959, in which he praised the fact that 90% of the lamas already engaged in productive labor illustrates the swift implementation of these reforms. (Mao 2001: 204). 20 After the escape of the 14th Dalai Lama to India, the 10th Panchen Lama became the highest Tibetan Buddhist dignitary. For some years he was very loyal to the Central Government (for instance in December 1959 during the session of the National People’s Congress he supported the “democratic reform” in Tibet—see Luo 2001: 202–204) which instrumentalized him in order to further its political goals. After his critical petition he was under house arrest from 1965 till 1977. He was released from detention in October 1977 and installed in the position of a member of the Standing Committee of the Fifth Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March 1978. Till his untimely death in January 1989 he exerted his political infl uence to promote the economic, religious, and cultural revival in Tibet.

was reduced by 90% with only 7 000 monks living in monasteries, and “in reality, the monasteries had already lost their function and signifi cance as religious organisations” (Anon. 1997: 52). According to the Panchen Lama the situation in Amdo and Kham was even worse as the number of monasteries has been reduced by 98–99% and due to administrative infringements focused on elderly educated lamas even the remaining monasteries do not fulfi l the criteria for a Tibetan Buddhist monastery (Anon. 1997: 104–105). The aim of the antireligious campaign was to destroy the institutional web of Tibetan Buddhism and to reduce religion to a domestic ritual which was still tolerated (Tsering Shakya 1999: 288). The Central Government decided to alter the ultra-leftist nationalities and religious policy which was implemented in the years 1958–1959 during the Great Leap Forward. In February 1960 during the 6th national conference on religious work

discussions on “leftist mistakes” started (Gong 2003: 179) which were followed by two meetings of provincial and local cadres in charge of nationalities and religious policy (Coll. 1999: 1735). In April 1962 during a session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai ਼ᘽᴹ (1898–1976) gave a speech in which he acknowledged certain failures in religious policy in late 1950s and stressed the importance of respecting the views of religious representatives. The change in political atmosphere also infl uenced the policy of the Central Government in Tibet. In April 1961 the State Council approved the “Directive on the Guiding Principle in the Tibet Work” (Coll. 1995: 136–137; Li 2003: 65) which was also a reaction to the meeting of the 10th Panchen Lama with Mao Zedong and other high Party and State leaders in Beijing in January 1961 (Tsering Shakya 1999: 265),21 when Panchen Lama confronted the Chinese leaders with his critical statements, which were later included in the above mentioned petition from May 1962. This directive revised basic goals of the “democratic reforms” and it laid stress mainly on economic issues (temporary halt of land reform, collectivization and the establishment of people’s communes). Religion is mentioned only briefl y: the document argued for a more patient and careful approach to Tibetan Buddhism and it demanded the retention of some

monasteries (Coll. 1995: 137; Tsering Shakya 1999: 265). The criticism of the Panchen Lama and Sherab Gyamtsho,22 another infl uential Tibetan positioned within the Chinese apparatus, contributed to the relaxation of religious policy in Tibetan areas and to the improvement of the status of Tibetan monasteries. This process, for which Tibetans use the term “the door of religion was opened” (Tib. chos sgo phye), resulted in the partial reconstruction of monasteries. For instance, in the Labrang Monastery in the Gansu Province ca 1 200 monks (i.e. about a third of the original, pre-1950 number) returned to monastic life 21 During this meeting Mao acknowledged some “leftist mistakes” which had occurred in recent years. At the same time he mentioned the decline of the monastic community and their participation in physical labor with great satisfaction (Mao 2001: 213–214). 22 In April 1962 during a national conference on minorities work Sherab Gyamtsho delivered a very critical speech, where he attacked the CCP’s policy on religion and nationalities and he likened the mistakes of some CCP cadres to the corrupted Guomindang policy during the Republic of China (Tsering Shakya 1999: 270).

after 1961 (Slobodník 2004a: 120).23 This limited improvement of the status of Tibetan Buddhism is also mentioned in the secret report of the 10th Panchen Lama according to which after 1961 a number of monasteries were rebuilt, the traditional monastic educational system was revived and the interference of authorities was reduced. At the same time the Panchen Lama stated that these partial corrections were insuffi cient (Anon. 1997: 86–87). The short period of the relaxation and liberalization of religious policy in China unfolded during the lasting leadership confl ict between the radical leftist group of Mao and the more pragmatic CCP leaders represented by Liu Shaoqi a Deng Xiaoping 䙧ᇣᑇ (1904–1997). Mao’s idea of the permanent class struggle started to prevail after his speech at the plenary meeting of the CCP Central Committee in August 1962, when he called for an intensifi cation of the class struggle and in the next year he initiated the

