Turning a Deaf Ear to the Dharma? The Theory of *śrutavāsanā (聞熏) and the Debate about the Nature of Hearing and Mind in Twentieth Century China

1. Prelude:

In February 1943, the renowned Buddhist scholar and head of the China Inner Studies

Institute (支那內學院), Ouyang Jingwu, passed away at the age of 73. Upon his death, Lü Cheng

(1896-1989), Ouyang’s major disciple, his successor, and one of the most prominent Chinese Buddhist scholars of our time, sent letters to other students informing them of the master’s

passing and requesting their contribution for an obituary to a Festschrift he intended to edit in honor of the late master. One such request was sent to Xiong Shili (1885 – 1968), the “black sheep” of the Inner Studies Institution. After renouncing the late master’s teaching, Xiong Shili had turned to reviving Confucian teaching with his own interpretive stamp, which he promoted as the “crystallization of Eastern philosophy.”1 Xiong Shili declined rather rudely as follows:

The power of master Ouyang’s vows is great; it is only regrettable that the School of Existence was the foundation of his teaching and that he chose the theory of permeation by hearing (Skt: *śrutavāsanā Ch: 聞熏) as his starting point, a teaching which the School of Existence itself often advocates. Those who choose the practice of *śrutavāsanā as their primary principle, though they invoke the great mind [of bodhi], are not as good as those who having returned to their [original] own mind, extend it out of compassion, there aren’t any [[[seeds]]] which are infused from the outside. (Lü and Xiong, 1984: 179)

Lü Cheng’s furious reaction led to an exchange of letters a correspondence of great importance and interest that sheds light on two important strands of thought during Republican China: the Yogācārins and scholastic Buddhists, on the one hand and the “Pure 1 為東方哲學思想之結晶

Mind” self-professed Confucians and East Asian Buddhist traditionalists on the other. Both drew on tradition to solve present needs. However, the solutions promoted by the first group were often critical of the latter. Why was it so lamentable to Xiong Shili that Ouyang upheld permeation by hearing as an important doctrine? And what was at stake in the propagation of the notion of *śrutavāsanā (wénxūn 聞熏)? Answers to these questions can be sought through careful consideration of the nature and philosophical significance of “hearing” in the Yogācāra tradition, and the role this tradition places on hearing in the process of liberation. More broadly, it is the role of the Buddhist teaching that is at stake here (教). In other words, do scriptures have a role in the Buddhist goal of liberation, or is that goal reached solely via introspection into the true nature of the mind? In other words, where does ultimate authority lie: in Buddhist texts or individual experience? The notion of *śrutavāsanā also serves as a case study of how a notion changes its meaning when it moves from one cultural context to another. While in the early Buddhist tradition the notion of hearing the correct teaching is pivotal to correct knowledge, and hence

to enlightenment, in East Asian Buddhism, doctrinal shifts left the door open to question the centrality of the Buddhist teaching as a liberating device. For some, as we can see from the opening quote, the notion of *śrutavāsanā (or hearing the doctrine) may emerge as threatening the very foundation on which Buddhist doctrine stood. The crux of this contention between Lü and Xiong reaches back to historical debates between the different Buddhists schools prior to the ninth century regarding the nature of the mind. At the heart of the matter are concerns that are difficult to settle regardless of the time period in which they are discussed. The debate also touches upon seminal issues for early

twentieth century Buddhist intellectuals. My approach is mainly textual, focusing on various texts in which the role of hearing— and later permeation by hearing—is a dominant theme. I begin with a discussion of the significance of hearing in Early Buddhism. Next, I provide an overview of the way Yogācāra thinkers such as Asaṅga,2 Vasubandhu, and Xuanzang all problematized the way hearing or listening to the correct Dharma serves as a means to enlightenment. Finally, I will move to the modern period and Ouyang’s view of *śrutavāsanā. To clarify Ouyang's view, I will outline the critique of *śrutavāsanā by two of the most important Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century—Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan—whose positions provide emblematic examples of the dominant strands of thought prevalent in China at that time.

2. Hearing as a Religious Tool:

Hearing is of paramount importance in many religious traditions. The way hearing (alone or as a part of the sensory whole) is understood and conceptualized can shed light on the way traditions understand the relation between humans, our world, and the divine or sacred realm. In some theistic traditions hearing is the primary (and sometimes the only) way to receive revelation; in others, it is the way of learning the lore and wisdom from a teacher or priest. Hearing is a means to connect with the upper realms, which are often understood as too sacred (and therefore dangerous) to see. In the Hebrew Bible, for example, it was through hearing that the covenant with God was heard, received and applied. Exodus 19:5 says: “Now therefore, if ye will obey [hear] my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all 2 Among the Yogācāra corpus the most extensive treatment of *śrutavāsanā can be found in Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha. A slightly different view is given in the Cheng weishi lun.

people: for all the earth is mine.” (King James Bible) In Hebrew the verb which translates as to obey is the same as to hear (Heb: shome’a). Hearing is also present in the early morning and evening prayers. One of the most important prayers in Jewish liturgy taken from Deuteronomy is known simply as “shma!” or “hear!” In the prayer the people of Israel are commanded to hear that “the Lord is our God, the Lord is one” (Deuteronomy 6:4). Hearing has an important role in Christian tradition as well. In his book Hearing Things, Leigh Schmidt demonstrates how Christian traditions in general and American Christians in particular are rich in religious practices that involve hearing, such as hearing revelations, talking statues, hearing divine music, etc. However, this rich effluence of practices was

marginalized by what Schmidt called the “sovereign nobility of vision” (Schmidt, 2000:7) espoused by enlightenment thinkers. In the Indian tradition, the śruti qua—heard or revealed texts—are the most important and sacred. Traditionally, it was held that it was only through hearing the text rather than by reading them that one could comprehend their true meaning.

