Mipam’s Middle Way Through Yogacara and Prasangika

Abstract In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrak?¯rti’s interpretation of Na¯ga¯rjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmak?¯rti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Candrak?¯rti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapada¯, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrak?¯rti and Dharmak?¯rti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and ‘‘deconstructive’’ negative dialectics on the other.

The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yoga¯ca¯ra in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Sva¯tantrika-Pra¯sa_ ngika distinction while claiming both Yoga¯ca¯ra and Pra¯sa_ngika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka. Mipam represents Pra¯sa_ngika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality.

As such, he portrays Pra¯sa_ ngika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the ‘‘content’’ of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Pra¯sa_ ngika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yoga¯ca¯ra as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Pra¯sa_ngika), the discourse of Yoga¯ca¯ra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Pra¯sa_ ngika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.

Keywords Madhyamaka Yogacara Prasan_gika Mipam Buddhism D. S. Duckworth (&) Department of Philosophy and Humanities, East Tennessee State University, Box 70656, Johnson City, TN 37614, USA

Introduction

The negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified in Tibet with Candrakrti’s interpretation of Na¯ga¯rjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmak?¯rti. Despite Candrak?¯rti’s explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapada¯, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrak? ¯rti and Dharmak?¯rti in distinct ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and ‘‘deconstructive’’ negative dialectics on the other. This integration is also a fundamental part of Mipam’s (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the relationship between Yoga¯ca¯ra and Pra¯sa_ ngika in his tradition. This paper explores Mipam’s representation of Madhyamaka, and the way that he integrates the negative and deconstructive dialectics of Pra¯sa_ ngika with the systematic and constructive discourses of Yoga¯ca¯ra.1

Yoga¯ca¯ra is an important part of Mipam’s systematic presentation of Buddhism. The synthetic approach of Yoga¯ca¯ra-Madhyamaka is instrumental to the way that he incorporates various systems of Buddhist thought in Tibet. Pra¯sa_ngika-Madhyamaka also has an important place in his works. Not only is Pra¯sa_ ngika commonly held in Tibet as the culmination of philosophies in the dialectical vehicles (the non-Mantra views), but Mipam also associates Pra¯sa_ ngika with the manner of understanding primordial purity (ka dag) in the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen), which is the penultimate view in his Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition. In this paper, I will show how Mipam portrays Madhyamaka through both the discourses of Yoga¯ca¯ra and Pra¯sa_ngika.

Ultimate Truth and Pra¯san_ gika

We will begin by looking at how Mipam positions Pra¯sa_ ngika. The main way he delineates Pra¯sa_ ngika is through a division of two types of ultimate truth: the categorized ultimate (rnam grangs pa’i don dam) and the uncategorized ultimate (rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam).2 The ‘‘categorized ultimate’’ refers to mere absence as a negative representation of the ultimate. In contrast to this concept of nonexistence, the ‘‘uncategorized ultimate’’ is nonconceptual. He describes this difference as follows:

1 This paper is derived from my Mipam on Buddha-Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), and develops an idea I raised therein. The reader can consult this source for a more detailed examination of this topic.

2 I use the terms ‘‘categorized’’ and ‘‘uncategorized,’’ following Thomas Doctor, to reflect the distinctive way that Mipam glosses the etymology of the term rnam grangs. Mipam states: ‘‘The categorized ultimate is ‘categorized’ because it is counted as one in a pair, the binary counterpart of relative existence, or, because it is included in the category of the ultimate. It is what is categorized as the binary counterpart of the relative when speaking of ‘two truths.’’’ Mipam (1990b), published in Doctor (2004, p. 62): rnam grangs pa’i don dam ni/ kun rdzob yod pa’i zla la sbyar ba’i cig shos kyi zlas drangs pa’i phyir ram/ don dam pa’i grangs su gtogs pas na rnam grangs te/ bden pa gnyis zhes pa’i kun rdzob kyi zlar bgrang rgyu de yin.

