The Heart Sūtra in Chinese Yogācāra
The Heart Sūtra in Chinese Yogācāra :
Some Comparative Comments on the Heart Sūtra Commentaries of Wŏnch'ŭk and K'uei-chi*
The causal mind is like a master artist who paints with dharmas.
K'uei-chi, Comprehensive Commentary on the Heart Sutra, p. 26 以心分別諸法皆邪。不以心分別諸法皆正
With mind discriminating, all dharmas are erroneous. With mind not discriminating, dharmas are all correct.
(paraphrasing Viśeṣacinta-Brahma-paripṛcchā )
The Heart Sutra, one of the shortest yet most revered works in the
Mahāyāna canon, is often held to be the quintessential encapsulation of the massive Prajñāpāramitā corpus. It has been recited and studied for over a thousand years, and to this day its recitation by monastics and laity alike can
Dan Lusthaus is a Professor of Religious Studies at University of Missouri.
- An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second Yog2c2ra Symposium, University of calgary, September 5-8. 2002.
International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture September 2003, Vol. 3, pp. 59~103. ⓒ 2003 International Association for Buddhist Thought & Culture
be heard daily in China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Tibet and other areas of Mahāyāna practice, regardless of sectarian affiliations. Since it has been appropriated and incorporated into the rituals of such a diverse range of Buddhist schools, its special affinities with Chinese Yogācāra and particularly Until very recthat towering figure at the heart of Wei-shih (唯識) thought, Hsüan-tsang (玄奘, (600-664)), have been easily overlooked.
Until very recently even less attention had been devoted by scholars, especially in the West, to the two earliest commentaries on the Heart Sutra. These were written by Hsüan-tsang's two rival disciples, K'uei-chi(窺基,(632-682)) and Wŏnch'ŭk(圓測,(613-696)): K'uei-chi's(般若波羅蜜多心經幽贊), Pan-jo po-lo-mi-to hsin ching yu-tsan (T.33.1710); and Wŏnch'ŭk's (佛說般若波羅蜜多心經贊), Fo shuo pan-jo po-lo-mi-to hsin ching tsan (T.33.1711). Both commentaries provide not only full and complex detailed readings of every phrase and term contained in the Heart Sutra. Additionally, both display great erudition, deploying a vast range of Yogācāra (and other) texts to raise and discuss, often in minute detail, aspects of theory, practice, and competing interpretations. For instance, for every passage in the Heart Sutra, K'uei-chi first offers a detailed Madhyamakan interpretation, followed by a Yogācāra rejoinder (sometimes he takes the debate into extra rounds). Thus the Heart Sūtrais read by him, in part, as an extensive, wide-ranging debate between
Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Wŏnch'ŭk also discusses the difference between Yogācāra and Mādhyamika (in very different terms from K'uei-chi), but treats the Heart Sūtragenerally as an occasion to present and evaluate inter-Yogācārin debates on various aspects of Yogācāra theory and practice (e.g., on meditation, definitions of Nirvana, trikāya theory, etc.), and their affinities or discrepancies with Mahāyāna thought in general.
Both commentaries, therefore, are deserving of our attention, not only for what they tell us about the Heart Sutra, but for the light they shed on East Asian Yogācāra of the seventh century. Since K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk competed to become Hsüan-tsang's successor (K'uei-chi triumphed), comparing their commentaries also affords us some clues about the differences between their respective approaches. Much of their rivalry, according to the surviving sources that discuss it, eventually focused on competing interpretations of the Ch'eng wei-shih lun (成唯識論). However, while K'uei-chi's commentaries on the Ch'eng wei-shih lun have largely survived, Wŏnch'ŭk's are no longer extant, preventing us from examining the differences between them through that venue . Since both commentaries on the Heart Sūtra have survived, a comparison of these two works may provide some insight into the major and minor differences in their approach to Yogācāra and Mahayanic Buddhist thinking. Since both K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk studied with and assisted Hsüan-tsang in his translation activities, and both became abbots in monasteries associated with him, their commentaries may also provide a window into Hsüan-tsang's own teachings and instructions,
especially about this text, but on other matters as well. Hsüan-tsang's prolific literary output consists mainly of translations; only two of the seventy-seven texts he composed were original works . We have little clear evidence about what additional instructions he might have offered on the materials he translated to those who assisted him with the translations or who studied with him subsequently, nor what additional insights he might have presented to his students and disciples about Buddhism and Buddhist texts in general, or even what forms of instruction (formal, informal) he actually provided. Wŏnch'ŭk, on four occasions
in his commentary, attributes specific teachings to Hsüan-tsang, teachings not found explicitly in Hsüan-tsang's works6 ; hence, these likely represent oral instructions Wŏnch'ŭk (and perhaps others) received directly from Hsüan-tsang. In brief, along with detailed exegesis on the Heart Sūtra itself, wrapped in intricate discussion of Buddhist debates of the day, as well expansive treatments of the most significant themes of Yogācāra thought, these commentaries offer
us a glimpse into the thinking and transmission of Hsüan-tsang as reflected in the writings of two of his most important students. After a brief discussion of the importance of the Heart Sūtrafor Hsüan-tsang, we will give an overview characterization of the commentaries, and then examine specific passages to illustrate what typifies each of their approaches.
I. Hsüan-tsang and the Heart Sutra
Hsüan-tsang's biography7 explains how he first encountered the Heart
Eight Consciousnesses" (八識規矩) Pa-shih kuei-chu sun (cf. T.45.1865). The former is his well known travelog of Central and South Asia; the latter is a summary of Yogācāra topics similar to, but arranged differently than the Ch'eng wei-shih lu. For a complete annotated list of all of Hsüan-tsang's works, see Lusthaus (2002), appendix four. In addition, we should mention the Ch'eng wei-shih lu which is a unique text, not exactly translation and not exactly an original work, but rather a hybrid, incorporating translations of a number of texts rearranged into a novel order, and very likely supplemented with discussion and glosses by Hsüan-tsang.
6 These will discussed below.
7 Da Tang da ci'ensi sanzang fashi zhuan (大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳) (T.50.2053) by Hui Li and Yan-ts'ung, composed during Hsüan-tsang's life by Hui Li and completed a few years after his death by Yan-ts'ung. The only complete English translation Is A Biography of the Tripi%aka Master of the Great Ci'en Sūtra and the importance it quickly gained for him during his travel to India.
Beyond this place was the Moheyan Desert, which stretched more than eight hundred li.... Now the Master had only his lonely shadow travelling with him, and all he could do was repeat the name of Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva and recite the Praj@2p2ramit2h#daya S^tra. Formerly, when the Master was in the region of Shu, he once saw a sick man suffering from a foul skin ulcer and dressed in rags. With a feeling of pity, he took the man to his monastery and gave him money to
purchase clothes and food. Being ashamed of himself, the sick man taught the Master this sutra, which he often recited. In the desert he met various evil spirits with strange appearances that surrounded him and refused to be dispelled completely, although he repeated the name of Avalokiteśvara Bodhisattva. But as soon as he uttered this sutra, all of them disappeared immediately. It was by depending upon this sutra that he was saved from many a peril. [[[Wikipedia:emphasis|emphasis]] added]
Whether we choose to read this account biographically or hagiographically, it indicates that from early on it was the mantric aspect of this sutra that struck Hsüan-tsang as particularly efficacious; in fact, for him it was the most efficacious dh2ra!6 he knew for warding off pain, suffering, and adversities of all kinds.
Eventually Hsüan-tsang's Chinese rendition of this sutra was inscribed on the wall of the Ta Hsing-shan Monastery(大興善寺) in Louyang, his home town, and a rendition of this text accompanied by a Sanskrit transcription was discovered at Dunhuang (S 700).9 That version contains a preface―attributed to Amoghavajra―that adds many details to the story cited above, including instances during his travels when reciting the text helped him face dangers
Monastery of the Great Tang Dynasty, tr. by Li Rongxi, Berkeley: Numata, 1995.
8 Ibid., T.50.2053.224b; translation, Biograph pp. 26-27.
9 These parallel texts are discussed and translated by Leon Hurvitz, "Hsüan-tsang 玄奘 (602-664) and the Heart Scripture" in Lewis Lancaster, ed., Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in honor of Edward Conze, Berkeley: Univ. of Berkeley, 1977, 103-121.
and difficulties, such as near starvation or being lost in the desert and Central Asian wildernesses. He would recite it, according to this preface, forty-nine times, and a nirm2!a person (a magical apparition) would appear and help him. When he finally arrives at Nālandā, he again meets the ill person who taught him the Heart Sūtra—now young and healthy—who turns out to not only be the nirm2!a person who had appeared to him in moments of dire distress, but also none other
than Avalokiteśvara himself. Avalokiteśvara then explains why he taught this sutra to Hsüan-tsang. As a motif, this story implies that it was Avalokiteśvara himself who provided Hsüan-tsang with a motive and the indispensible means for making the treacherous journey to India, even before Hsüan-tsang himself had thought of making such a trip. The Heart Sūtra became his secret weapon, his talismanic amulet, his magical companion, and the facilitator of the epic journey from China to India and back again, for which Hsüan-tsang has, ever since, been rightfully celebrate d.
