Madhyamika in Tibet

However effective Chandrakirti may have been in vindicating the method of Buddhapalita and refuting Bhavaviveka, it is clear that he did not succeed in convincing all his contemporaries. There is no doubt that the Svatantrika method remained popular. Shantarakshita himself, who in his synthesis of the

Madhyamika and Yogachara schools represents the last great stage in the development of Buddhist philosophy in India, made use of independent syllogisms as Bhavaviveka had done several centuries before. He is therefore classified as a Svatantrika, although, as we shall see, this question is more complex than it appears. It was, in any case, Shantarakshita and his disciple Kamalashila who, at the invitation of King Trisong Detsen, carried the Buddhist sutra teachings to Tibet, with the result that the Madhyamika doctrine first established there was Yogachara-Svatantrika, in which form it was to flourish for approximately four hundred years. Only in the twelfth century, when Patsap Nyima Drak translated the works of Chandrakirti, did the Prasangika really take hold in Tibet.

According to The Blue Annals, Patsap was born in Penyul but left Tibet while still a child. He grew up in Kashmir and India, where he studied at the feet of numerous famous and important scholars. He returned to Tibet around 1160 and embarked on a career of translation and teaching. He expounded in particular the six logical treatises (rigs tshogs) of Nagarjuna and, in collaboration with the Indian pandita Kanakavarman, translated Chandrakirti5s Prasannapada and the Madhyamakavatara, together with its autocommentary, as well as the commentary on the Yuktishastika by the same author. From slender beginnings he became an influential teacher, and his return home marked a turning point in the study of Madhyamika in Tibet.

The introduction of Prasangika ideas was the focus of intense interest. Convinced that they were in possession of a more accurate and profound understanding of Nagarjuna5s doctrine, the early Tibetan Prasangikas attacked the Svatantrika establishment with the enthusiasm of missionaries. They

encountered a sturdy resistance. The period of persecution inflicted by King Langdarma (836-841) had been followed by an intense religious and scholastic renewal. And in the intervening period, before the return of Patsap, the Madhyamika had been closely studied, mainly according to the tradition laid down by Shantarakshita and Kamalashila, but also following the works of Bhavaviveka, which had also been translated in the early period. A number of great scholars had been involved in this enterprise, and by the twelfth century the Svatantrika view was well able to resist, at least for the time being, the wave of novelty. The master Chapa Chokyi Senge, for example, whose interpretation of Dignaga and Dharmakirti was to form the basis of the logic tradition still upheld by the Gelugpa school, was a formidable debater and defended with brilliance the Svatantrika view against Prasangika innovation. He composed several expositions of the Madhyamika system and numerous refutations of Chandrakirti. It is recorded that, on one occasion, he encountered in debate, and defeated, the celebrated Indian Prasangika master Jayananda.-

Be that as it may, the Prasangika view gained ground in Tibet and eventually triumphed. Even before the translation of Chandrakirti by Patsap, the Prasangika view was advocated by Atisha, whose role in the development of Tibetan Buddhism can scarcely be exaggerated; and it became intimately associated with the mind-training teaching of the Kadampas, which exerted a pervasive influence throughout the tradition. In their different ways, all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism have adopted the Prasangika approach一the teaching of Nagarjuna, as interpreted by Chandrakirti一as the highest view on the sutra level. Svatantrika was driven into the shade, and nowadays, especially in the New Translation schools, it is relegated to the d oxographic al literature, in the context of which it is studied largely as a lower view to be examined and surmounted by students on their way to mastery of the Prasangika system. It is comparatively rare for the original writings of Svatantrika authors一even of Shantarakshita一to be studied at first hand. Mipham Rinpoche and the Prasangika-Svatantrika Distinction

It is therefore of some interest, before finishing with this topic, to advert to the attitude of Mipham Rinpoche toward the Svatantrika teaching, specifically in the form advocated by Shantarakshita. Naturally, this finds its full expression in the great commentary on the Madhyamakalankara, which is one of Mipham's great masterpieces, but it is appropriate to mention it briefly here, since not only does the view of Shantarakshita represent the final development of Madhyamika in India, but it also profoundly qualifies the Nyingma understanding of the relationship between Prasangika and Svatantrika, and of Madhyamika in general.