The categorized ultimate, which is merely a negation—an absence of true establishment—is an object of mind and an object of language. The uncategorized is the unity of appearance and emptiness that does not fall to the side of either appearance or emptiness. It is signified by the words such as ‘unity of the two truths,’ ‘freedom from constructs,’ ‘the Middle Way,’ but these are merely indicators, like the finger pointing to the moon; the meaning is far beyond the domain of language and mind.

Thus he says that the ‘‘uncategorized’’ is indicated by words such as the unity of the two truths, but it has no linguistic or conceptual referent. Its meaning defies affirmation and negation, and any other conceptual formulation.

Mipam describes the transcendent quality of the ultimate in the discourse emphasized by Pra¯sa_ ngikas, in accord with a perspective in which no position is held, while maintaining an ultimate truth that can be conceptually discerned in the discourse emphasized by Sva¯tantrikas. For Mipam, Sva¯tantrika discourse emphasizes the categorized ultimate, the ultimate truth known within a conceptual framework. While the categorized ultimate is known within the framework of discursive, conceptual analysis, there is no such framework demarcating the uncategorized ultimate. Thus there are no conceptual or linguistic boundaries to demarcate what is uncategorized.

Mipam defines Pra¯sa_ ngika as a discourse that emphasizes this uncategorized ultimate.4 As such, he positions Pra¯sa_ ngika as a discourse that accords with the way things are in meditative equipoise, free from duality, in contrast to Sva¯tantrika, which he frames as addressing the way the ultimate is conceptually discerned in postmeditation. Accordingly, for Mipam, Pra¯sa_ ngika and Sva¯tantrika respectively emphasize the two contexts of: (1) the way things are seen by wisdom—as the undivided truth, and (2) the way things appear to consciousness—as distinguished into two truths. Pra¯sa_ ngika discourse emphasizes reality as it is experienced in meditative equipoise when the two truths are not separate.

3 Mipam (1990b, p. 366): don dam rnam grangs pa bden grub med par dgag pa tsam ni blo’i yul yin sgra’i yul yin/ rnam grangs min pa la ni snang stong re re’i phyogs su ma lhungs pa’i snang stong zung ’jug bden gnyis zung ’jug spros bral dbu ma sogs ming btags pa ni mtshon byed tsam ste mdzub mos zla ba bstan pa dang ’dra ba las don du sgra rtog gi yul las shin du ’das pa yin no. 4 A slippery word in Mipam’s definition here is emphasize (rtsal du bton). If Pra¯sa_ ngikas were said to always present the uncategorized ultimate in their discourse, they would not be able to have a presentation of conventional reality, or the two truths, which is an extreme view that Mipam does not follow. By using the word ‘‘emphasize,’’ even though he preserves a context for Pra¯sa_ ngikas to present the conventional truth, the word also brings ambiguity to the definition.

That is, when Pra¯sa_ ngikas are not emphasizing the uncategorized ultimate, is their discourse still Pra¯sa_ ngika? After all, their discourse is not directly characterized by the definition when they are not presenting the uncategorized ultimate. Also, with this definition we can see that uncritically labeling an author a ‘‘Pra¯sa_ ngika,’’ or generalizing an entire text, such as Candrak?¯rti’s Madhyamaka¯vata¯ra, as a ‘‘Pra¯sa_ ngika’’ text is a problem. The definition leaves open significant questions such as: is part of the Madhyamaka¯vata¯ra Pra¯sa_ ngika (e.g., Chap. VI that addresses the uncategorized ultimate), while other parts not (e.g., Chap. XI that presents the qualities of a Buddha)? Or is the entire text ‘‘Pra¯sa_ ngika’’ because it deals more with, or emphasizes, the uncategorized ultimate? How much discourse must be devoted to the uncategorized ultimate to constitute emphasis on it? While recognizing the ambiguity of the word ‘‘emphasize’’ in his definition, we can see the significant place that the uncategorized ultimate has in his characterization of Pra¯sa_ ngika. For the textual reference to Mipam’s definition of Pra¯sa_ ngika, see the following note.