3. Hearing in Early Buddhism: Yogācāra teaching was not an attempt to replace the older teachings of the Nikāyas or the Abhidharma. Instead, the early Yogācārins sought to give more coherent doctrinal and philosophical solutions to problems they identified in the earlier teaching. Scrutinizing hearing and the idea of *śrutavāsanā was an element of this search for a deeper and more coherent understanding. The importance of hearing the teaching frequently appears in the early texts, which is unsurprising in light of the general importance of hearing in the Indic, especially Vedic, tradition.

As it is well known, each sutta in the nikāyas begins with the assertion that this discourse was “heard by me,” affirming that what follows is indeed the word of the Buddha or the words of his eminent disciples in accordance with the Buddha’s teaching. Here the “heard,” although not a divine revelation, indicates a special status of hearing. As in the Vedic tradition, “heard” speaks to the validity of the discourse that contained the correct Dharma. Another crucial term here is bahuśruta (Pāli: bahussuta Ch: 多聞).3 The term appears throughout the Buddhist canon numerous times including in the nikāyas/āgamas. In their translation of the Majjhima nikāya, Bhikku Ñānamoli and Bhikku Bodhi translated the term as “[those] of great learning” (Bhikku Ñāṇmoli and Bhikku Bodhi, 1995:127),4 or the Bhiukku “who has learned much” (Bhikku Ñānamoli and Bhikku Bodhi, 1995:308).5 This translation is supported by Monier-Williams who gives, “one who has studied much, very learned, well versed in the Vedas.” Literally, bahuśruta means “someone who heard much” or “he who is of much learning,” but here the notion of hearing is key to the learning process and to advancement on the path, hence the common translation of “well learned.” In addition to being learned, the term for one who has attained the first level of sainthood is often translated as “Stream Enterer” (Skt: Śrotāpanna, Pāli: Sotāpanna). The compound etymologically might be related to the root √śru (to hear). In that case, if we understand the compound as a tatpuruṣa, the translation should be “the one who obtained (āpanna) hearing (srotas)” or “entered by hearing.”6 If this interpretation is correct, then it follows that hearing is not just an intellectual understanding of the teaching of the Buddha, but the very gateway to penetrate the mystery of his attainments. True, the tradition does

3 For more see Ran Yunhua, 1992. 4 Sallekha Sutta 5 Mahāgonsinga Sutta 6 This is the way the term was rendered by some scholar such as Masefield (1986:130-136) and Harrison (1987; 262).

allow the pratyekabuddha path in which one can discover the path to enlightenment independently, without hearing a teaching of a Buddha, however, this was not the recommended path by the tradition. No text that I am aware of elaborates on the benefits and ways to attain the path of the pratyekabuddha beyond acknowledging its existence and legitimacy. The pratyekabuddha path is often considered similar to the Chan path from a Pure Land perspective, an effective and legitimate path yet a “difficult,” or, as a Thai Buddhist monk once told me, why reinvent the wheel when we have a Buddha that set the wheel in motion for us? In his provocative book, Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism, Peter Masefield attributed even greater importance to hearing. He argued that, as it is evident in the nikāyas, the “Ariyan eightfold path began, as the Buddha always said it did, with right view. However, since the path would seem to incorporate all aspects of Buddhist practice, this entails that there can be

no practice by means of which such right view might be acquired” (Masefield, 1986:18 of the preface). The way such right view is acquired, argued Masefield, is through “oral initiation by the Buddha” (Ibid.). Hearing the oral teaching of the Buddha is the way of entering the path and the way to achieve the goal. Upon hearing the discourse, the two often happened in a very short time (between a few minutes to a maximum of seven days), although the goal was different depending on the karmic residue after achieving the goal (Ibid.). I am not a Pāli expert and I do not wish to refute or accept Masefield’s bold thesis at length. It seem to me even Masefield would agree that the vast majority of the Buddha’s followers understood the path as demanding more self-effort than merely hearing the Buddha’s oral teaching. Surely, if this were the case, the Buddhist tradition would have come to a sad end together with the Buddha’s Parinirvāṇa. There are also numerous texts where the Buddha encouraged his monks

to practice meditation.7 It seems unlikely that the Buddha would stress this point if it was not useful for soteriological purposes. Instead of rejecting or accepting Masefield’s radical position, I would like to suggest that what really comes out of his book is the centrality of hearing and how much listening to a Buddha or a correct dharma was crucial as a liberative device. The Buddha’s departure presented new challenges for its followers, including redefining what the role of hearing would be, how to infuse the right view into the mind of pṛthagjanas, and how to overturn the defilements created by our habituated mind. These debated questions are still echoed among Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century.

4. Hearing in Yogācāra Literature:

One note of qualification first: the Yogācāra understanding of hearing in general—and permeation by hearing in particular—is broad and complex. Limiting myself to the East Asian tradition and its problematique, I am drawing mainly on influential texts that shaped the way the problem of hearing is perceived in this tradition. As noted above, the notion of permeation by hearing is mainly discussed in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Vasubandhu’s Bhāṣya. It is later also addressed in texts such as the Cheng weisi lun, but, as we saw from the modern Xiong Shili’s critique, fell out of grace in the later East Asian intellectual milieu. In attempting to reconstruct the development of the philosophical and historical complexity of the way permeation by hearing was understood, it is important to remember that most of the Indian texts that dealt with the concepts are not available to us in their Indic

7 See for example the Sallekha Sutta, MN 8 (jhāyatha cunda, “meditate Cunda”) or Dvedhāvitakka Sutta (jhāyatha bhikkhave, meditate monks).

origin. 8 The texts available to us and to East Asian Buddhists appeared either in the Paramārtha or Xuanzang’s translations, each presenting its own challenges. This leaves us with only a glimpse into the Indian context filtered by translations, and the later Chinese interpretations.