Hsüan-tsang continued to have a special affinity with Prajñāpāramitā literature throughout his life. His largest translation—in fact, the largest text by far in the Chinese canon—is his translation of the Prajñāpāramitā sutra corpus (T.5-7.220), consisting of six hundred fascicles filling three entire Taishō
volumes, worked on from February 16, 660 until completed on November 25, 663, while Hsüan-tsang was already suffering from poor health. It was his last major project; he died the next year. The Heart Sūtra itself was translated separately (T.8.251), in 649, the same year he completed eleven other translations, including the Buddhabhūmi sūtra (T.26.1530), Bhāvaviveka's Karatala-ratna (T.30.1578), and Asa9ga's Mahāyānasamgraha (T.31.1594). It seems to have gone unnoticed that Hsüan-tsang recited the Heart Sūtra on his deathbed, probably because his Biography doesn't quote the sutra precisely. The Biography reports that a few days before he died : After having said farewell, he concentrated his right thought in silence, while he murmured, "The aggregate of matter is void; and the aggregates of perception, concentration, volition, and consciousness are also void. The realm of sight is void; and [all sense realms] up to the realm of mind are also void; and [all sense-perception realms] up to the realm of the mental faculty are also void. Ignorance is void; and [all nidānas] up to old age and death are also void. Even enlightenment is void; and voidness itself is also void."
辭訖因默正念。時復口中誦。色蘊不可得。受想行識亦不可得。眼界不可得。乃至意界亦不可得。眼識界不可得。乃至意識界亦不可得。無明不可得。乃至老死亦不可得。乃至菩提不可得。不可得亦不可得。
The emptiness (or "unattainablity" 不可得) of the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus; the emptiness of pratītya-samutpāda, and the emptiness of "even enlightenment," is the same sequence found in the Heart Sūtra. That the Biography misquotes it suggests that either whoever passed the story to Yan-ts'ung (who is believed responsible for this part of the text, coming near the end) was not sufficiently familiar with the Heart Sūtra to quote it verbatim, but remembered
well the gist of what Hsüan-tsang recited, or that it was Yan-ts'ung himself who wrote from an inaccurate memory. It also suggests that even though the Heart Sūtra assumed huge importance for Hsüan-tsang and his closest disciples, it may not have been well known yet even among those associated with Hsüan-tsang's group, or that a written copy was not available to or consulted by Yan-ts'ung.
It shouldn't be surprising that the dh2ra!6 Hsüan-tsang found most useful and comforting as he faced the adverse uncertainties of his earlier monumental journey would again strike him as particularly apt when he faced his own death, an even more uncertain journey.
II. Brief Overview of the Commentaries
We have no dates or other background information on when or where the two commentaries were written. Neither makes any obvious reference to the other-not surprising given the contentious rivalry between K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk at the time. We don't know for certain even if these commentaries were written before or after Hsüan-tsang's death, though my sense is that they were written after. Consequently, we also cannot be certain which of the two commentaries was
written first. I suspect, but cannot prove, that Wŏnch'ŭk's commentary was, in part, a response to K'uei-chi's, and will offer a few comments on this later. For both K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk, the Heart Sūtr a represents an upāya of the second turning of the Dharma Wheel, which, for them, explains why it emphasizes emptiness (空)and nonexistence (無). That emphasis, according to the theory of the three turnings of the Dharma Wheel expounded in the Sa9dhinirmocana Sūtra
and elsewhere, was a response to the first turning of the wheel during which—in an effort to concretize the abtruse and unclear—basic facts of existence (有) were asserted. That emphasis on existence, since it lent itself to the extreme of eternalism, needed to be corrected by counter-stressing emptiness. K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk both associate this second turning of the wheel with Mādhyamika (though in different ways). The second turning, since it could foster the opposite extreme of annihilationalism, needed to be supplanted as well, this time by a third turning of the Wheel, represented by Yogācāra thought, which provided the culminating corrective to the existence/nonexistence dialectic. Both Wŏnch'ŭk and K'uei-chi cite the same passage from the Madhyānta-vibhāga (vs. 2-3) to illustrate this :
In this, duality is entirely nonexistent.
In this, only emptiness exists,
In that [i.e., emptiness] also exists this [i.e., abhūta-parikalpa].
Hence it is said: all dharmas are neither empty nor not-empty.
Existence, nonexistence and again existence, This conforms to the Middle Way.
Wŏnch'ŭk expresses the corrective project entailed in the relationship between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra in terms of a debate between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla. According to his understanding, Bhāvaviveka stressed the negative, i.e., wu (無), while Dharmapāla countered that by re-emphasizing the positive, yu (有). Wŏnch'ŭk casts this debate not as an intractable sectarian impasse, but as two faithful bodhisattvas expressing two sides of the same Buddhist truth, complimenting rather than conflicting with each other.(T.33.1711.544a.) It is not uncommon in such literature to find an author conflating 'emptiness' with 'nonexistence,' as if the two were synonymous, and Wŏnch'ŭk's text displays some degree of guilt in this regard. However he does show that he is aware that these should not be conflated, when, for instance, he writes during his discussion of the Heart Sūtra passage
"form is emptiness, emptiness is form":
However, then emptiness does not contradict existence; that is precisely the principle of emptiness. Nor is it that nonexistence does not contradict emptiness; that is precisely the explanation of how rūpa (form) establishes itself. 'Both emptiness and existence' accords with and establishes the two truths. 'Neither emptiness nor existence' conforms to the Middle Way. Isn’t this the Great Tenet of the Buddha Dharma? [[[Wikipedia:emphasis|emphasis]] added] He also summarizes Dharmapāla's project, in one place, in the following way (T.33.1711.544b.8-10.):
Dharmapāla, based on the Sa9dhinirmocana sūtra, etc., and Maitreya's tenets, established a contemplation gate, i.e., retaining consciousness while refuting sense-objects (在識遮境). By discerning through the gate of emptiness contemplation, he established that all dharmas are understood as existent and nonexistent.
This both "existent and nonexistent" he explains through the trisvabhāva.
Parikalpita: [the dharmas of] sentient beings in principle are nonexistent.
Paratantra: [[[dharmas]]] exist because of causes and conditions.
Parini4panna: [[[dharmas]]] in principle exist and are not nonexistent.
Wŏnch'ŭk's contention—one drawn, I believe, by misreading some of his sources—is that a key difference between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla involves their disagreements about trisvabhāva theory. According to Wŏnch'ŭk, Bhāvaviveka insists that the first two natures—parikalpita and paratantra—have to be negated, and possibly all three svabhāvas must be negated, while Dharmapāla argues that only the first nature, parikalpita, must be negated. Wŏnch'ŭk uses this
distinction to buttress one of his underlying themes, one derived possibly more from his reading of Paramārtha's works than Hsüan-tsang's: Discrimination (fen-pieh 分別). Paramārtha renders all sorts of terms— especially terms connected to the Sanskrit root √k7p—into Chinese with fen-pieh, including his term for parikalpita (fen-pieh-hsing 分別 性), and thus he tends to stress that the fundamental problem involves introducing discrimination into a nondiscriminate purity.
It is likely that Hsüan-tsang devised a new rendering for parikalpita—(遍計所執) pien-chi so-chih—precisely to move Chinese thinking about parikalpa beyond a narrow focus on the 'discrimination' issue, so that Chinese Buddhists would instead address the issues of attachment (so-chih) and pervasive mental constructions (pien-chi). For Wŏnch'ŭk, Dharmapāla's interpretation of the trisvabhāva indicates that the reason why emptiness is taught at all is so that
parikalpa can be negated. That, in itself, is not an unusual claim in Yogācāra works, so he can call on a number of proof texts, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, to illustrate how emptiness and negation must be applied to parikalpita. What remains problematic is (1) Wŏnch'ŭk's frequent reduction of parikalpita to 'discrimination'—though at times he does take cognizance of Hsüan-tsang's rendering and its focus on "attachment" (so-chih), as we'll see shortly—and (2) his
neglect of the equally important tri-ni5svabh2va (three non-self-nature) theory, in which all three svabhāvas are negated, as he has only Bhāvaviveka claim.18 Wŏnch'ŭk, from the beginning of his commentary, indicates that the Buddha-Dharma is deep, profound, beyond words or discrimination, but gets carved up, discriminated, when efforts are made to teach it. In one place he returns to that theme to blame all sectarian disputes on assertions made by unenlightened so-
called scholars in the name of Buddha-Dharma (學者未悟乃成異說).(T.33.1711.544a.9) K'uei-chi also briefly seems to slip into the same error of conflating emptiness and nonexistence in his commentary, but he quickly and rigorously corrects it a little further on.19 However, one feature of Wŏnch'ŭk's work is an
18 Wŏnch'ŭk also seems gripped by Bhāvaviveka's defining of unconditioned dharmas (asa8s#k9ta) as unreal, "like sky-flowers," since Suchness tathat2) is classified in the Yogācāra One Hundred Dharma system as asa8s#k9ta. Other implications concern him as well. Wŏnch'ŭk relies on Hsüan-tsang's translation of Bhāvaviveka's Karatalaratn (T.30.1578). For instance, at T.33.1711.544b.7-8 Wŏnch'ŭk writes: 是清掌珍論曰﹕真性有為空﹐如幻緣生故。無為無有實, 不起似空華。
"Thus Bhāvaviveka's Karatalaratn treatise says: 'The substantial nature (dravy) of conditioned (sa8sk#ta) [[[dharmas]]] is empty, like an illusion, since conditionally arisen. Unconditioned [[[dharmas]]] are non-substantial (na-dravy), not arising into appearance, [like] sky-flowers'."