In other words, he represents Pra¯sa_ ngika as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality—the reality as experienced in meditative equipoise. He depicts Sva¯tantrika, on the other hand, as emphasizing the component of dialectical inquiry, a discourse at play within the conceptual structures of thought. In this depiction of the Pra¯sa_ ngika-Sva¯tantrika distinction, we can see that Mipam juxtaposes consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes), the conceptual and the nonconceptual—which reflects the important consciousness-wisdom distinction (or sems and rig pa distinction) in his Nyingma tradition’s Great Perfection. The key distinction between Mipam’s two contexts of (nonconceptual) meditative wisdom and (conceptual) postmeditative consciousness is precisely how he distinguishes key themes related to the Pra¯sa_ ngika-Sva¯tantrika distinction such as:

(1) whether or not there are assertions,5 (2) whether or not the qualifier ‘‘ultimately’’ is needed to modify what is negated, (3) whether or not commonly appearing objects are accepted,6 (4) whether or not autonomous arguments (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, svatantraprayoga) are appropriate in the ascertainment of the ultimate,7 and (5) whether or not apprehension (’dzin stangs) is present in the ascertainment of the ultimate.8 5 Mipam states: ‘‘The defining character (mtshan nyid) of Sva¯tantrika is explanation that emphasizes the categorized ultimate together with assertions.

The defining character of Pra¯sa_ ngika is explanation that emphasizes the uncategorized ultimate free from all assertions. In the context of positing the defining characters for these two, positing a distinction such as whether or not [[[phenomena]]] are established by their own character conventionally, and the manners of forming evidence, etc. are merely ancillary divisions subsumed within the defining characters above. Also, due to this [[[Wikipedia:emphasis|emphasis]] on the categorized or uncategorized] itself, which was just explained, is also the key point of: whether or not there are assertions, whether or not there is acceptance of establishment by own character conventionally, the manner of forming evidence establishing the lack of intrinsic nature as a consequence or an autonomous argument, and whether or not the qualifier ‘ultimately’ is applied to the object of negation.’’ Mipam (1990b, p. 99): rnam grangs pa’i don dam khas len dang bcas pa de rtsal du bton nas ’chad pa rang rgyud pa’i mtshan nyid yin la/ rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam khas len kun bral rtsal du bton nas ’chad pa thal ’gyur ba yin pa shes par bya’o// ’di gnyis kyi mtshan nyid ’jog pa’i skabs su tha snyad du rang mtshan gyis grub pa ’dod mi ’dod dang gtan tshigs ’god tshul sogs kyi khyad par phyes te ’jog pa ni yan lag gi dbye ba tsam ste gong gi mtshan nyid ’dir ’du ba yin te/ khas len yod med/ tha snyad du rang mtshan gyis grub pa zhal gyis bzhes mi bzhes/ rang bzhin med sgrub kyi gtan tshigs thal rang du ’god tshul/ dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar mi sbyar gyi gnad kyang bshad ma thag pa’i tshul de nyid kyi dbang gis yin no.

6 For instance, Mipam states: ‘‘In the perspective of authentic vision—a perspective like the sight of the absence of floating hairs for which nothing at all is found—there are no commonly appearing objects; and due to that essential point, a qualifier [e.g., ‘ultimately’] does not need to be applied to the object of negation.’’ Mipam (1990a, p. 503): yang dag pa’i gzigs ngor ci yang ma rnyed pa skra shad med pa’i mthong ba lta bu’i ngor chos can mthun snang med pa dang/ gnad de las dgag bya la khyad par sbyar mi dgos pa. See also Mipam (1990a, p. 502).

7 See Mipam (1990b, p. 99), cited above in footnote 5.

8 For instance, Mipam states: ‘‘The uncategorized ultimate free from all assertions appears as the object of meditative equipoise of a Sublime One, and the categorized ultimate appears in postmeditation certainty; the former is the domain of wisdom and the latter is the domain of consciousness...In this way, there is a great essential point here that applies to the [difference between] the nominal and genuine ultimates, and postmeditation and meditative equipoise. If this is understood, one can also understand the essential point of whether or not apprehension has deconstructed (zhig).’’ Mipam (1993b, p. 473): rnam grangs min pa khas len thams cad dang bral ba’i don dam ’phags pa’i mnyam gzhag gi yul du snang zhing/ rnam grangs pa’i don dam rjes kyi nges pa la snang la snga ma ye shes dang phyi ma rnam shes kyi spyod yul yin. . .de ltar don dam btags pa ba dang mtshan nyid pa gnyis po dang mnyam rjes sbyar rgyu ’dir go ba’i gnad chen po yod cing ’di go na lta ba’i ’dzin stangs zhig ma zhig gi gnad kyang go nus.