4.1. Yogācāra conceptual building blocks

The concept of hearing in the early Yogācāra tradition is inseparable from its meaning in early Buddhism and the Abhidharma, and more generally in the Mahāyāna, and should be understood as a continuation of an older discourse in a new garb. Major innovations in the Yogācāra discourses about hearing, as in the early tradition, are closely connected to the way this specific tradition understood the nature of the mind and the path to liberation. Generally speaking, the notion of hearing in Mahāyāna—or the more extended meaning of śruta, as learning from an authoritative source—became problematic and suffered a loss of primacy. The absence of the Buddha from the world is naturally one important reason,

but one can think also of the removal of the taboo with respect to writing down religious texts.9 Also, one important development in Buddhist thought in early Mahāyāna was the emergence of the discourse of emptiness found in prajñāpāramitā literature, which gave rise to traditions within Buddhism that conceived the oral and written teaching as a potential impediment rather than a means to a soteriological end. While warnings against over attachment to doctrine are widespread in the Pāli canon as well, the early Mahāyāna took it a step further by reducing the Dharma to a heuristic device, a means to gain further insight, a gateway to the mysteries of the Buddha’s message. 8 There are, of course, Tibetan translations but they were employed by East Asian Buddhists and scholars only in the twentieth century. 9 See for example McMahan 1998.

On the other hand, Yogācāra literature in general was a product of Abhidharmic Buddhism. This is especially true in the cases of its two champion expounders, Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, as Abhidharmic Buddhism was well developed in their lifetime. Their writings therefore reflect more Abhidharmic traits than the Prajñāpāramitā literature, which greatly influenced the way they approached the problem of hearing. To better understand the Yogācāra insistence on the importance of hearing, a few words about the doctrinal “building blocks” that were later employed in their analysis of the role of hearing are warranted. The Yogācāra model of mind is different from the theory in the Abhidharma and early Buddhism in that two additional “consciousnesses” (vijñāna) were

added. Early Buddhism, followed by the Abhidharma literature, often saw consciousness as six fold, corresponding to the five sense-bases and the mind. It is the last component, the mind, which received further analysis by the early Yogācāra thinkers. As pointed out by many scholars of Yogācāra, this new discourse was formulated especially to fill in logical gaps left by the earlier Abhidharma, especially in regard to the deeper and subconscious dimensions of the mind. The Yogācāra tradition further developed the model of mind by adding two more consciousnesses, the seventh and the eighth. The eighth is the ālayavijñāna, which Vasubandhu defined in the second verse of the Triṃśikā as maturation (vipāka) and that which contains all

the seeds (sarvabījakam). The seventh additional consciousness is manas, which is defined by Vasubandhu in the second verse of the Triṃśikā as the consciousness that thinks or reflects (manana). Its major role and function, as expressed in the fifth and sixth verses, is to operate based on the even deeper consciousness of the ālayavijñāna (tadāśritya pravartate), which it takes as its object (tadālambaṃ), and its nature is of thinking or reflecting (mananātmakam). In

addition, one other important function of manas is its association with the four kleśas: view of self (ātmadṛṣti), illusion of self (ātmamoha), pride in self (ātmamāna) and the love of self (ātmasneha). In short, the manas, by taking the ālayavijñāna as its object, is responsible for the creation of a false notion of selfhood. Using the ālayavijñāna model, the early Yogācārins also defined the process of causality using different terms. Important among them is the theory of seeds (bījas). The notion of seeds was developed in pre-Yogācarā Buddhist circles in all likelihood as an analogy for our habitual tendencies and to explain the way karma is functioning. According to this theory, seeds are the result of defilements created by past actions. Seeds that were sown by defilements created by our active consciousnesses will mature when sufficient conditions are present. Those seeds will evolve from their dormant state into full blown actions which in themselves create more seeds of the same sort in a vicious cycle Buddhists called saṃsāra. Yogācārins took this analogy very seriously and developed a sound theoretical background to explain the location of seeds in their dormant state and how they come into fruition. It was for this purpose that the two additional consciousnesses were outlined. But how are those seeds recreated? And how do they contribute to the karmic connection between past action and future activity? What is the mechanism that creates our habitual behavior? In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the center of our discussion, causality is closely

linked to the notion of ālayavijñāna. The text describes the ālayavijñāna as having three characteristics: self-characteristics (自相), characteristics as a cause (因相) and characteristics as a result (果相). Both characteristics as a cause and as a result are relevant for our notion of continuity and causality. The second characteristic of ālayavijñāna is defined as the state where

it is “the cause of manifestation of all defiled dharmas.”10 The third, characteristic of ālayavijñāna as a result, is defined as the fact that “the ālayavijñāna continues and recreates based on the beginningless permeation of those defiled dharmas.”11 According to the Yogācārins, the way to stop the recreation of seeds is to extinguish the container of all those seeds, the ālayavijñāna. This is the process called “transformation of the basis” (Skt: āśraya-parāvṛtti Ch: 轉依). But how can we begin a process of the purification of a defiled mind?

4.2 Permeation by Hearing

4.2.1 In Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha Asaṅga understood the notion of permeation, from which the concept of permeation by hearing is derived as explained: Again, what do we mean by permeation (Skt: vāsanā Ch: 薰習)?12 What does the term permeation try to convey? It means that based on another dharmas all is born and perishes. [Permeation] conveys the nature of giving rise to other causes. It is like sesame seeds,13 which are perfumed by the scent of the flower; the sesame and flower are born and perish simultaneously. The sesame seeds can be born again and become the cause of that scent. So too it is with someone who acts with lust etc. The permeated acts of lust etc. are simultaneously born and perish with other acts of lust etc. This mind [of lustful thought] arises while becoming the cause for the rise of other [[[lustful]]] thoughts.14 But if a defiled seed leads to a new defiled seed in a vicious cycle, how can one attain liberation? How can a defiled mind embark on a path toward liberation? There must be pure seeds which give the initial “push,” but where do those seeds come from? Asaṅga quoted the

10T31. 1594.134b27-8 "謂即如是一切種子阿賴耶識。於一切時與彼雜染品類諸法現前為因”. 11 T31. 1594.134c01 “謂即依彼雜染品法無始時來所有薰習。阿賴耶識相續而生。” 12 Paramārtha gives 習氣 13 While Paramārtha gives sesame seeds 麻 Xuanzang gives 苣藤 which is another name for sesame. 14 T31.1594.0134c02-10