Again, at T.33.1711.544b.9-10, he writes:
故掌珍曰﹕無為無有實﹐不起似空華。準此應知﹐圓成亦遣 。 "Hence, the Karatalaratn says: 'Unconditioned [[[dharmas]]] are non-substantial, not arising into appearance, [like] sky-flowers.' You should know by this, that parini4panna is also negated."
The Ch'eng wei-shih lu also defines asa8sk#ta dharmas, including tathat2, as prajñapti. See Buddhist Phenomenology, chs. 17 and 23, and passim. 19 K'uei-chi begins to draw rigorous distinctions between 'emptiness' and 'nonexistence' around 535b-c Comprehensive... pp. 82ff; I will henceforth only give references for this English translation, since the
at times inconsistent treatment of the implications of 'existence' and 'real,' at times hypostatizing these notions more than one would expect from a Yogācāra thinker. In a few places, Wŏnch'ŭk shows an affinity with tathāgatagarbha thought.
While Wŏnch'ŭk casts the distinctions between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra entirely in terms of differences between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla, and discusses this in only select places in his text, K'uei-chi treats Madhyamaka and Yogācāra much more broadly, being interested more in their positions and the implications inferable from those positions than in actual personages per se. Put another way, Wŏnch'ŭk tends to list alternate positions, and then indicate which is right,
using a proof text where necessary (i.e., forming judgements about scripture), while K'uei-chi actually argues positions, i.e., K'uei-chi uses reason and scripture to make his case, not just scripture. These were the standard Buddhist pram2!as in India until Dignāga shifted to perception and inference (= reason), though scripture was still valid within a community that accepted that text's authority; it was invalid for supporting assertions beyond such a community to others who did not already accept the legitimacy of such a scripture. Hsüan-tsang's Ch'eng
corresponding Taishō page numbers can be found in the margins of that edition). He continues to etch the distinction ever finer throughout the remainder of the text. Even near the beginning he seems clear about the distinction, for instance, when he writes (p. 9): "This is to say that conventionally self and dharmas exist, while ultimately both are empty" [[[Wikipedia:emphasis|emphasis]] added], indicating that something can be both existent and empty at the same time. Later he makes clear that emptiness has nothing to do with either existence or nonexistence. Despite obviously being aware of the importance of this distinction (he even adroitly uses it to refute some Madhyamakan positions) on a very few occasions his rhetoric lapses.
20 Starting at T. 33.1711.548c.22, he claims that the true Buddha Fruit (= Buddhahood) is permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure (理實佛果常樂我), and folds that into his contention that much misunderstanding of Buddhism, and especially j@ey2vara!a (obstruction to knowing, stems from an insufficient understanding of the substantial reality( 理實﹐理道﹐真實etc.) of tathat2; that idea conflicts with the Ch'eng wei-shih lu's explanation—based on the writings of Asa9ga and Vasubandhu—that tathat2 is a prajñapti (heuristic), not a dravya (substantial reality). On the Ch'eng wei-shih lu's understanding of tathat2, see Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology, p. 466 and passim.
wei-shih lun primarily relies on reason and scripture to argue its case, though it explicitly discusses approvingly Dignāga's notion that perception and inference are the only valid pramā!as. Assenting to the idea of such an epistemological foundation apparently is not the same as rigorously implimenting it in one's own thinking. In any case, K'uei-chi's reliance on reason and inference mirrors exactly Hsüan-tsang's methodology in the Ch'eng wei-shih lun, and thus, one might presume, Hsüan-tsang's approach in general.
The most dramatic and pervasive difference in K'uei-chi's commentarial approach from Wŏnch'ŭk's is that while Wŏnch'ŭk treats the Madhyamaka vs. Yogācāra theme in only select spots in his text, usually in terms of what does or doesn't exist or not-exist, and always as complementary approaches, K'uei-chi provides, for every line and concept of the Heart Sūtra, first a Madhyamakan interpretation (often in elaborate detail), followed by a Yogācāra rejoinder; and he pits the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra positions in debate against each other, not as complimentary opposites. For instance, when Śāriputra's name first appears, both Wŏnch'ŭk and K'uei-chi provide similar details about various theories concerning his name, parents, etc., but in K'uei-chi's text this is preceded by a Madhyamakan theory about what constitutes a person, since, of course, Śāriputra is a person.(T.1711.545a)
SUTRA: ŚĀRIPUTRA,
Commentary: The Madhyamikans comment that beings are established through dharmas, and dharmas are the cause of beings. Here the emptiness of beings is revealed first and then that of dharmas.
The Yogacarins comment that... Śāriputra is mentioned as one
who responds [to the teachings] and as an example, to show the superior practice of eradicating the four barriers....
Both Wŏnch'ŭk and K'uei-chi strive to domesticate the apparent nihilistic flavor of the Heart Sūtra by subsuming it into more positive Yogācāra models. Both do so ingeniously. K'uei-chi's approach is more philosophically astute, while Wŏnch'ŭk's treatment is more scholastic. Both open their commentaries by explaining the purpose of the sutra. For K'uei-chi, there are different teachings for the needs of different people. This particular sutra is to be seen primarily as an encouragement to practice. If Avalokiteśvara can achieve what he achieves, then I should be able to do likewise. One should think that way whenever one becomes discouraged, according to K'uei-chi.
Avalokiteśvara and Śāriputra are exemplars for us to emulate, to engage in the heroic journey, like Vimalakīrti and the Ś^ra9gama s^tras extol. In other words, rather than being a statement about the absence of practice or the uselessness of models, the seemingly nihilistic language of the Heart Sūtra is intended as an encouragement to practice.
This produces what is easily the most remarkable feature of K'uei-chi's text. Early in his commentary, while commenting on the sutra's first line— "When practicing the profound prajñāpāramitā"—K'uei-chi focuses all of his attention on a term in that phrase that commentators frequently overlook or neglect: "practice." His text stretches across pages 523b to 542c of the thirty-third volume of the Taishō; "practice" appears in his commentary already at 524c, and
his discussion of it doesn't conclude—returning to the Heart Sūtra proper—until 535b. In other words, he devotes over half of his text (11 of 19 pages) to expounding the details of what practice entails, covering such topics as the five stages (as explicated in the Ch'eng wei-shih lun and other texts), various types of contemplation (including five types of contemplation on vijñapti-mātra), an extensive discourse on the six pāramitās (drawing on the Yogācārabhūmi
primarily, but other texts as well), offerings, ethics, the
thirteen abodes (avasthāna) of Bodhisattva practice (i.e., a detailed summary of the second section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi), and so on.
In short, K'uei-chi not only brings our attention to one of the most neglected terms in the Heart Sūtra, he makes that term his centerpiece. He reminds us that Avalokiteśvara's insight into emptiness arose from and during practice, and, in the process of pointing this out, he composed one of the most concise yet comprehensive overviews of the stages and intricacies of Yogācāra practice ever written.
By way of contrast, Wŏnch'ŭk disposes of the term "practice" occurring in this passage with a single line(T.1711.543c17-18): "Practice means advancing, which is the capacity for contemplative wisdom." (行謂進行﹐是能觀智). He adds:
"Deep" is "very deep" (深卽甚深). "Deep" has two types:
1. Practicing deeply (in) nirvikalpa-jñāna (nondiscriminative cognition), one internally realizes the two emptinesses (of self and dharmas), and detaches from discriminations. That nothing is able to be practiced is considered the mark of practice; hence it is called "practicing deeply." Thus, the Pa@cavi8$atis2hasrik2-praj@2p2ramit2 s^tra says: "No view of practice, no view of non-practice, hence this is called the Bodhisattva practicing deeply Prajñā."