In the context of modern Madhyamika scholarship, dominated as it is by the Gelugpa and Sakyapa schools, the position of Mipham Rinpoche is liable to appear unusual, certainly unfamiliar. It is not, however, a personal eccentricity. One of the main reasons for Mipham's scholarly work was to revive and reexpress the teachings characteristic of the Nyingma school; his understanding of Madhyamika is rooted in the tradition of the Old Translations. Without going into

excessive detail, it is possible to summarize the Nyingma attitude (as expressed by Mipham Rinpoche) toward Madhyamika by saying that it accommodates the Prasangika approach current in Tibet after the translation of ChandrakirtPs works, without betraying its original allegiance to the teaching of Shantarakshita. And in this connection, one may advert to the paradox, with regard to the works of these two masters, occasioned by the fact that

chronologically the order of translation in Tibet was the reverse of the order of composition in India. After Patsap, Chandrakirti seemed "new" in Tibet and Shantarakshita seemed "old," whereas it was the teaching of the latter that represented the final development of Madhyamika in India at a time when Buddhism was still at its zenith.

So far in this introduction, in distinguishing the teachings of Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and Chandrakirti and their followers, we have followed the common convention of speaking about Svatantrikas and Prasangikas. These terms are the Sanskrit renditions, contrived by Western scholars, of two Tibetan terms (rang rgyud pa and thal fgyur pa respectively). It is important to realize that the Svatantrika-Prasangika distinction, as such, is the invention of

Tibetan scholarship, created as a convenient method for cataloging the different viewpoints evident in Madhyamika authors subsequent to Chandrakirti5s critique of Bhavaviveka. There is no evidence that these two terms were ever used by the ancient Indian Madhyamikas to refer either to themselves or to

their opponents. Moreover, although the Svatantrika and Prasangika viewpoints differ on a number of interconnected issues, the actual terminology refers, as we have seen, to the characteristic method of debate adopted when the question of the ultimate status of phenomena is at issue. This divergence was emphasized by Chandrakirti in the first chapter of the Prasannapada, from which it follows that the terminological distinction "Svatantrika-Prasangika" became current in Tibet only from the twelfth century onward. Convenient as it may be, it is not without its difficulties.

If the Madhyamikas are differentiated solely according to whether they use independent syllogisms or confine themselves to consequences, a twofold division results, with Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti on one side and Bhavaviveka and Shantarakshita on the other. The identification of the view of Chandrakirti and Buddhapalita is natural, but the placing of Bhavaviveka and Shantarakshita in one undifferentiated category is problematic. Historically, Bhavaviveka and

Shantarakshita are separated by a period of about two hundred years, while Chandrakirti appeared approximately midway between them. Given that these three masters were scholars of the first magnitude, and given Shantarakshita's knowledge of the entire philosophical and religious field, as evidenced in the Tattvasamgraha, it is difficult to explain how, if Shantarakshita is merely continuing the Svatantrika stance of Bhavaviveka, he should have been so oblivious of Chandrakirti5s critique一a development in the history of Madhyamika of which he could not conceivably have been ignorant. However convenient, the Svatantrika-Prasangika distinction, made exclusively in terms of debate procedure, is not wholly adequate as an account of the evolution of Madhyamika or as a general description.

There is, however, another set of criteria for distinguishing between the approaches of these three Madhyamika masters, namely, their way of speaking about the conventional truth. We have seen that one of the reasons Chandrakirti objected to Bhavaviveka5s innovation was that, according to the rules of logic,

independent syllogisms commit their user to an implicit and compromising acquiescence in the existence of the elements referred to. Bhavaviveka was apparently aware of this, and we have seen that, in the interests of consistency, his use of the independent syllogism went hand in hand with a view that, on the conventional level, phenomena do indeed enjoy a certain existence "according to

their characteristics.^^ By contrast, Chandrakirti5s quite different attitude toward the role of pramana in establishing emptiness reflects his rejection of any kind of existence at any level. In the doxologies written in Tibet during the earlier period 一that is, before the discovery of the teaching of Chandrakirti一the two kinds of Madhyamika known to Tibetans at that time were defined not according to debate procedure but on the basis of the attitude evinced toward the conventional truth, namely, the Sautrantika-Madhyamika and the Yogachara-Madhyamika.- This method of classification could theoretically be enlarged to accommodate the position of Chandrakirti, namely, that of the Madhyamika that accepts the common consensus as the conventional truth/

The conventional truth corresponds to the world of everyday experience. It is the dimension, the field of perception, so to speak, in which ordinary beings live and interact. Viewed in the light of their soteriological aims, the attitude of Madhyamikas toward the conventional is largely a matter of

communication. In trying to introduce beings to the Middle Way (the wisdom of the Buddha as expressed by Nagarjuna, by which alone samsara is destroyed and liberation gained), different approaches are both possible and necessary. This is what we would expect of any Buddhist system. Beings differ in their capacities and requirements; the form in which the teachings are expressed varies accordingly.