Buddha saying, “Based on the words of others and their content, each contemplates within himself according to reason. With this [contemplation] as a cause, right view is born.”15Even before the discussion of permeation by hearing, Asaṅga had already established the importance of hearing. In addition, Asaṅga emphasized that after one hears the correct dharma, one has to carefully reflect on the dharma (如理作意, yoniśo-manaskāra). As we will see below, Ouyang constantly referred to hearing and careful reflection as a duo that goes hand in hand. The need for careful reflection is not limited to Yogācāra; it is a standard

formula in the Nikāyas/Āgamas16 as well as in Abhidharma literature.17However, things cease to be as simple in the post-Nikāyas stage. During the centuries after the Buddha’s death, the Abhidharmikas problematized doctrinal points taken for granted in the Nikāyas. Both Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were part of the Abhidarma tradition and their discussion of hearing reflected a later development of Abhidharma debate using a unique Yogācāra framework.

4.2.2 Permeation of hearing as infusing seeds from the dharmadhatū In his Mahāyānasaṃgraha Asaṅga gives the following account of permeation by hearing: Q: And again, how is this maturing consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna), which is the sum of all seeds and the cause of all defilements, able to serve as an antidote consciousness, seeds of purified consciousness and a supramundane consciousness? If someone has never been permeated [by pure seeds], one definitely has not [this kind of] permeated [[[pure]] seeds]. And if one has no such permeation, where are the [[[pure]]] seeds born from? Please answer that.

A: It is from the purest dharmadhatū that the correct permeation by hearing is born. . 15《攝大乘論本》卷 1：「謂世尊說。依他言音及內各別如理作意。由此為因正見得生。」(CBETA, T31, no. 1594, p. 136, b16-17) 16 Consider, for example, the answer of Mahākoṭṭhita “There are two causes and two conditions that give rise to correct view. What are the two? The first one is hearing others (從他聞) and the other is inner self-reflection (內 自思惟) (T01.0026.0791a01-2) See also T02.0125.0578a05-9 17 See for example the *Jñānaprasthāna śāstra T26.1544.0918c25-26 or the *Mahāvibhāṣā T27.1545.0002b10-11

Q: Is this permeation by hearing [[[identical]]] with the ālayavijñāna self-nature or is it different? If it is similar, how can it be antidotal seeds (pratipakṣa)? if it is not the ālayavijñāna how can the base of the seeds of permeation of hearing be seen?

A: Until the attainment of the wisdom of all Buddhas the permeation by hearing is changing together with the one kind of a basis (i.e. the foundational consciousness); they mix and change together like milk and water. But it is not the ālayavijñāna because [the permeation by hearing] is its antidote.18

A few lines later Asaṅga continues:

And again the seeds of permeation by correct hearing, whether of lower, middle or high quality, one must understand that they are seeds [originated] from the dharmakāya and are countering the ālayavijñāna; they are not stored (collected) by the ālayavijñāna because they flow from the purest realm of the dharmadhātu, although they take place in the phenomenal realm, these seeds, by nature, are transcendental.

Furthermore, even though the supramundane mind has not been born yet, [those seeds] can already counter the tangle of the afflictions. It can also counter the dangerous and evil paths and can counter all the bad karma and evil deeds. And again, they make the meeting with all the Buddhas possible.

In these short passages, the question of the status of hearing is self-evident in Yogācāric contexts. If everything is a construction of the mind through the filter of the ālayavijñāna, what is the status of external hearing? Is it also a part of the ālaya consciousness? If it is, what does it mean for the purity of the seeds created through pure hearing? If it is not, does it mean that not everything is construction or representation only? What will remain of the “representation-only” tenet of this school? Asaṅga’s answer is straightforward and cuts through any attempt to reconcile the problem with a sophisticated solution. The ālayavijñāna does construct the way reality is perceived; it is the “cause of all defilements.” But this is exactly why hearing becomes crucial. It is unlikely that one would be able to redeem himself unassisted of the defiled seeds that his ālaya consciousness carries. There must be an external

source that would infuse pure seeds into our defiled ālayavijñāna, and for Asaṅga these seeds are infused from the purest realm of the dharmadhātu. But then, once those seeds are infused into the ālayavijñāna, do they submerge into the ālayavijñāna and become part of it? In other words, is this a new stage where the ālayavijñāna is now composed of pure and impure seeds? Asaṅga’s answer is again a continuation of his emphasis on the separation of supramundane, or pure, seeds, from the mundane, or defiled, seeds. According to Asaṅga, they cannot be a part of the ālayavijñāna, since these are the seeds that serve as an antidote to the ālayavijñāna and will eventually lead to its destruction. The idea that the ālayavijñāna would destroy itself makes no sense. It must be an external force.

It may be concluded that the function of hearing is merely a preparatory stage, as it implants the pure seeds that gradually bring about liberation and lead the way to the more important stage of contemplation-introspection. However, this is not the case. Asaṅga stated clearly that we need the constant infusion of the correct teaching by means of hearing the correct Dharma, and that it is vital for the completion of the transformation of the basis. He says: Despite the fact that this is a mundane [[[state]]], it is [the permeation] that is attained by beginner Bodhisattvas. [This permeation] is also comprised in the dharma-body attained by śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas, which is the only dharma-body of liberation. And again, this permeation is not the ālayavijñāna but is comprised in the dharma-body of liberation (法身解脫身攝). Just as the permeation [of pure seeds] is gradually increased in those with low, middle and high capacities, the maturation consciousness (i.e. the ālayavijñāna) gradually decreased, which is the transformation of the basis. When all the seeds of the basis were completely transformed, it means that the maturation consciousness and all the seeds [have been transformed]. Then there are no more seeds to transform and they are all eternally severed.”19

4.2.3 Permeation by Hearing in Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya

According to Schmithausen, Vasubandhu, in his commentary to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, has a different understanding of the function of permeation by hearing. For Vasubandhu, the permeation abides in the ālayavijñāna. Schmithausen based his conclusion on the following sentence from Vasubandhu’s Bhāṣya: “This permeation continuously abides (住) in the ālayavijñāna” [《攝大乘論釋》卷 3：「此熏習相續住在阿賴耶識」(CBETA, T31, no. 1597, p. 333, c21)]. The difficulty is the single word “abide.” It is hard to judge, at least in the Chinese text, whether this means that permeation and seeds are one and the same in this context, or whether the notion of abiding entails that the seeds have become part of the ālayavijñāna (see Schmithausen, 1987:371).