Wŏnch'ŭk's approach in general is more scholastic, consisting primarily of scouring the literature, Yogācāric and non-Yogācāric, to collect alternate explanations and definitions of the various terms and concepts he discusses, evaluating the discrepancies between the different sources he consults, and then making a determination as to which is 'right' (正) or 'better' (勝). Each item is first broadly analyzed according to a set of categories (e.g., 'name,'
'nature,' etc.) that varies from passage to passage, which is then further subdivided ("general name of the model," "names of distinct items within the model," etc.). These subdivisions are then often subjected to even further subdivisions. Entire sections of subdivisions are then subsumed into the subdivisions of other sections, each carefully catalogued, classified, defined, and explained. The effect is that each item has a proper place within the overall order of the
sutra, an order that acquires a coherence from this structuring. In his analysis of these items and subdivisions, Wŏnch'ŭk brings in passages and interpretations from a wide range of Buddhist literature that includes, but is not restricted to Yogācāra materials.
As one example of K'uei-chi's straight-ahead philosophical approach as compared with Wŏnch'ŭk's scholastic approach, we can briefly look at the difference between the way each addresses an issue not explicitly raised in the Heart Sūtra itself, but which both mention in their commentaries. An important Yogācāra notion about vijñāna is that, at certain points, the eight consciousnesses cease to be 'consciousness' (vijñāna) and become direct cognition (jñāna) instead.
More technically, as explained in such texts as Ch'eng wei-shih lun and Buddhabhūmi sūtra, the jñānas begin to appear at certain stages of practice, positively influencing subsequent development along the path, until reaching full fulfilment through the utter replacement of the consciousnesses with jñānas. The starting point for the appearance of these jñānas is defined differently in different texts (most Yogācāra literature does not posit the change as simultaneous for all eight consciousnesses, but that different consciousnesses are transformed at different stages, bhūmis, along the path). K'uei-chi's account of these transformations treats their timing as noncontroversial:
In the stage of Buddhahood, the ālaya is transformed into great mirror wisdom (mahā-ādarśa-jñāna)...
In the first bhūmi, manas is transformed into the direct-cognition that equalizes (samatā-jñāna), which possesses the characteristics of ten equalities. In the stage of insight (Darśana-mārga) of those of the three vehicles, the sixth consciousness is transformed into the cognition of profound contemplation (pratyavek4a!2-j@2na), which is perfected with ten superior functions. The first five consciousnesses are transformed into the cognition of perfect achievement (k#ty2nu4%h2na-j@2na), which brings forth the fulfillment of the ten actions and the original vows.
So for K'uei-chi, the ālayavijñāna is transformed into ādarśa-jñāna only when one has attained Buddhahood; manas becomes samatā-jñāna already in the first bhūmi; and mano-vijñāna and the five senses are converted into jñānas during the Darśana-mārga.
Wŏnch'ŭk approaches the question of the first appearance of each of the jñānas differently.(T.33.1711.550c)
... differentiating when each appears. According to the Buddhabhūmi śāstra the Great Mirror Cognition first appears in the mind during the vajra-[[[samādhi]]] (i.e., the eighth bhūmi). The part of the mind associated with the Cognition that Equalizes makes its first appearance during the first meditation in the first Bodhisattva bhūmi. The part of the mind associated with Cognition in Profound Contemplation also first appears during the first meditation of the first bhūmi. There are two interpretations concerning the Perfect Achievement Cognition. (1) It is already attained and appears in the first bhūmi. (2) It appears once Buddhahood (佛果方) is attained. The latter explanation is correct (正). That śāstra explains this more extensively.
According to the Ch'eng wei-shih lun, there are two theories as to [when] the Great Mirror Cognition [first appears]. (1) It first appears during the vajra-(samādhi) mind. (2) It appears on the attainment of Buddhahood. The latter explanation is correct. The remaining (Cognitions are explained there) the same way as in the Buddhabhūmi.
In fact, the Ch'eng wei-shih lun provides more details than either of these two accounts. According to it, there are indeed two theories concerning the Mirror Cognition. The first states that it initially appears during the vajra-samādhi stage, but only reaches completion at Buddhahood. The second theory states that it only appears after the vajra-samādhi, when a Bodhisattva reaches initial Buddhahood, so that uncontaminated vāsanās can be conveyed uninterruptedly, without
any increase in actual seeds. Equalizing Cognition first appears in the Darśana-mārga, intermittently. After the tenth bhūmi it continues without interruption. Profound Investigative Cognition also appears first during the Darśana-mārga, and continues to last (reappear) as long as the mind remains impure and doesn't abide in no-mind (acitta). There are also two theories concerning the Accomplishing Cognition: (1) It initially appears during the Bhāvanā-mārga; (2) it arises in Buddhahood, but even then is only intermittent since it arises from focused attention (manasikāra). Neither K'uei-chi nor Wŏnch'ŭk seem very concerned with the gradual development of these Cognitions (as does the Ch'eng wei-shih lun), but rather with their final outcome. The Ch'eng wei-shih lun emphasizes that these jñānas are not vijñānas, but only called 'transformations of consciousness'
(par2v#tti-vij@2na) because the consciousnesses—which they utterly replace— serve as the basis for their initial appearance. Hence the importance of associating initial appearances with the eight consciousnesses in the first place.
Both commentaries at all times display impressive erudition. Texts cited and used to great effect by both commentaries include: Ch'eng wei-shih lun, Yogācārabhūmi, Buddhabhūmi sūtra (and Bandhuprabdha's commentary, Buddhabhūmi-sūtra śāstra), Mahāyāna-sam-graha, Abhidharmasamuccaya (and Sthiramati's commentary), Madhyānta-vibhāga, Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā, Ta chih tu lun, Vimalakīrti Sūtra, Śrīmālā-sūtra, Lotus Sūtra, Hsüan-tsang's translations of
Bhāvaviveka's writings, and so on. Numerous additional Mahāyāna sutras are cited by both as well. Generally speaking, the most prominent background texts for K'uei-chi seem to be the Yogācārabhūmi and Ch'eng wei-shih lun. Wŏnch'ŭk focuses on different texts for different things, but most frequently relies on the Buddhabhūmi texts and the Ch'eng wei-shih lun, especially in the later portions of his commentary when dealing with Nirvana, the four types of jñānas, etc. For enumeration of categories, he relies primarily on Abhidharmasamuccaya. While neither restricts himself to using
Hsüan-tsang's renditions exclusively, Wŏnch'ŭk is more inclined to include the works of other translators, and his own vocabulary often straddles the terminologies of Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang (as do some of his interpretations). While both explicitly name texts they are citing, Wŏnch'ŭk does so more frequently and thoroughly; K'uei-chi frequently omits the name of his sources. On the other hand, K'uei-chi's quotations are usually very accurate, while Wŏnch'ŭk often paraphrases or glosses his sources, occasionally proffering questionable readings.
III. Wŏnch'ŭk's Trisvabhāva
Having summarized some of the more apparent features of each commentary, I will now focus primarily on a few elements of Wŏnch'ŭk's commentary, since our translation of K'uei-chi's commentary is now readily available in English translation.
Deep into his discussion of the "four phrases"—"Form does not differ from emptiness, emptiness does not differ from form; form is emptiness, emptiness is form"—Wŏnch'ŭk states(T.33.1711.545c):
There are three ways in which parikalpic form is opposed to emptiness in the four phrases:
1. Parikalpic form (所執色) opposed to parikalpic emptiness (所執
空). By way of explaining the four phrases in accordance with feelings of attachment [= parikalpita] (隨情所執), [[[being attached]] to] forms such as sense-organs, sense-objects, etc., is no different than being attached to the emptiness of original nonexistence (pen-wu本無) [i.e., what has never existed]. Therefore [the sutra] says "form is emptiness." The emptiness of original nonexistence feels as if it exists. Hence [the sutra] says "emptiness is form." The remaining two phrases should be understood in the same way.
Wŏnch'ŭk lays out the following model, which I will summarize:
1. Parikalpic form vs. parikalpic emptiness:
Parikalpic forms (i.e., form = sense-organs, sense-objects, etc.) are empty since they are fundamentally nonexistent (pen-wu) "Form is emptiness" because this fundamental nonexistence actually "exists." Hence, "emptiness is form." This is an example of "mutual identity of the same nature" (同性相卽).
2. Parikapic form vs. paratantric emptiness:
Paratantrically understood, the parikalpic form that one draws near to, which is the other on which one depends (paratantra), is actually no different than if the other on which one depended were the emptiness of the non-real (since it is due to causes and conditions other than itself). Thus, "form is emptiness." Some take this type of emptiness to be the 'truly real form,' and yet they erroneously feel that in that empty locus there is something, a substantially real form to which they can attach (parikalpita). Hence, "emptiness is form."
3. Parikalpic form vs. parini4pannic emptiness:
What is held (parikalpita) to be 'real form' in parini4panna is not different from parini4panna, which is the emptiness of self-nature. It is what is within the self-nature of emptiness that one holds (parikalpita) to be true form. Therefore, "form is emptiness, emptiness is form." Like paratantra, this is "mutual identity of different essentials" (異體相卽).