The characteristic approach of Chandrakirti and Buddhapalita is clear. When debating the final status of phenomena, they are content merely to deconstruct the false opinion; they refrain from verbalizing a position of their own. In the same way, they abstain from elaborating a theory of the conventional.

Ultimately, phenomena are empty by their nature; conventionally, they appear by the force of dependent arising. The appearances of the common consensus are accepted, without analysis, as the conventional truth. No theory is advocated as to the nature of phenomena, and no sort of existence is attributed to them on a provisional basis. This approach seems simple and straightforward. In practice, it is less so.

A realist may hold to the view, let us say, that phenomena truly exist in the way that they appear. But in undermining this notion, the Prasangika does not intend to show that phenomena do not exist. On the contrary, the true status of phenomena lies wholly beyond both existence and nonexistence. It is subtle,

inexpressible in thought and word. The Prasangika method, whereby the consequence is adduced without further comment, offers few concessions to the slow-witted and is obviously not without an element of risk. Admittedly, the destruction of one position, by reduction to absurdity, is not taken in isolation; it is accompanied by the negation of the other alternatives of the tetralemma. Nevertheless, the Prasangika does no more than expose the inadequacy of the

opponent's position. The effectiveness of the consequential method depends as much on the acuity and honesty of the opponent as it does on the accuracy and cogency of the argument. Whether or not the opponent "gets it" and realizes the point that the Madhyamika is making, and whether or not he or she is then able to apply it to good purpose, depends not only on intelligence but also on merit, the positive orientation and receptiveness of the mind, which is the result of training in virtue on the path. It is merit that empowers the mind and renders it apt not

only to understand in an intellectual sense, but also to progress into the direct experience of wisdom itself. It is therefore said that the Prasangika approach, which, by a process of austere annulment of all intellectual positions, constitutes a direct introduction to the ultimate truth in itself, is appropriate for persons of the highest spiritual faculties, a qualification, incidentally, that is not to be confused with mere intellectual acumen.

By contrast, the Svatantrikas make use of independent syllogisms and thus adopt a "position" with which to interpret conventional experience (Sautrantika in the case of Bhavaviveka, Yogachara in the case of Shantarakshita). Their approach is gradual; it makes allowances for the needs of beings who must be

led along the path. In such a context, the two truths must be distinguished, unpacked, and presented in terms of words and concepts. In the nature of things, this distinction, whereby the conventional is contrasted with the ultimate is一can only be一 confined to the level of conventional truth. From the ultimate point of view, no distinctions of any kind can be made; it is only on the conventional level that the analytical investigation of phenomena takes

place. Furthermore, two kinds of analysis are differentiated, depending on their object. On the one hand, there is ultimate or absolutist reasoning, which investigates and establishes the ultimate status or emptiness of phenomena. On the other hand, there is conventional reasoning, which determines whether a given object is "real" or "illusory" according to the general scheme of things accepted in the common consensus.

It is on the conventional level also that a further important distinction is made, this time with regard to the ultimate truth. In itself, the ultimate is utterly ineffable. It is beyond the ordinary mind and cannot become the object of a cognition in which there is a separation between subject and object.

This is the "ultimate in itself.,，s It is experienced by nondual wisdom and can never be expressed in thought and word, themselves the preserve of the conventional. The ordinary mind can, however, point to the ultimate indirectly, describing it, for example, as the counterpart of the conventional. This is the approximate ultimate.-It is the concordant image of, or gateway to, the ultimate truth in itself.

As methods of introduction to emptiness, the ultimate condition of phenomena and of the mind, the Prasangika and Svatantrika approaches are adapted to two kinds of beings: those who are able to enter into the ultimate truth in itself directly, without the intermediary step of the approximate ultimate truth (cig char pa), and those who must progress toward it gradually (rim bsl<yed pa). It may be thought that Prasangika is superior to Svatantrika, but if there

is a hierarchy of levels, this refers only to the respective capacities of the disciples concerned, where the difference is one of merit. It is not a reflection on the quality of the approaches themselves, which, Mipham Rinpoche argues, are both indispensable and equally valuable. Neither are they interchangeable. The direct approach is useless for someone who must progress gradually; the gradualist approach is unnecessary for one who is able to perceive directly.