campaign against “religious superstitions” (Welch 1972: 356–357). The criticism of the Maoist group soon turned to the 10th Panchen Lama and to Sherab Gyamtsho who were later dismissed from their positions (Anon. 1997: 139–140). The lose of their political infl uence and the resumption of Maoist policy resulted already in 1964 in another administrative infringement into religious life and in a dramatic decline in the number of monks, as many monasteries were forced to close (Tsering Shakya 1999: 301). The status of Tibetan Buddhism – and other religions—in the PRC till the mid-1960s was quite vulnerable as the legal framework regulating the functioning of religious communities within the socialist state was limited to the brief provisions of the Constitution.24 Moreover the

undemocratic character of the Communist regime made it basically impossible to exercise the legal guarantees stipulated by the Constitution and religious freedom was not safeguarded on the basis of the legal documents but the implementation of religious freedom refl ected the general political atmosphere. The shift of the government’s policy to more radical and leftist measures during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) resulted not only in an antireligious campaign but it also brought with itself a more suppressive policy towards national minorities that favored assimilation of non-Han ethnic groups. The subsequent prevalence of a more pragmatic policy, primarily aimed at correcting the failures in economic policy that resulted in a famine during the years 1960–1961, also infl uenced the more tolerant approach of the state to religious groups and partial revival of religious life. In 1949–1965 Tibetan sangha underwent a complicated development. In the fi rst period until 1958 the state to a large degree maintained the status guaranteed by the Constitution and the 17-Point Agreement with the aim of avoiding a confl ict with traditional political (Buddhist dignitaries and aristocracy) elites in Central Tibet. The

23 For instance in the Gannan ⫬फ (Tib. kan lho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture where the Labrang monastery is also situated, there were about 15,000 monks in late 1940s. After the process of “democratic reforms” this number dropped to several hundred and in 1961 the number rose to ca 5,000 (Coll. 1999: 1734–1736). 24 In 1950s religious fi gures (e.g. Wu Yaozong ਈ㗔ᅫ, an infl uential representative of Chinese Protestants) appealed to the Central Government to work out more comprehensive and detailed legal norms and regulations which would more precisely lay out the status of religious communities and thus defi ne their duties and rights (Luo 2001: 136–137).

“democratic reform of the religious system” carried out in 1958–1959 marked the launch of a more suppressive religious policy and this was the fi rst large scale state interference into the inner life of Tibetan monastic communities. During the subsequent relaxation in 1960–1962 the monasteries were partially rebuilt and operated again. The state authorities adopted in Tibet the same religious policy as in the Chinese inland, however these measures were implemented in Tibet with a delay of seven to eight years.25 A number of the crucial issues of the religious policy in Tibet, which occurred during the 1950s (establishment of the Monastery Democratic Management Committees, limits imposed on the size of monastic communities, economic issues of the functioning of monasteries) has until now played an important role in the discussions on religious policy towards Tibetan Buddhism (see Slobodník 2004b; Slobodník 2008). This may serve as proof of the continuity of the religious policy in China in the postMao period when despite the economic reforms and a certain political liberalization, the central

government in Tibet has carried out a more rigid and conservative policy and has not developed any new measures in order to deal with religion in Tibet. The reduction of Tibetan Buddhism solely to “spiritual” matters, which results from the secular concept of the separation of politics and religion and forms the core of Chinese religious policy, is in contradiction with the traditional understanding of religion in Tibet, where the traditional role of monastic institutions and Buddhist dignitaries encompassed not only religious authority but political and economic power as well. These two different models of the relationship between political power and religious authority resulted from a divergent historical experience in China and in Tibet as well as from the Marxist ideology of the Communist regime. Therefore from the longterm perspective the confl ict was inevitable as there was no space for an acceptable compromise. The changes in the economic functioning of monasteries in the late 1950s that endangered the very existence of the Tibetan monasteries triggered the escalation of the tensions with the state which fi nally resulted in the implementation of a set of political, economic and social reforms which dramatically changed the situation in Central Tibet and had a negative impact on the sangha. The ensuing complete destruction of religious life in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution did not represent a negative exception to the religious policy, as the offi cial Chinese documents claim (e.g. Anon. 1992: 66), but a logical consequence of the antireligious campaign launched in the late 1950s in its most radical form.

25 In the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region the number of monks in Buddhist monasteries dropped by 80%—from 80 000 to 17 000—already in the early 1950s (Chen 2002: 29; Delege 1998: 738–742) which illustrates the specifi c status of Tibet.

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