4.2.4 The problem of dualism

Problems with the above theory of mind were quickly pointed out by the Yogācāra's adversaries. To put it in the words of Robert Gimello, “Yogācāra, simply characterized, is a kind of dualism. According to it, truth or reality is comprised of two inextricably related principles – mind, in its role as imagination of unreality, and emptiness as the suchness of truth-element (dharmadhātu) of all things imagined” (Gimello, 1976:260). According to this understanding, the two may “appear incompatible and quite separate in their origins;” while the first is conditioned, the other—suchness—is not. How is it that an unconditioned dharma gives rise to pure seeds that condition the defiled mind? If permeation via hearing, as Asaṅga suggested, flows from the purest dharmadhātu, then it is not unconditioned. This point is relatively under-addressed in both Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha and in Vasubandhu’s Bhāṣya. Despite using different terminology, an interesting and possibly different solution is

found elsewhere in the Viniścayasaṃgrahṇī section of the Yogācārabhūmi, also ascribed to Asaṅga. The text says, “From what seeds are the supramundane dharmas born? Saying that those seeds are born out of seeds whose nature is bad (麤重, dauṣṭhulya), is unreasonable. I answer, the seeds of those supramundane dharmas (lokottaradharmāḥ) are produced from seeds which take suchness as their objective cause (ālambana-pratyaya). Pure dharmas were not produced out of a permeated aggregation of seeds.”20As this answer indicates, the pure and supramundane seeds do not originate from suchness but just take suchness as their mental object. In this way, Asaṅga maintained the dualism of unconditioned suchness and conditioned imagined reality, while at the same time allowing suchness to have an indirect function in the soteriological path. Yet the notion of seeds not coming directly from suchness but only taking suchness as an object suggests a different solution than that asserted in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

4.2.5 Permeation by Hearing in the Cheng weishi lun Tracing the precise moment these ideas emerged within the Yogācāra is difficult, but it is evident that around the seventh century, the Dharmapāla-Xuanzang School, while still maintaining a similar emphasis on the importance of hearing and recognition of an external

aid to the mind, had considered ways to bridge the gap between the pure realm of dharmadhātu and the defiled ālayavijñāna. Nothing is taken for granted in the later tradition−the nature of seeds and if and how they are different from permeation (vāsanā)−all received a thorough treatment. The Cheng weishi lun, in its abstruse style, allows us only a glimpse into those later developments.

20《瑜伽師地論》卷 52：「諸出世間法從何種子生。若言麁重自性種子為種子生。不應道理。答諸出世間 法從真如所緣緣種子生。非彼習氣積集種子所生。」(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, p. 589, a14-17)

According to the text, there were several theories regarding the origin of seeds. For Asaṅga, almost all seeds were included in the ālayavijñāna, excluding the seeds of the pure and supramundane dharmas, whose source is the dharmadhātu. The first opinion, which Kuiji identified as Candrapāla’s, stated, “All seeds originally existed, they are not born by permeation, and the power of permeation can only increase them.”21 Candrapāla then supported his view with quotations from texts such as the *Mahāyāna-Abhidharmasūtra and the Yogācārabhūmi, which attested to the fact that all seeds are already in the ālaya. Of course, this position is contrary to the one outlined by Asaṅga. A second opinion, attributed by Kuiji to Nanda and Prasenajit, is the position that stated that all seeds are born out of permeation. Both the perfumer and the perfumed exist from time immemorial, therefore the seeds exist from time immemorial as well.22 This opinion is also supported by scriptural evidence deemed by the authors as sustaining their argument, mainly

from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

These two opposing views differ on whether the source of the seeds is external or internal, but essentially agree that regardless of the source, the whole process has been in effect since time immemorial. The seeds are either all in the ālayāvijñāna already or are acquired externally from time immemorial. The difference is found in the way the holders of the two opinions understood the notion of vāsanā. For Candrapāla, vāsanā is the action that gives the right conditions for the seeds to bloom. For Nanda and Prasanjit, the vāsana is merely a synonym for the seeds. As the perfumer and the perfumed have existed from time immemorial, the same thing can be said about the seeds.

21《成唯識論》卷 2：「一切種子皆本性有不從熏生。由熏習力但可增長」(CBETA, T31, no. 1585, p. 8, a21-22) 22 T31.1585.0008b07

The text then moves to the orthodox and “right view,” espoused by the Cheng weishi lun and attributed to Dharmapāla. According to this view, there are two kinds of seeds: created and inherited. After refuting the two earlier opinions, the text proceeds to a rejection of the notion of pure mind, attributed to the Vibhajyavādins.23After the author has argued against the Vibhajyavādins and established the view stated above, the text treats the notion of permeation by hearing according to this view, which is of interest to the way this theory was understood by Ouyang and therefore also by Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan, and (more generally) in East Asian Faxiang circles.24 Since this text is crucial I quote it in its entirety: 然契經說心性淨者說心空理所顯真如。 真如是心真實性故。或說心體非煩惱故 名性本淨。非有漏心性是無漏故名本 淨。

由此應信。有諸有情無始時來有無漏種 不由熏習法爾成就。後勝進位熏令增 長。無漏法起以此為因。無漏起時復熏 成種。有漏法種類此應知。

However, when the scripture25 is talking about the pure mind, it is talking about suchness, which is revealed by the principle of emptiness, because suchness is the true nature of the mind. Or alternatively, [the scripture] says that the mind in itself is not afflicted and hence [the mind] is said to be originally pure in its nature. It is not the case that the contaminated mind is named originally pure because its nature is uncontaminated.