Furthermore, the adoption of these different methods reflects the compassionate activity of the masters concerned, not their own personal realization. With regard to the ultimate truth, all Madhyamikas, of whatever complexion, are in full

agreement. Mipham Rinpoche observes that the ultimate in itself, beyond the domain of words or concepts, is what the Aryas see by stainless wisdom in their meditative equipoise; on this level, neither Prasangikas nor Svatantrikas make assertions of any kind, and there is no differentiating them. The distinction comes only with regard to the conventional, for it is here alone that the Svatantrikas make their statements about the ultimate (the

approximate ultimate). UA person who, by dint of practice, thus attains the experience of the ultimate truth in itself may be called either Prasangika or Svatantrika depending on the way he or she makes assertions with regard to the postmeditation period. But one should know that in the ultimate realization there is no difference between them. They both enjoy the wisdom of the Aryas.5- It is thus meaningless to place the Madhyamika masters themselves in a hierarchy according to the manner in which they instruct beings. In their own right, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, Chandrakirti, Shantarakshita and so on are all equal一they are all, we might say, Prasangikas, possessed of the highest view.

For Mipham, therefore, Prasangika and Svatantrika are two approaches to be understood in harmony; they are not diverging views. This point is brought out very clearly in the introduction to his commentary on the Madhyamakalankara, which has been described as one of the most profound texts on Madhyamika ever written. Having referred to the eighty-ninth stanza in the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakavatara, where Chandrakirti says that the source of phenomenal experience is the mind itself, Mipham Rinpoche comments:

To say [on the contrary] that the phenomenal world does not arise from one's mind necessarily implies the belief that it is caused by something else. And since this involves the assertion that beings are bound in samsara or delivered from it through causes other than their own minds, it will doubtless cause one to fall into non-Buddhist tenet systems. It is therefore established step by step that if there is no external creator and no external world, extramental objects are but the mind's projection. This assertion that conventionalities are "only the mind" exists in all the Mahayana schools.

Why is it then that glorious Chandrakirti and others do not posit the conventional level in this way? As was explained above, when he establishes the ultimate in itself, which accords with the field of wisdom of Aryas while they are in meditative equipoise, it is sufficient for him to have, as the object of assessment, the phenomena of samsara and nirvana as they appear and are referred to on the empirical level, without examining them. Since, from the very

beginning, these phenomena are beyond the four conceptual extremes, it is not necessary for him to enter into a close philosophical investigation of the way phenomena appear on the conventional level. When one assesses appearances with words and concepts, one may, for instance, say that phenomena exist or do not exist, that phenomena are or are not the mind. But however one may assert them, they do not exist in that way on the ultimate level. Therefore, with the consequences of the Prasanga reasoning, which investigates the ultimate, Chandrakirti is merely refuting the incorrect ideas of the opponents. And given that his own stance is free from every conceptual

reference, how could he assert a theory? He does not. In this way, he can refute, without needing to separate the two truths, whatever assertions are made as to existence and nonexistence. In the present Svatantrika context, since assessments are made with the reasoning specific to each of the two truths, one cannot refute or establish anything without separating these same two truths. But in Chandrakirti5s tradition, assessment is made using the valid reasoning, which investigates the ultimate nature of the two truths一the ultimate in itself. As Chandrakirti quotes from a scripture in his autocommentary to the Madhyamakavatara: "On the ultimate level, 0 monks, there are no two truths. This ultimate truth is one."

Therefore from the beginning, the honorable Chandrakirti emphasizes and establishes the ultimate in itself. He does not do away with mere appearances, for these are the ground for his absolutist type of investigation, the means or gateway to the ultimate. He therefore takes them as a basis of debate and establishes them as being beyond all conceptual extremes. Then, in the postmeditation period, he establishes or refutes all the propositions concerning the

path and result in accordance with the way they are assessed by the two kinds of reasoning. And thus even the Prasangikas do not invalidate the conventional level. They assert conventional phenomena as mere appearances (rl<yen nyid (di pa) or simply as dependent arisings. If, with regard to these

mere appearances, an investigation is made using conventional reasoning, the Prasangikas do not deny the manner in which samsara and nirvana are produced through the forward and backward progression of the twelve interdependent links of existence. They show that phenomena arise dependently through the power of the pure or impure mind. And in this way they clearly express the tenet of mind-only.

In the present text (Madhyamakalankara) by the great abbot Shantarakshita, emphasis is placed on the approximate ultimate. The two truths are, to begin with, distinguished; each of them is assessed with the appropriate kind of valid cognition and each is established as having assertions proper to it. Finally, the ultimate truth in itself, which is completely free from all assertion, is reached. These two approaches (Svatantrika and Prasangika) belong

respectively to those who follow the gradual path and those whose realization is not gradual but immediate. And since the essence of Shantarakshita5s approach is the ultimate-in-itself, he does indeed possess the ultimate and essential view of the Prasangikas. And what he says in the text itself is in perfect agreement with the view of the glorious Chandrakirti.