Within the realm of consciousness, the domain of thought and language: there are assertions, the qualifier ‘‘ultimately’’ is applied when negating (conventionally existent) phenomena, there are commonly appearing objects, autonomous arguments can be used to ascertain the (categorized) ultimate, and apprehension is present. It is just the opposite in the context of wisdom and the discourse of Pra¯sa_ ngika that accords with it.

Under the rubric of Sva¯tantrika, Mipam depicts a progressive approach to truth, a truth determined by thought and language. He depicts the Sva¯tantrika as based in a perspective of the two truths conceived separately. While Sva¯tantrikas separate the two truths, the two truths are not separated in the discourse that defines the Pra¯sa_ ngikas.9 The Pra¯sa_ ngikas—while emphasizing the way things are in meditative equipoise—have no claims and use consequences to negate wrong views. The difference between Sva¯tantrika and Pra¯sa_ ngika, however, is not simply in logical form, but involves emphasis on a distinctive perspective on truth. For this reason, we should recognize the fluidity of the categories of Pra¯sa_ ngika and Sva¯tantrika in Mipam’s interpretation, as the difference between them is a contextual one.

Also, an important point of Mipam’s presentation of Pra¯sa_ ngika is that it is not so much a view but is a discourse in accord with a view. Consequently, one is allowed the flexibility to proclaim a Pra¯sa_ ngika discourse in the morning and a Sva¯tantrika one in the afternoon, without being limited to one at the exclusion of the other. While Pra¯sa_ ngikas emphasize the discourse of the uncategorized ultimate, ironically, they do so without making a distinction between the categorized and uncategorized ultimate.10

So oddly enough, we are confronted with the paradox that the defining character of Pra¯sa_ ngika, explanation with an emphasis on the uncategorized ultimate, is based on the distinction of an uncategorized ultimate that the Pra¯sa_ngikas themselves do not accept in such discourse! This aporia is a significant part of Mipam’s representation of Pra¯sa_ ngika. I wish to argue that the systematic exposition of Pra¯sa_ngika as Mipam defines it necessarily entails this aporia, this contradiction without rational resolution, because distinctions become necessary when theorizing about Pra¯sa_ ngika, (but theorizing about Pra¯sa_ ngika is not Pra¯- sa _ ngika discourse!) for such distinctions fall within the discursive contexts of nonmeditative states, whereas there are no distinctions in the wisdom of meditative equipoise nor the discourse that accords with it.

9 Mipam states that the unique object of negation for Pra¯sa_ ngikas is holding onto the two truths as distinct: ‘‘One should know that the Pra¯sa_ ngika’s unique object of negation is the aspect of apprehending the two truths as distinct because if the Sva¯tantrikas were free from this object of negation, which is conceiving the two truths as distinct, then other than that view, there would not be the slightest thing to develop for even the Pra¯sa_ ngikas, etc.’’ Mipam (1990b, p. 97): de ltar bden gnyis so sor zhen pa’i cha de thal ’gyur ba’i dgag bya thun mong ma yin pa yin te/ gal te rang rgyud pa dag bden gnyis so sor zhen pa’i dgag bya dang bral bar gyur na/ thal ’gyur ba sogs la’ang lta ba de las skyed cung zad kyang ’don rgyu med par shes par bya ste.

10 Mipam states as follows in his commentary on the Wisdom Chapter of the Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra: ‘‘One should know that in this context of Pra¯sa_ ngika, since the emphasis is on the great Middle Way, which is a unity and free from constructs, there is no twofold distinction of the categorized and uncategorized ultimates in this tradition.’’ Mipam (1993a, p. 9): thal ’gyur ba’i skabs ’dir zung ’jug spros pa dang bral ba’i dbu ma chen po nyid rtsal du ’don pas ’di’i lugs la rnam grangs dang rnam grangs min pa’i don dam gnyis su dbye ba med par shes par bya’o.