Wŏnch'ŭk then continues these permutations, describing: paratantric form vis-à-vis paratantric emptiness paratantric form vis-à-vis parikalpic emptiness paratantric form vis-à-vis pariniṣpannic emptiness
and then parini4pannic form vis-à-vis parikalpic, paratantric and parini4pannic emptiness, respectively.
Parini4panna and paratantra are in each other, and therefore are not mutually exclusive, according to Wŏnch'ŭk, yet they have different natures. Parini4panna is not conditionally arisen emptiness, so technically it is not "mutually identical" with paratantra; rather they are mutual identities of different natures. It is a fascinating exercise, but, in the interest of time, I will move on to another issue.
IV. Earlier Versions of the Heart Sūtra Referenced by Wŏnch'ŭk
In a provocative article, Jan Nattier argued that the Sanskrit version(s) of the Heart Sūtra we now have were not written in Sanskrit, but translated back into Sanskrit from some other language, which she speculates was Chinese. The evidence she uses to demonstrate the tell-tale signs of back-translation is compelling. Passages in the Chinese version of the Long Prajñāpāramitā text have exact parallels in wording with what one finds in the Chinese Heart Sūtra. Yet
when one looks at the Sanskrit versions of the Heart Sūtra and the corresponding Sanskrit passages in the longer Prajñāpāramitā text, one finds the wording completely different, the longer texts using normative and typical Sanskrit expressions, while the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra employs odd and unexpected words and usages. In other words, while the Longer Prajñāpāramitā Sūtraand the Heart Sūtra offer exact or nearly exact parallels in Chinese, they are completely
different in Sanskrit. That, states Nattier, is clear sign of back-translation. Someone took the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit Longer Prajñāpāramitā text, did some cutting and pasting, and the new pasted up text was later translated back into Sanskrit by someone unaware of the original terminology. Looking for an historical time and place for this back-translation to have transpired, and even better, a recognizable historical figure, Nattier settles on
Hsüan-tsang. As already pointed out, he was involved in Heart Sūtra translation; he was known to have translated at least two texts from Chinese into Sanskrit (Tao te ching and the Awakening of Faith). Nattier points to the story cited earlier about Hsüan-tsang learning the Heart Sūtra from a stranger. Why, she asks, would he have to learn a text that was already available? For Hsüan-tsang to be the culprit, there should be no earlier translations into
Chinese from Sanskrit than his. So, Nattier is forced to argue that the commonly recognized translation by Kumārajīva, which would have been done in the early fifth century at the latest—roughly two hundred years before Hsüan-tsang was born—was not authentic. It must, she contends, have been composed later, after Hsüan-tsang, and mis-attributed to Kumārajīva, who is indeed known for having later texts mis-attributed to him.
Wŏnch'ŭk's commentary poses a serious problem for Nattier's hypothesis, since he cites, and quotes, earlier translations of the Heart Sūtra, including Kumārajīva's, contrasting them with Hsüan-tsang's version. He also seems to be quoting earlier versions no longer extant, since no current version of the Heart Sūtra displays exactly the wording he provides.
Still, things may not be that simple. At least four times in his commentary, Wŏnch'ŭk discusses what may be other, earlier Chinese translations of the Heart Sūtra. I will review these passages briefly, in the order they appear in his text, before determining what impact, if any, they might have on Nattier's hypothesis.
At T.33.1711.543b.21, Wŏnch'ŭk writes, in reference to Hsüan-tsang's new and unusual rendering of Avalokiteśvara as (觀自在) Kuan-tzu-tsai: This is what the old text(s) named Kuan shih yin. 若依舊本名觀世音。
It would be natural in this context to understand this as referring to older versions of the Heart Sūtra, but it could simply be referring to older texts in general. Kumārajīva, and most other translators, used Kuan shih yin for Avalokiteśvara's name. That eventually was shortened to Kuan-yin.
Wŏnch'ŭk next points out an alternate version of a passage, this time unambiguously referring to an alternate Chinese translation.(T.33.1711.544c.12-13) There is another version of the text 或有本 which says:
"illuminatingly, he saw the five skandhas, and so on, are all empty." Although there are two versions of the text 有兩本, the latter text is correct. An examination of the Sanskrit text shows that it has the word "and so on." Hence the "and so on" stated by the latter (text) should be understood to be the standard.
或有本曰 照見五蘊等皆空 雖有兩本。後本為正。撿勘梵本 有等言 故 後所說等 準此應知。
Wŏnch'ŭk informs us (1) there are two different Chinese versions of this passage, one adding (等) teng, "and so on," and (2) that he consulted a Sanskrit original and found the Sanskrit also had "and so on," so he concludes the latter reading―which is not the way Hsüan-tsang translated it (at least according to what has come down to us as Hsüan-tsang's version)―is the right reading. When he first cites, earlier in his commentary, the Heart Sūtra text that he discusses here, he does not include the teng.(T.33.1711.544a.6)
It is unclear which Sanskrit version of the Heart Sūtra Wŏnch'ŭk had at hand, since, at least the ones I have examined, do not have an "etc." here. It is absent, for instance, from the standard edition presented by Conze, nor is there any Sanskrit suggesting "and so on" in the transcription made by Hurvitz of the Dunhuang version that supposedly presents the exact version used by Hsüan-tsang.
It is equally unclear which alternate Chinese version of the Heart Sūtra he is alluding to, since the only extant translation older than Hsüan-tsang's is Kumārajīva's, and Kumārajīva's version does not have deng here. Some old records claim that other early translations were once available in China, but they have not come down to us (and hence were dismissed by Nattier). Possibly Wŏnch'ŭk had one of these at his disposal. There is another possibility, but I will wait until we have looked at the next citation in his commentary of an alternate translation before raising it.
The next example also unamibiguously refers to (at least) two different texts. Wonchuk states:(T.33.1711.546a.13-15)
Further, for interpreting this sutra, we have two texts (自有兩本). One text is as above (i.e., Hsüan-tsang's version, which says: "vedanā, sa8j@2, sa8sk2ras, and vijñāna are also like this"). The other text of the sutra says: "vedanā, sa8j@2, sa8sk2ras, vijñāna, and so on, are also like this." The word "and so on" [teng] indicates what is [discussed] below in the text of the sutra, i.e., the six skill in means, the aggregates, āyatanas, dhātus, pratītya-samutpāda, the Four Truths, Bodhi, and Nirvana.
又解此經 自有兩本 一本如上。一本經曰 受想行識等亦復如是。所 言等者 準下經文 有六善巧。謂 蘊 處 界 緣生 四諦 菩提 涅槃。
Wŏnch'ŭk is clearly talking about texts (本, 經文), and he is talking about a text that is different from Hsüan-tsang's in virtue of, once again, adding the word (等) teng "and so on." As a tireless exegete, Wŏnch'ŭk immediately sets himself to work explaining what this additional word refers to, namely the contents of the remainder of the text. Once again, it remains unclear which Chinese version he is referring to, since Kumārajīva's does not have teng here.
Nor, for that matter, do any of the Sanskrit texts I examined. They go directly from vijñāna to iha ("here"), the beginning of the next line. When one looks at the citation of these two passages in K'uei-chi's commentary, one finds that he includes deng in his sutra quotations. In other words, the
version of these passages which K'uei-chi implicitly accepts as authoritative is the one which includes teng. Perhaps Wŏnch'ŭk used K'uei-chi's commentary as the source of his teng text (or perhaps vice versa?). Like Wŏnch'ŭk, K'uei-chi also considers the two instances of teng as integral to the root text, and gives an account of what they refer to. For the first occurrence of teng, K'uei-chi writes:32
Skandhas mean the aggregates, which include form, feelings, perception, impulses, and consciousness. And so forth [teng] refers to other dharmas such as the sense fields (āyatanas).
This explanation is similar to, but briefer than, Wŏnch'ŭk's. The second additional deng is explained by K'uei-chi thus:33
And so forth [teng] refers to the five kinds of skillful means with regard to the [twelve] sense fields and the [eighteen] realms. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra says, "From form up to enlightenment, everything is empty. Even if there is a dharma that surpasses nirvana, I will say it is still as an illusion or a transformation." Therefore, the phrase "and so forth" [teng] encompasses all dharmas. The Madhyamakans and Yogācārins have the same interpretation in regard to this.
Clearly, both K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk consider teng in both instances to be integral to the main text. Why have our received versions of Hsüan-tsang's translation of the Heart Sūtra lost this term?