Therefore, one must believe that all sentient beings since time immemorial have uncontaminated seeds that are not created by the permeation but arise spontaneously. Later [practitioners] in advance stages increase those seeds by permeation. This is the cause of the uncontaminated dharmas. When seeds of

23 Since this position was not originally one of the discussed positions and since, as we will see below, this was the most predominant position in East Asia, it is hard avoiding the speculation that Xuanzang does not incidentally insert the rejection of the Vibhajyavādins’ position. It seems as if Xuanzang found a suitable place in the text to insert his critique of the growing tendency in his native China to see the cause of the rise of pure dharmas not in seeds but in the pure mind itself. 24 T31.1585.0009a05-21 25 The sūtra is identified by Kuiji and Zhizhou as Śrīmālādevīsiṃha nāda sūtra

諸聖教中雖說內種定有熏習。而不定說 一切種子皆熏故生。寧全撥無本有種 子。

然本有種亦由熏習令其增盛方能得果故 說內種定有熏習。

其聞熏習非唯有漏。聞正法時亦熏本有 無漏種子令漸增盛展轉乃至生出世心故 亦說此名聞熏習。

聞熏習中有漏性者是修所斷。感勝異 熟。為出世法勝增上緣。無漏性者非所 斷攝與出世法正為因緣。此正因緣微隱 難了。有寄麤顯勝增上緣方便說為出世 心種。 uncontaminated dharmas arise, they again perfume and create other [uncontaminated] seeds. One must understand that the same process happens with seeds of contaminated dharmas.

Despite the fact that the sacred teachings are saying that internal seeds are necessarily perfumed, they do not necessarily say that all seeds are born due to permeation. How can one [understand the scriptures] as completely rejecting the innate seeds?

But because the innate seeds cannot attain the fruits unless they are permeated and hence advanced, the scriptures say that internal seeds are necessarily permeated.

[The scriptures’] notion of permeation by hearing is not only limited to the permeation of the contaminated seeds. When one hears the correct dharma the uncontaminated seeds gradually grow as well until they give rise to supramundane mind, therefore it is called permeation by hearing.

The contaminated seeds [which exist] when permeation of hearing takes place will be destroyed by cultivation. The resultant superior maturation is an auxiliary condition (adhipati-pratyaya) to the supramundane mind. The uncontaminated seeds, which in the process of permeation by hearing are not destroyed, serve as the direct cause (hetupratyaya). This direct cause is hidden and hard to comprehend. It is for the purpose of skilful means [that those texts such as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha] discuss the gross [impure seeds] and reveal the

contributory cause [i.e., the contaminated seeds] as seeds of the supramundane mind.

The Cheng weishi lun rejects, de facto, Asaṅga’s position in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. While it is rare for someone within the lineage to say that Asaṅga was simply wrong, we see the author resorting to the notion of skilful means (upāya), a standard way in the Mahāyāna tradition of saying that a certain position is not final and warrants further explication (neyārtha). As for the Cheng weishi lun, its view is that not all seeds are external, some are

internal; they are invigorated and increased by permeation, but are not created by it. The author of the Cheng weishi lun makes it clear that when the text uses the notion of the supramundane realm of suchness it is epistemic and not ontological. In other words, suchness is used as a way of indicating a Buddha or a saint capable of seeing things as they really are and understanding the principle of emptiness. Suchness is not an entity and not a metaphysical realm. It is this middle ground that, as we will see below, is also echoed in Lü Cheng’s response to Xiong Shili.26 We can conclude our brief discussion about the way the notion of hearing is discussed in the different earlier scriptures with the observation that the notion of hearing, what we hear, the function of hearing, and the relationship of hearing and mind are complex matters 26 It is interesting to note that a similar opinion can be found in the nivṛtti portion of the Viniścayasaṃgrahṇī section of the Yogācārabhūmi. In this nivṛtti portion. In Waldron’s translation, “The ālayavijñāna, which holds the seeds of the skillful roots (kuśala-mūla) conducive to liberation (moksa-bhāgīya) and conducive to penetrating insight (nirvedha-bhāgīya), is [however] not the cause (hetu) of the Truth of Origin, because those skillful roots conducive to liberation, etc., are indeed impediments (virodhatva) to the arising [of defilements].” (Waldron, 2003:186). Lambert Schmithausen found this passage to be an interpolation and explained that, “it would, however, appear questionable to uphold such a position (i.e. holding the view that the ālayavijñāna “is or contained the seed(s) of pure or supramundane dharmas”) for a text like the nivṛtti portion where ālayavijñāna is regarded to be essentially, a kind of principle of pollution.” (Schmithausen, 1987:77)

understood in manifold ways. However, regardless of the answer, it is clear that, at least in Abhidharma and Yogācāra teachings (things are less clear cut in the prajñāpāramitā literature and Madhyamaka teaching), there is little doubt about the importance of the Buddha’s teaching for the path. When we move to the East Asian context, this certainty is shaken and the status of the “external teaching” is significantly devaluated.

4.3 The dominant East Asian approach

4.3.1 The Tathāgatagarbha Teaching of East Asian Buddhism It is a well known fact that the teaching of Tathāgatagarbha became the quintessential East Asian Buddhist doctrine and that its place has always been secure as one of the advanced teachings of Buddhism in the doxographies or panjiao system of the different East Asian schools. By contrast, the major Indian schools such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra were often considered partial teachings in need of further explications (Skt. neyārtha; Ch. 不了義).