Consequently, this unresolved paradox is a necessary feature of Pra¯sa_ ngika as Mipam has positioned it: if Pra¯sa_ ngika represents the deconstruction of systematic thought, then a systematic exposition of Pra¯sa_ ngika will always entail this contradiction. We can also see this as a reason why Yoga¯ca¯ra plays an important role in Mipam’s representation of Madhyamaka: for in order to sustain a radically negative dialectic like Pra¯sa_ ngika, the discourse must eventually implode—it must turn on itself; hence, it must defer to something else for its systematic configuration. Furthermore, we can see this as a reason why Mipam, unlike Tsongkhapa for instance, does not attempt to explicate Pra¯sa_ ngika as a complete and consistent system. In fact, Pra¯sa_ngika is not a system at all—for it does not stand alone as a coherent structure in a conceptual scheme.

Unlike the systematizing function that Yoga¯ca¯ra plays in Mipam’s works, Pra¯sa_ngika functions to deconstruct systematic representation; it is a discourse that accords with meditative equipoise in that it performatively enacts the nonconceptual— where all distinctions, including the distinction between the conventional and ultimate truth, have collapsed. Yoga¯ca¯ra, on the other hand, frames the nonconceptual; that is, it plays the all-important function for Mipam to situate the nonconceptual state of meditative equipoise within an overarching structure of a system that distinguishes the conceptual from the nonconceptual.

By doing so, Yoga¯ca¯ra is more suited to represent a comprehensive account of reality that accounts for both distorted (conceptual) experience and undistorted (nonconceptual) experience. Thus, we can see how Mipam configures Pra¯sa_ ngika and Yoga¯ca¯ra such that they can relate in a symbiotic way.11 Pra¯sa_ ngika’s deconstruction of systematic thought depends on the architecture of systematic thought, or in other words, we might say that the antistructure of Pra¯sa_ ngika presumes the structure of Buddhist thought. In any case, the integral relationship between the negative and destabilizing discourse of Pra¯sa_ngika and the comprehensive and constructive system of Yoga¯ca¯ra is a significant part of Mipam’s formulation of Madhyamaka.

Conventional Truth and Yogacara

In contrast to Pra¯sa_ ngika’s emphasis on the (uncategorized) ultimate, the domain of Yoga¯ca¯ra plays an important role in Mipam’s formulation of conventional reality, where phenomena are known and discussed as if they were separate from emptiness. Mipam presents Yoga¯ca¯ra-Madhyamaka as a system that makes a distinction between the conventional mode of appearance (tha snyad snang tshul) and the conventional 11 Mipam does not claim that all Pra¯sa_ ngikas must necessarily go along with Yoga¯ca¯ra (Mind-Only), in fact, he explicitly denies this. He states: ‘‘In general, it is sufficient for Middle Way proponents to determine that all phenomena that arise in dependent relation are non-arising; it is not required for them to accept a Mind-Only philosophy. . .’’ Mipam, A Feast on the Nectar of the Supreme Vehicle: Commentary on the Maha¯ya¯nasu¯tra¯lam: ka¯ra (theg pa chen po mdo sde’i rgyan gyi dgongs don rnam par bshad pa theg mchog bdud rtsi’i dga’ ston), Mipam’s Collected Works, vol. 2 (a), 98.5–98.6: spyir dbu ma pas rten cing ’brel ’byung gi chos rnams skye ba med par gtan la phab pas chog gi /sems tsam gyi grub mtha’ khas ma blangs thabs med pa ma yin.

mode of reality,12 through which one can take account for the fact that although things appear to be external, they are not because their conventional mode of reality is Mind-Only. It is not only the presentation of conventional truth that distinguishes Yoga¯ca¯ra, for Mipam uses Yoga¯ca¯ra discourse to offer a systematic representation of both conventional and ultimate truth. The systematic quality of Yoga¯ca¯ra contrasts with Pra¯sa_ ngika, which he defines with reference to only the ultimate truth. While Mipam’s defines Pra¯sa_ ngika with reference to the (uncategorized) ultimate, his characterization not only reflects an approach to the ultimate truth, but also implicates a different way that the conventional truth is represented. Bo¨tru¨l (bod sprul mdo sngags bstan pa’i nyi ma, 1898–1959), an influential commentator on Mipam’s works, elaborates Mipam’s Pra¯sa_ ngika distinction not only in terms of ultimate emptiness, but also in terms of relative appearance.