Also, while K'uei-chi does not treat the appearance of teng as problematic in any way, merely commenting on its referents in both cases, Wŏnch'ŭk does take up the question of teng as a problem, recognizing, already then, that there were other versions of the Heart Sūtra(or at least one other version) that omitted the two teng-s. He attempts to solve this disparity by consulting the original Sanskrit, which, he says, confirms that teng does belong there. Since we don't have a Sanskrit version that confirms the teng (it has disappeared from our received versions of both the Chinese and Sanskrit),
32 Comprehensive Commentary.., p. 82.
33 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
one has to wonder what Sanskrit form of the text Wŏnch'ŭk consulted. Should we be suspicious about Wŏnch'ŭk's claim that he consulted a Sanskrit text that confirmed the teng-s? Was he merely relying on K'uei-chi's text for the two teng-s? From where would K'uei-chi have received the teng-s? Did both K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk receive a Heart Sūtra from Hsüan-tsang that included "and so forth" at these two points? Why does Wŏnch'ŭk not include teng when initially quoting the text, but only introduce it later, as something to check and confirm against the Sanskrit? Which other versions of the Heart Sūtra― Chinese and Sanskrit―did these two exegetes have at their disposal?
Before we leave Nattier's thesis and Wŏnch'ŭk's mentioning of alternate Chinese versions, there is one more passage we need to examine.
While discussing the passage, " because there are no obstructions, there is no fear. Completely detached from conceptually-perverted dream thoughts, [this is] ultimate Nirvā!a," Wŏnch'ŭk once again indicates there is an alternate Chinese text with a different reading. He states:(T.33.1711.548c.12-13) There is another version of the text (或有本) which says: "...detached from all conceptually-perverted dream thoughts."
Although there are two versions of the text(有二本), the latter text is better (勝).
Unfortunately for Nattier's thesis, the alternate version this time is recognizable. It is Kumārajīva's version. Even if one dismisses the veracity and tenability of the first three citations as insufficient evidence that there were known Chinese versions earlier than Hsüan-tsang's, this passage seems to provide conclusive proof that Kumārajīva's version, which is most probably the version Wŏnch'ŭk referred to earlier as the "older text," was not a post-Hsüan-
tsang pseudepigraphic fabrication (though, since he does not mention Kumārajīva by name, he offers nothing on the question of author-attribution). So, whether or not Kumārajīva was the actual translator of the Heart Sūtra text now attributed to him, that version was already extant and considered "old" during Hsüan-tsang's life. Since the other quotes given by Wŏnch'ŭk do not seem to come from Kumārajīva's version, we might conclude that there were even more Chinese Heart Sūtra versions than
Hsüan-tsang's or Kumārajīva's available at that time.
What of the charming story about how Hsüan-tsang first learned the Heart Sūtra? Does that story suggest, as Nattier speculates, that the Heart Sūtra was unknown until Hsüan-tsang disseminated it? The probable solution is that what Hsüan-tsang learned from the sick man was not the Chinese Heart Sūtra, which
would not have had the mantric efficacy attributed to it in the story. What he learned was how to recite the text in Sanskrit, thus availing himself of its full mantric potency. Whether true or hagiography, Hsüan-tsang's early reception of a Sanskrit mantra serves to prefigure― because it is in Sanskrit (the sacred language of India) and will protect him on his way―his journey to India. It was the lucky charm bestowed on him by Avalokiteśvara to guarantee he would arrive safely.
V. Wŏnch'ŭk Quoting Hsüan-tsang
Four times in his commentary, Wŏnch'ŭk quotes Hsüan-tsang with statements not found in any of Hsüan-tsang's works. These statements probably represent teachings Wŏnch'ŭk received either directly or indirectly from Hsüan-tsang, though whether his citations are intended as verbatim quotes or paraphrases is not clear.
The first instance(T.33.1711.549a.11) has Hsüan-tsang commenting on the 'eight types of discrimination' (八種分別) listed in the Yogācārabhūmi (T.30.1579.489c). Wŏnch'ŭk's paraphrase of that passage reads:
What are the eight types of discrimination called?
1. Self-nature, which is the discrimination of self-nature in all dharmas, such as rūpa, sound, and so on.
2. Differentiation(差別), i.e., within those discriminations, what can and can't be seen, etc.
3. General attachment (總執) , concerning those rūpas, sounds, etc. which one calculates計 (to be such things as) sentient beings, self, houses, armies, forests, and so on.
4. Discriminating a self.
5. What's associated with self ("mine," etc.).
These two discriminations are contaminated (āśrava), in grasping [i.e., the grasper-grasped, grahāka-grāhya, relation], calculating
(everything) in terms of an "I" who experiences and calculates [things as] "mine."
6. Hedonic discrimination(受分別)
7. Non-hedonic (discrimination).
8. Both and neither(俱相違). This is like the sequence: (taking) things (事, vastu) that have arisen from discrimination to be wondrous, nonwondrous, both, and being removed (from things).
According to Wŏnch'ŭk, Hsüan-tsang said:
All eight types are karmically neutral (avyākta 無記) karmic maturations (vipāka 異熟) for whom giving rise to wisdom (慧) is considered their self-nature. Some others take their self-nature to be initial and sustained mental application (vitarka vicāra 尋伺).
This wording is found nowhere in Hsüan-tsang's writings.
Later, Wŏnch'ŭk presents us with Hsüan-tsang's transliteration and translation of parinirv2!a: (波利匿縛喃), translated as "completely quiescent" (圓寂). That transliteration is not found elsewhere in the Taishō or in
Hsüan-tsang's writings (though 波利 is a common Chinese transliteration for pari-). Still later, during a detailed discussion of the four types of Nirvana,
Wŏnch'ŭk writes "Now Tripi%aka [i.e., Hsüan-tsang] said, the four types of Nirvana use (用) tathatā as their ti (體)." Wŏnch'ŭk continues : Hence, the Ch'eng wei-shih lun, tenth fascicle, says: The four types of nirvana, on the basis of tathatā, establish separation from the obstructions.
When considered in the context of the rivalry between K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk, specifically K'uei-chi's accusation that Wŏnch'ŭk pretended to have legitimate access to Hsüan-tsang's teachings on the Ch'eng wei-shih lun when, according to K'uei-chi, in fact he did not, since such special teachings were given to
K'uei-chi alone, this citation by Wŏnch'ŭk serves as a rebuttal of that charge. He implies that he has received direct instruction from Hsüan-tsang related to the Ch'eng wei-shih lun. Moreover, Hsüan-tsang's comment serves to strengthen Wŏnch'ŭk's own tendency to hypostatize tathatā. The final citation Wŏnch'ŭk offers from Hsüan-tsang comes during his discussion of how to understand the Sanskrit phrase anuttar2 sa8yak sa8bodhi.
(T.33.1711.550a)First he offers several ways of breaking down the phrase:
a = negation 無 uttarā = higher 上 sa8 = correct 正 yak = true 眞 sa8 = correct 正 bodhi = Way, Path 道
which would mean: The unsurpassed, correct, true, correct Way. 無上正真正道. After some discussion he offers another alternative:
a = negation 無 uttarā = higher 上 sa8 = correct 正 yak = everywhere, universal 遍 sa8 = correct 正 bodhi = Awakening 覺 He glosses:
Principial cognition conditioned by tathatā is called 'correct.' Inferential cognition conditioned by sa8v#ti is called 'everywhere/universal.'
Nondiscriminative cognition (nirvikalpa-jñāna) that extinguishes the two (forms of) non-knowing . 無知 is called ‘knowing.' Bodhi is a manner of saying 'Awakening from a dream.'
These four wisdoms/cognitions are the essence (ti) of Bodhi,
transcending the fruits of the Two Vehicles. Hence it is called 'nothing higher.'
Then, as if to buttress his readings, he presents Hsüan-tsang's own interpretation:
a = negation 無 uttarā = higher 上 sa8 = correct 正 yak = equalized 等 sa8 = correct 正 bodhi = Awakening 覺
The text (is this Hsüan-tsang or Wŏnch'ŭk?) explains:43
No dharma can surpass it; hence it's called 'unsurpassed.' [It is] universal knowledge (遍知) of principle and phenomena (理事), hence it's called 'correct equalization.' Separate from the erroneous, displaying the true, so, again, it's called "correct awakening." It precisely is: Unsurpassed, correct equalization, correct awakening(無上正等正覺).
Is it accidental or intentional that in two of the passages attributed to Hsüan-tsang, Wŏnch'ŭk portrays him using the Buddhist jargon of the day: ti yong (體用) and now li shi (理事)? While the other three statements attributed to Hsüan-tsang are not
jñāna wheusin 智chih. Perhaps one reason East Asian Buddhists never fully understood Indian Buddhist epistemology can be traced directly to the ambiguation resulting from the overuse of this one character, blurring the distinction between 'wisdom' and a sheer 'cognition,' or cognitive act. For instance, the bivalence of chih allows Wŏnch'ŭk to conflate the prajñā of prajñāpāramitā with the jñāna of nirvikalpa-jñāna. Since nirvikalpa-jñāna is a cognitive modality and not a specific type of wisdom with its own unique object of knowledge, efforts to assign it such an object are arguably missplaced.