The primacy of Tathāgatagarbha teaching became securely established during the late Tang dynasty and was rarely challenged until the twentieth century Yogācāra revival. Later debates were focused on different interpretations of the teaching and less on its validity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline the trajectory of this predominant strand of thought and the different nuances developed in China. Here I will only outline briefly the gist of the teaching as it appeared in the Awakening of Faith--the text both Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan understood as one of the most important texts in outlining the principle of tathāgatagarbha. It

is to this text we must turn for the doctrinal backbone that informed Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan’s later criticism.27 To simplify a complex topic, we can resort to the well known simile of the sea and the wave from the Awakening of Faith: It is like the relationship that exists between the water of the ocean and its waves, stirred by the wind. Water and wind are inseparable; but water is not mobile by its nature, and if the wind stops, the movement ceases. But the wet nature remains undestroyed. Likewise, man’s mind, pure in its own nature, is stirred by the wind of ignorance. Both Mind and ignorance have no particular forms of their own and they are inseparable. Yet Mind is not mobile by nature, and if ignorance ceases, then the continuity [of deluded activities] ceases. But the essential nature of wisdom remains undestroyed.” (Hakeda 196 7:41)

The key to this allegory was outlined by Fazang in his commentary on the Awakening of Faith: The mind not subject to birth-and-death is stirred by the wind of ignorance to give rise to birth-and-death. Therefore [the text] says that the mind subject to birth-and-death is based on the mind not subject to birth-and-death. Still, even though there are these two [aspects of the one] mind, there are not two [separate] essences. It is only in terms of these two aspects [of the one mind] that [the text] is able to explain the dependence of phenomenal appearances. It is like [the case of] unmoving water that is blown by the wind to become moving water. Even though stillness and motions are different, the essence of the water is one…..the intrinsically pure mind is called the tathāgatagarbha. It is stirred by the wind of ignorance to give rise to birth-and-death. (Gregory, 1991:181)

The view of pure mind as an ontic foundation that “gives rise” to the phenomenal and active world was further elaborated later in the tradition with more ontological emphasis than what the original author of the Awakening of Faith may have intended. One of the questions that remain open is whether the tathāgatagarbha indeed gives rise to the phenomenal world, and, if so, then what is the source of ignorance? Whichever answer is given, as Xiong Shili will tell us below, the solution arises from the pure mind itself. He asserts that the pure mind already

27 The major characteristics of the tathāgatagarbha teaching outlined in many scholarly works and needs not to be repeated here. For more see for example Gimello, 1976; Buswell, 1989; Gregory, 1991; Lusthaus, 2002 and recently also Chu, 2006.

possesses the cause for enlightenment, which is not acquired from external sources, as was postulated by Asaṅga. While this view was very likely a derivation from the Yogācāra tradition’s view of the constructed world as created by the defiled ālayavijñāna, the Tathāgatagarbhins transformed the epistemological teaching into a solid idealist-ontology, in which this pure mind actually gives rise to the phenomenal world. Whalen Lai attributed the conceptual mistake to the Bodhiruci’s translation from the Huayan sūtra. While the original Sanskrit gives cittamātram idam yad idam traidhātukam, or “the triple world is mind only,” the Bodhiruci translation gives: “the illusions of the three worlds are created (作) by mind only.”28

Although far from exhausting the complexity evolved from such an interpretation of the texts—a complexity which is partially treated in Lai’s article—it is sufficient for our purpose to suggest that it is this ontic foundation of reality that provided a potential solution for the question of the cause of the seeds leading to enlightenment. If indeed enlightenment as well as delusions originate from this pure mind, why are listening or external sources so important? As we will see below, this is the gist of the view held by Xiong Shili. Once we understand this fundamental claim, his objection to the notion of hearing becomes clearer.

4.3.2 Permeation in the Awakening of Faith

The Awakening of Faith does not reject the possibility of permeation of the defiled mind with pure seeds but rather re-contextualizes the doctrine in such a dramatically different way that the whole meaning of Asaṅga’s teaching changes. The text says: And again, because there are four kinds of dharmas called permeation, defiled and pure dharmas arise unceasingly. What are the four? The first is pure 28 《十地經論》卷 8：「三界虛妄但是一心作」(CBETA, T26, no. 1522, p. 169, a15)

permeation, which is called suchness. The second is the permeation of the cause for all defilements, whose name is ignorance. The third is the permeation of the deluded mind, whose name is active consciousness. And the fourth is the deluded objects, whose name is the six sense fields. What is permeation? It is like the ordinary cloth which has no scent. If someone will permeate it with perfume, then they will have a scent. Our notion of permeations is like that, the pure dharmas of suchness have no defilements, but they are permeated by ignorance, therefore they possess the defiled characteristics. Ignorant and defiled dharmas have no pure action, but if they are permeated by suchness then they will have a purifying function.29

Two striking differences from Asaṅga’s teaching are evident in this text. First, the notion of hearing or the means by which pure dharmas would be infused into the ignorant mind are not discussed, noris the theory of seeds. Second, and perhaps the most striking difference, is the two-way direction in which permeation is operating. While for Asaṅga it is only the pure dharmadhātu that can permeate the defiled mind, in the Awakening of Faith the impure dharmas, with their ignorance, can defile the pure suchness. This view of the Awakening of Faith was crucial for developments in Chinese Buddhism. As we will see below it also played a role in the opposition of Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan.