He makes a distinction between the way the relative truth is respectively asserted in the three traditions of (1) Mind-Only, (2) Yoga¯ca¯ra-Madhyamaka (S´a¯ntaraks: ita), and (3) Pra¯sa_ ngika- Madhyamaka. He says that appearances are held to be mind in the Mind-Only tradition, and that the mind is conceived as truly established. In Yoga¯ca¯ra-Madhyamaka, however, while the conventional mode of reality (tha snyad gnas tshul) is mind, that mind is not held to be ultimately real. Finally, in the Pra¯sa_ ngika, the appearances of relative truth are ‘‘merely self-appearance’’ (rang snang tsam).13 In contrast to the accounts of conventional reality in the Mind-Only and Yoga¯- ca¯ra-Madhyamaka systems, ‘‘merely self-appearance’’ seems to be the concise and comprehensive delineation of conventional truth in the context of what is a uniquely Pra¯sa_ngika account of conventional reality. We are not given an elaborate discussion of conventional truth beyond ‘‘self-appearance’’—perhaps necessarily so— because when we engage in discourses that theorize about conventional reality, we are no longer in the domain of Pra¯sa_ ngika as it is defined: namely, a domain of discourse that emphasizes the uncategorized ultimate—the ‘‘content’’ of nonconceptual meditative equipoise.

Unlike Yoga¯ca¯ra, a uniquely Pra¯sa_ ngika discourse does not make an appearancereality distinction between a conventional mode of appearance and a conventional mode of reality. Also unlike Yoga¯ca¯ra, a uniquely Pra¯sa_ ngika discourse does not offer the mind as the ontological ground for appearances even conventionally. Thus, there is no reality behind conventional appearances to ground reality in the Pra¯sa_ngika tradition; Pra¯sa_ ngika is ground-less and anti-realist through and through. Nevertheless, Mipam shows how conventional reality as it is laid out in terms of Yoga¯ca¯ra can be compatible with Pra¯sa_ ngika. He states:

In general in the Pra¯sa_ ngika tradition, the collection of six consciousnesses is accepted, and there is no presentation of reflexive awareness and so forth, as it is clear from their texts. Yet how is it that just because there is no assertion conventionally in that [[[tradition]]] that one must necessarily understand that [these] definitely do not exist conventionally? For example, like the fact that 12 See Mipam (1990a, p. 528). 13 Bo¨tru¨l (1996, pp. 185–186). For an in-depth presentation of Bo¨tru¨l’s interpretation of Mipam’s Madhyamaka, see my forthcoming English translation of his Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011).

although there is no point in using conventions such as innate mind and great bliss in the Pra¯sa_ ngika tradition, it is not that these are conventionally unreasonable.14

There is no point to theorizing about conventional existence in Pra¯sa_ ngika discourse—a discourse in accord with the nonconceptual. Yet in terms of conventional truth, such conventions as reflexive awareness (rang rig), innate mind (gnyug sems), and great bliss (bde ba chen po) are not necessarily incompatible with the Pra¯sa_ngika tradition either. Similar to his distinction between Pra¯sa_ngika and Sva¯tantrika, Mipam uses a perspectival system to integrate Pra¯sa_ ngika with Yoga¯ca¯ra, as well as tantra. Such a perspectival system can be seen as an extension of S ´ a¯ntaraks: ita’s integration of Dharmak?¯rti and Na¯ga¯rjuna.