43 今大唐三藏阿之言耨多羅名三名藐名三又言菩提云覺。無法可故言無上。理事遍故云正等。離妄照復云正覺。即無上正等正覺
found in his writings, and the transliteration of parinirv29a is completely unique to this text, as far as I can tell, the translation of anuttar2 sa8yak sa8bodhi that Wŏnch'ŭk assigns to Hsüan-tsang—(無上正等正覺)—is not at all unusual. I have found it eighty-two other times in the Taishō, in a variety of texts, including works by other translators (e.g., Fa Hsian's Pu shih jing, T.16.705, from the third century), and the works of K'uei-chi (e.g., in his commentary on the Amitābha Sūtra, T.37.1758, and his commentary on Dignāga's 0lambana-par6k42, T.38.1772). It was, thus, an early and pervasive rendering. In fact, K'uei-chi offers exactly the same rendering, (無上正等正
覺), in his Heart Sūtra commentary (T.33.1710.541c.7-9). Did one of them borrow from the other, or was this a teaching Hsüan-tsang shared with both of them? VI. Wŏnch'ŭk and K'uei-chi on the Concluding Mantra
Since in these and their other texts, K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk both endeavor to give the impression of deep familiarity with Sanskrit, scholars have often wondered just how good was their Sanskrit? Are they merely repeating what they picked up working with Hsüan-tsang and others? In other words, could they comment on certain words and phrases because they had heard Hsüan-tsang (or others) explicate them, or were they capable of sitting down with some of the six-hundred-plus Sanskrit texts Hsüan-tsang returned with from India, and read them on their own?
In their Heart Sūtra commentaries, K'uei-chi and Wŏnch'ŭk both sprinkle Sanskrit information liberally. For instance, both define numerous compounds using Sanskrit linguistic labels (tatpuru4a, karmadhāraya, etc.). It is a shame that such an endeavor never became more wide-spread in East Asia, since Chinese compounds are, if anything, more ambiguous than their Sanskrit counterparts. Specifying clearly how compounds should be read (Does one character modify the other? Which is subordinate, and in what sense? Do the two characters signify one 'word' or should each character retain some distinct sense? And so on) would have prevented countless uncertain and erroneous readings of many texts.
Wŏnch'ŭk seems to get mixed grades in his handling of Sanskrit. In what, if he was considering Sanskrit at all, would constitute a major blunder, he associates the xin心 (mind, heart) of the title of the "Heart" sutra, with "mind," a connection possible in Chinese, but not in Sanskrit, since the word in the title is h#daya (heart), not citta (mind).47
Similarly, he takes the Chinese term (苦厄) k'u-o (sickness and distress) as a compound of two distinct terms (labeling it a karma-dhāraya 持業釋). He then classifies the two terms, together and separately, in a variety of ways.(T.33.1711.548b-c) In Sanskrit only one term, du5kha, appears. On the other hand, he clearly recognizes that (罣礙) kua-ai
(obstructions) is to be treated as a single term for the Sanskrit 2vara!a (obstruction), rather than as separate terms as they appear in Chinese. He explicitly relates kua-ai to the two 2vara!as, kle$2vara!a and j@ey2vara!a.(T.33.1711.548b-c) Given this mixed grade, it is tempting to take the concluding mantra of
translation, and then why Hsüan-tsang's rendering was more faithful to the original.
47 T.33.1711.543b.10-12. 心經正顯能詮之教。盧道之中心王獨秀於諸般若此教最尊。從諭立名故曰心也
the Heart Sūtra as a test case. It is one of the most famous Buddhist mantras, and one which even modern scholars express some uncertainties about, though, unlike some mantras that are semantically challenged, this one yields its meaning in relatively clear language.
Gate gate paragate parasamgate bodhi svaha;
gone, gone, gone (to the) other, completely gone (to the) other, awakening, Hail!
Svāhā, as Conze points out, is a reverent salutation that in tantric practice one addresses to female deities, in this case Ms. Prajñāpāramitā herself. While K'uei-chi leaves the final mantra untranslated, and barely comments on it beyond stating that it is a mantra, offering two other examples of mantras using Chinese characters that present Sanskrit sounds, Wŏnch'ŭk provides a number of alternate possibilities for translating and interpreting the mantra. As he
has done throughout his commentary, he quickly generates some categories, defines terms, and then fits the terms into the categories. But first he offers some theories about mantras and their translatability, noting that there are different theories available on the matte r. The first theory is that the mantra verse cannot be translated (此頌不可翻譯).
What has been transmitted down to us from the ancients is a mantra (呪) that only sounds correct in Sanskrit (西域正音). If its esoteric words and phrases were to be translated, it would lose its powerful efficacy (秘密辭句, 翻卽失驗). Hence we should preserve the Sanskrit pronunciation (故存梵語).
Further, one should understand that mantras are names of sages, some say of spiritual beings (鬼神), and some (even) say that the meanings of the words (themselves) contain many deep and hidden Dharma meanings (諸法甚深奧義言含多義). In this country there are no words that appropriately (convey the meaning of) that language, and so we should preserve the Sanskrit. And so (Hsüan-tsang) transliterated the Sanskrit sounds(如薄伽梵).
Others say that the esoteric (meaning) within mantras can be translated, as in the case of words like nāmo buddhāya (南無佛陀耶等).
The verse phrases may be interpreted in three classifications:
First, gate gate means 'deliver, deliver' (or 'cross over, cross over') 度度. As was explained in the prose portion prior to the verse, the two characters pan-ju (prajñā) have great efficacious abilities (有大功能) for delivering oneself and delivering others (to the other shore). Hence (the sutra) says: deliver, deliver.
Here Wŏnch'ŭk is drawing on the old translation of pāramitā as tu (度), as in the title of Kumārajīva's translation of the Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra (大智度論) Ta chih tu lun (Great Wisdom Deliverance Treatise). While seeming to confuse prajñā (智) with pāramitā (度)—since he equates du(度)with pan-ju (般若) instead of with po-lo-mi-to (波羅蜜多)—he is referring to an earlier discussion of prajñā in which he explicitly defined it as that which delivers one to the other shore.
Next, in the phrase para-(gate) (the para-) is identical to (what was discussed in the) prose (section under) pāra-mitā. It means "reaching the other shore" (彼岸到), 'other shore' being a name for Nirvana. To what place does the word gate 'deliver' one? The Other Shore is the place one is delivered. Hence it says: paragate.
Whether to derive the para- in paragate from the para- in pāramitā is debatable. Buddhists have offered various etymologies for the term. More natural would be to see it as an abstracted nominal form (-tā) of paramā, a superlative meaning the best, the highest, etc. That is one way that modern translators have arrived at "perfection" for pāramitā. Stephen Hodge, in a posting to buddha-l, June 4, 2002, wrote:
... [the popular folk etymology] "pāram (the far side) + itā
(gone)...forms the basis of the Tibetan "pha-rol-tu phyin-pa." Unfortunately, this etymology is wrong. Looking at the early mentions in Pāli sources (pāramī / pāramitā) and later comments in such works as the Bodhisattvabhūmī, it becomes clear that the correct etymology is derived from paramā (most excellent, highest, etc.) + tā (suffix forming abstract nouns). Thus the earlier meaning of prajñāpāramitā just means the prajñā which is most excellent. On the other hand, Richard Hayes posted the following on August 16, as part of the same discussion:
The word pāram literally means the opposite shore of a bank or a river. It also means the end of a journey, the goal of an enterprise and the fullest extent of an undertaking. Idiomatically, pāram can be used with any verb of motion, such as gacchati, eti, or yati to form a phrase meaning to accomplish, to master fully, to bring to a close. Pāram joined with the past participles of any of those verbs of motion therefore produces words meaning accomplished, mastered, or
perfected. Examples of such words would be p2ra8 gata, p2ra8 y2ta, and p2ra8 ita. The phrase prajñā pāramitā is made up of the feminine noun prajñā, so the participle has to agree with it in gender. That's why we find the feminine form pāramitā. The whole phrase means wisdom brought to a state of completion. Wŏnch'ŭk's reading concurs with Hayes' explanation. Wŏnch'ŭk's explanation continues:
The (next occurrence of the) word para is translated as above. Sa8gate means "to arrive at the end."
The word bodhi is the essence of the other shore (彼岸體). Svāhā means "quickly"( 速疾). This means that due to the functioning of the excellent qualities (有勝功用) of wondrous wisdom(妙慧), one is quickly able to reach Bodhi, the Other Shore.
Another interpretation of the verse breaks the four phrases in two sections. The first two phrases revere the excellence of the Dharma to which one aspires, and the latter two phrases seek to revere people. In aspiring to and seeking the Dharma, the first gate is the cause and the second is the effect. This [is why one] says [twice] 'Excellent! Excellent!' (勝勝). At the causal stage, prajñā includes self-benefit and benefitting others. These are the two functional excellences. Hence, one says "Excellent! Excellent!"
Paragate means the excellence of the other shore, since it is due to prajñā that one attains the other shore, Nirvana. Hence the words, "Excellence to the other shore!"
In aspiring to revere people, the first (part of the second set of phrases) is the cause, and the latter is their effect.
Parasa8gate (波羅僧揭諦) says: "Excellence to the saṅgha (僧) (seeking) the other shore!" (彼岸僧勝). This reveres the causal stage of Ekayāna Bodhisattvas seeking to be people of the other shore.
The justification for having the latter phrase address people does not derive from anything in the Sanskrit (such as recognizing that svāhā is addressed to deities), but from the fact that the Chinese transliteration of parasa8gate employs the character seng( 僧), which is also used in Chinese for saṅgha and, by extensions, the monastics of the saṅgha. Wŏnch'ŭk's interpretation can be represented in the following chart:
Wŏnch'uk: Interpretation 2
gate gate para-gate para-sa8-gate bodhi svāhā
du du bi'an dao du bi'an dao jing (du) bi'an ti suji
A translation of this gloss would read: "Deliver, deliver, to the Other
Shore delivered, to the Other Shore finally delivered, essence of the Other
Shore, quickly."
Wŏnch'ŭk also glosses the mantra to mean: 由妙慧 有勝功用 即能速疾 到菩提岸. "Due to the functioning of the excellent qualities of wondrous wisdom, one is quickly able to reach Bodhi, the Other Shore."
He offers, again, another possibility:
gate gate = Practice 行
paragate = Fruit 果
parasa8gate = Sa9gha 僧
These represent the Three Treasures (Buddha, Dharma, Sa9gha). "The first two express reverence for practice as the Fruit of Dharma. The second two, you should know, are reverence for the Sa9gha and Buddha." Those are the final words of his commentary.
Curiously, K'uei-chi does not translate or even explicate the mantra. The very last line of his commentary begs off the task in the following words: "The intention [of the mantra] is profound and its doctrine abtruse and broad.
It is not easy to comment on it in detail."
A little earlier in his text, when commenting on the Heart Sūtra passage extolling the mantra ("...the great marvelous mantra, the great illuminating mantra," etc.), K'uei-chi explained four kinds of dh2ra!6, and for the last two of those four, offered other mantras (which he also didn't translate), one coming from the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, and the other as yet unidentified.
But he alludes there to the broad powers that mantras contain. Perhaps K'uei-chi subscribed to one of the theories mentioned b y Wŏnch'ŭk on why the mantra is untranslatable. Or, possibly, his decision not to translate or explicate it was meant to express deference to the awe that Hsüan-tsang must have held for this particular mantra. The real significance of the concluding mantra may lie precisely in its power to be effective beyond or without linguistic referentiality. It becomes a performative act that takes language beyond language. K'uei-chi's final words in his commentary, picking up the sentences preceding the passage just offered, are:
The doctrine and meaning expounded above is to exhort people to bring forth faith and to study, and in order to help them quickly get the essence, the mantra is taught. Because wisdom and compassion are difficult to practice in the era of the great kalpa, the Buddha vowed to employ concise words. The intention [of the mantra] is profound and its doctrine abstruse and broad. It is not easy to comment on it in detail.
Appendix
[Opening portion of Wŏnch'ŭk's commentary]
Commentary to the Praj@2-p2ramit2-h#daya-S^tra
Written by sha-men Wŏnch'ŭk
I will explain this [[[Heart]]] Sūtra by differentiating four aspects:
1. The causes and conditions that gave rise to this teaching.
2. Differentiating between the core (t'i 體) and the doctrines (tsung 宗) of the Sūtra.
3. Explaining the [[[Sūtra's]]] title.
4. Interpreting [the Sūtra] by analyzing its textual content.
[Wŏnch'uk seems to be subtly playing with an equivalence between t'i=core and heart=core. He also is interested in reciprocity/ying(應) and what counts as reliable evidence. He is also offering something of a theory for how language can communicate—in fact, for him language is necessary to teach and help people reach what is nonlinguistic.]
1. The causes and conditions that gave rise to this teaching:
I humbly submit that the perfect principle, mysterious and quiescent, wondrously cuts off the objects of existence and nonexistence. The characteristics of dharmas are very deep, able to transcend the superficial [[[Wikipedia:expressions|expressions]]] of names and words. Now then, the contents of this principle have no fixed means, so [the Buddha] expressed it in the two scriptural collections [of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna]. Actualizing of the response (ying 應) of the triple bodies (of Buddhas,
viz. Dharma-kāya, Sa8bhoga-kāya and Nirm2!a-k2ya) is the basis on which the teaching is expounded. For instance, it could be said that when the spring water becomes clear, the moon's reflection suddenly appears; with the enemy's slightest move in the dark, the heavenly drum automatically sounds.
[These are examples of ying(應), 'mysterious' responses to conditions, the first requiring that the recipient purify and calm itself, the second involving the automatic and 'mysterious' response of one 'hidden' thing to another, alluding to kan-ying (感應) stimulus-response. On the one hand, Buddhavacana (Buddha's Word) is the kan, while sentient beings responding in varying ways to it are the ying. On the other hand, Buddha responds (ying) to the needs of sentient beings.]
Now then, when responding to things, the Tathāgata expounds the Three Wheels of Dharma so that [[[beings]]] may, according to their capacities, be led [to awakening]. In order to lead those who have not yet entered the Dharma to quickly (趣) enter it, at Deer Park (M#gad2va) in V2r29as6 [the Buddha] first unfolded the causes and effects of sa8s2ra and nirvana. This was the First Wheel of Dharma, "the Four Noble Truths." So that those [[[Hīnayāna]] practitioners following the first Dharma Wheel] who already were able to cut off the view of self would quickly be converted to Mahāyāna, on sixteen occasions, including at Vulture Peak (G#dhrakuta), [the Buddha] expounded the Prajñā-pāramitā-Sūtras. This was the Second Wheel of Dharma,
[the teaching of] "No Characteristics" [or No Marks]. Since [practitioners of the Second Wheel] gradually eliminate the view that dharmas have an existent nature, and yet still remain unable to dispel attachment to the view of "emptiness," the Third Wheel, which is the definitive (nitartha) Mahāyāna teaching of the Saṅdhinirmocana-Sūtra, was expounded in the Pure and Polluted lands of Padmāgarbhālokā dhātu. [This Third Wheel] reveals the reasoning of both emptiness and existence, so that the two types of extremist attachments to existence and nonexistence will be eliminated.
This is precisely what gave rise to the teaching [of the Heart Sūtra].
2. Differentiating between the core and the doctrines [of the Sūtra]:
"Core" refers to the core of the teachings that can be communicated with full knowledge, whereas "doctrine" discloses the specifics of what has been communicated by the various teachings.
However, the explanations [given by various Hīnayāna Buddhist schools] of the core of the Buddha's teaching are not the same. Sarvāstivāda doctrine takes sound as the core (of linguistic communication), because name, [sentence, and utterance – the three linguistic dharmas in the Abhidharma scheme] are karmically indeterminate while sound is karmically wholesome [and Buddha's teaching would necessarily have to be karmically wholesome]. According to Sautrāntika doctrine, the sequence (pratibandha) [of linguistic signifiers, i.e., names, sentences and utterances] is provisionally labeled (prajñapti = nominally) 'sounds', since names, sentences, etc., do not exist independently of sound.
There are also many different Mahayana doctrines. Some places [in the Mahāyāna scriptures claim that the core of communication is] only sound. For instance the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-Sūtra says there is a certain Buddha Land in which [the primary mode of] Buddha's affairs [i.e., his teaching and activities] are sound. Other places [in the Mahāyāna texts assert that] only names, [sentences, and utterances] are the core. For instance, the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun states that "the cognitive-object (vi4aya) of Unobstructed
Cognition is considered to be name, etc." In other places [[[Mahāyāna texts]]] combine the [above] explanations of "sound" and "name, etc." For instance, the Daśabhūmika-Sūtra says: "those who understand it [viz. the teaching being communicated] rely on two things: sound and names, etc."
Why are there such differences between these teachings? To definitively grasp the real, one pursues the real by means of the provisional (prajñapti). While we all use sound and name, etc., in order to [understand] the nature of this core, nevertheless, there is one meaning definitively grasped by each of the these holy teachings, so therefore they do not contradict each other. What is the reason? Taking the provisional to pursue the real, one uses sound as the core [of communication] since―apart from sound―names, sentences and utterances would be indistinguishable (and hence incoherent).
Taking the core to pursue the function [of communicating], names, etc. are considered the core that can communicate the distinctions between the self-natures of (different) dharmas. Hence these two are (both) relied upon. The provisional and the real require each other; their interaction is called "core." To try to follow one (without the other) would be a mistake; an explanation (predicated on this one-sided basis) would not be able to establish [anything meaningful].
Taking cognitive-objects (vi4aya) to pursue the mind, one uses consciousness as the core. The Sūtras [of the Third Dharma Wheel] say that since there are no dharmas apart from consciousness, when one recovers the real by converting the false, Suchness is used as the core. This is how the Benevolent Kings Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra describes the nature of all dharmas....