In Mipam’s case, however, it extends to become an integration of Candrak?¯rti and Padmasambhava. So the question remains: how do we understand Mipam, as a proponent of Pra¯sa_ngika or Yoga¯ca¯ra? We might think that the fact that he does not develop a uniquely Pra¯sa_ ngika position on conventional reality reflects his commitment to Yoga¯ca¯ra. However, rather than this fact being necessarily due to a preference for Yoga¯ca¯ra over Pra¯sa_ ngika, his representation of Pra¯sa_ ngika apparently necessitates this. As such, he does not develop a systematic theory of conventional reality that is unique to Pra¯sa_ ngika precisely because such theories necessarily involve foundationalist presuppositions. Instead, he positions Pra¯sa_ ngika as antithetical to the foundationalist and discursive presumptions that system-building discourses such as Yoga¯ca¯ra involve.

When we carefully consider this question of whether Mipam is a proponent of Pra¯sa_ngika-Madhyamaka or Yoga¯ca¯ra-Madhyamaka, we can see how the answer to the question of where he stands might be best answered with a ‘‘both/and.’’ As we see in his Sva¯tantrika-Pra¯sa_ ngika distinction, his presentations of Yoga¯ca¯ra and Pra¯sa_ngika reflect a distinction based on different perspectival contexts rather than necessarily entailing incompatible ontological commitments. The question of whether he is a proponent of either Pra¯sa_ ngika or Yoga¯ca¯ra is poorly formulated because neither necessarily precludes the other, and both discourses can be employed to demonstrate the authentic view of Madhyamaka.

Conclusion

Mipam represents Pra¯sa_ngika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Pra¯sa_ ngika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the ‘‘content’’ of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Pra¯sa_ ngika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yoga¯ca¯ra as a 14 Mipam (1993b, p. 561): spyir dbu ma thal ’gyur pa’i lugs la rnam shes tshogs drug tu bzhes pa dang/ rang rig gi rnam bzhag sogs ma mdzad pa ni rang gzhung na gsal mod/ der tha snyad du zhal bzhes med pa tsam zhig gis tha snyad du med nges su go dgos pa’i nges pa ga la yod de/ dper na thal ’gyur pa’i lugs la gnyug sems dang bde ba chen po sogs kyi tha snyad sbyar don med kyang de dag tha snyad du mi ’thad pa ma yin pa bzhin no.

discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Pra¯sa_ngika), the discourse of Yoga¯ca¯ra represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Pra¯sa_ ngika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual. Mipam portrays Pra¯sa_ ngika as a deconstructive and radically negative dialectic. Although he unequivocally denies discursive practices as such in the discourse that defines Pra¯sa_ ngika, we must situate the negative dialectics within the context of his larger hermeneutic project. His larger project incorporates Yoga¯ca¯ra and the systematic portrayal of two truths, as well as tantra, which has historically been the main emphasis, and defining character, of his Nyingma tradition.

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Mipam. (1987). A Feast on the Nectar of the Supreme Vehicle: Commentary on the Maha¯ya¯nasu¯- tra¯lam: ka¯ra (theg pa chen po mdo sde’i rgyan gyi dgongs don rnam par bshad pa theg mchog bdud rtsi’i dga’ ston). (’ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846–1912). Collected works (Dilgo Khyentsi’s expanded reduction of sde dge edition) (Vol. 2(a), pp. 1–760). Kathmandu: Zhechen Monastry. Mipam. (1990a). Eliminating Doubts (dam chos dogs sel). Published in dbu ma rgyan rtsa ’grel, 498–563. Sichuan: Nationalities Press.

Mipam. (1990b). Words That Delight Guru Mañjughos: a: Commentary on the Madhyamaka¯lam: ka¯ra (dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ’jam byangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal lung). Published in dbu ma rgyan rtsa ’grel. Sichuan: Nationalities Press.

Mipam. (1993a). Commentary on the Wisdom Chapter of the Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra (spyod ’jug sher ’grel ke ta ka). Sichuan: Nationalities Press.

Mipam. (1993b). Light of the Sun (brgal lan nyin byed snang ba). Published in spyod ’jug sher ’grel ke ta ka, 465–579. Sichuan: Nationalities Press.

1 This paper is derived from my Mipam on Buddha-Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), and develops an idea I raised therein. The reader can consult this source for a more detailed examination of this topic. Mipam’s Middle Way Through Yoga¯ca¯ra and Pra¯sa_ ngika 439 123