5. Hearing and permeation of hearing as the foci of debate in the twentieth century: 5.1 Ouyang Jingwu and the theory of *śrutavāsanā The revival of Yogācāra studies in the early Republican era was perhaps a surprise to many. Since its decline in late Tang China, the Yogācāra School remained in the margins of the

29 《大乘起信論》卷 1：「復次有四種法熏習義故。染法淨法起不斷絕。云何為四。一者淨法。名為真如。 二者一切染因。名為無明。三者妄心。[3]名為業識。四者妄境界。所謂六塵。熏習義者。如世間衣服實無 於香。若人以香而熏習故則有香氣。此亦如是。真如淨法實無於染。但以無明而熏習故則有染相。無明染 法實無淨業。但以真如而熏習故則有淨用。」(CBETA, T32, no. 1666, p. 578, a14-21)

East Asian Buddhist world. Considered as “less attuned to Chinese philosophical concerns,” (Keenan, 1995:370) and as “pedantic, trifling, mechanistic philosophy that could be barely be qualified as Mahāyāna” (Chu, 2006:271-72), the Yogācāra School may have seemed an unlikely candidate to rise during a time of national crisis when Chinese indigenous culture was threatened by progressive forces that challenged phenomena that were deemed traditional. And yet, it was during the early twentieth century that a group of intellectuals led by lay Buddhist scholars such as Ouyang Jingwu, Han Qingjing, and others, made Yogācāra their focus of inquiry and drew some of the brightest minds of the period into their research institutes. Among them were thinkers such as Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, Tang Yongtong, and Xiong Shili. A review of the historical circumstances that led to this development must wait. For now, it is sufficient to say that Ouyang Jingwu epitomized more than anyone else the Yogācāra revival. He was the charismatic leader and the intellectual driving force behind the

movement. With his polemical style and his erudite writings, Ouyang challenged the long established orthodoxy described above by reintroducing texts, ideas, and the meticulous and philosophically sophisticated mode of scholarship characteristic of the Faxiang School. In addition to his erudition in the Buddhist literature, Ouyang was also well trained in evidential research (考證, kaozheng), a style of scholarship that emphasized the philological and historical studies of the Confucian texts, which Ouyang applied to his study of Buddhism. The result was a renaissance of Yogācāra and scholastic Buddhist studies. Ouyang’s embrace of Yogācāra thought also included references to the notion of

• śrutavāsanā. It seems, however, that the notion of *śrutavāsanā should be understood as a part

of his return to orthodox Yogācāra and that he never privileged the *śrutavāsanā teaching as claimed by Xiong. We can conclude that this was the case from the surprise in Lü Cheng’s

response, for example, and from the fact that Ouyang never systematically pursued the notion of *śrutavāsanā in his writings, including in his outline of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Based on Xiong’s contention and of some of Ouyang’s lectures it is clear that *śrutavāsanā was a part of his oral teaching. It seems that Ouyang’s usage of the term is conventional and may appear controversial only to those with strong Tathāgatagarbha sensibilities, such as Xiong and later Mou. It is instructive to note when Ouyang used the notion of *śrutavāsanā. He used it most often to illustrate the importance of Buddhist teaching, which he saw as having been devalued after years of Chan anti-scholasticism that emphasized the cultivation of and return to the

pure mind. In this arena, Buddhist teaching was considered by many to be merely a skilful means for those incapable of comprehending the teaching of pure mind and lacking the capacity to cultivate it. Ouyang often combined the term with the notion of careful reflection (yoniśo-manaskāra, 如理作意), already discussed above. Upon hearing the teaching, one should carefully think and reflect on it and then practice it—a classical formula that dates back to the Nikāyas. For example, in his discussion of the Cheng weishi lun Ouyang says: “Ample permeation by hearing, [followed by] correct reflection is a direct contemplation based on thought (思現 觀). Uncontaminated seeds are born from that [ample permeation by hearing], the practice of the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment begins through that [ample permeation by hearing], the three marks of dharma (impermanence, non-self and quiescence of nirvāṇa) are deeply internalized, and the shared characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of all dharmas are realized and

known” (Ouyang, 1976:1359).30 In other words, the permeation by hearing followed by careful reflection is the gateway to knowledge of the fundamentals of Buddhism. Another example comes from a letter Ouyang wrote to his friend Zhang Xingyan, a revolutionary and one of the editors of the well-known newspaper Subao. In the letter Ouyang discusses the characteristics of the Inner Studies Institute. One of the points he mentions is the method of study employed by the Institute, of which he says: “We rely on the authority of scriptures (聖言量) as a means for reasoning (比量), and we [cultivate] the permeation of ample hearing and careful reflection in order to give rise to future uncontaminated seeds”31 (Ouyang, 1976:1542). Here, again, Ouyang demonstrated how reliance on the Buddhist teaching as an authority is crucial for the soteriological goal of Buddhism. Both of the passages should be interpreted against the background of the Buddhism of Ouyang’s day and the flaws against which he wished to protest.

5.2 Opposition for the theory of *śrutavāsanā: Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan

It might be surprising at first that the opposition to the notion of *śrutavāsanā was spearheaded by Confucian thinkers such as Xiong and Mou and not by traditional Buddhists. While traditional Buddhists may have objected to Ouyang’s primacy of Yogācāra teaching such as *śrutavāsanā, I have not encountered a complete rejection of the teaching among traditional Buddhists. One of the most conservative monks of the period, the Pure Landmaster Yinguang, who despised Ouyang’s teaching, even used permeation by hearing to illustrate the importance

30多聞熏習，如理作意，是思現觀。無漏種子由此引生，三十七菩提分法始於此修，三法印（無常，無我， 涅槃寂靜）於此深契，一切法共相真如亦於此証知 31求學之方法：假聖言量為比量，多聞熏習，如理作意，以引生其他日之無漏。

of Pure Land teaching.32 As we saw above in the Cheng weishi lun case and in the case of the Awakening of Faith, Buddhists often were less inclined to reject a teaching that appeared in Buddhist writings. Confucians, on the other hand, were freer to reject or accept whichever part of the Buddhist teaching they felt was right or wrong.

Both Xiong and Mou criticized the Buddhist teachings for what they saw as ethical and doctrinal flaws. Both were influenced by the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism, which in turn was influenced by the Chinese Buddhist proclivity toward tathāgatagarbha teaching. In addition, both Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan were well versed in the Buddhist teaching, better trained than many other traditional Buddhist thinkers of their time. Xiong Shili, for example,

was trained by Ouyang Jingwu. Although inferior in his knowledge of Buddhism in comparison to Ouyang himself or his students, such as Lü Cheng, Xiong did learn a great deal about Buddhist thought. Mou Zongsan, despite not being a Buddhist or a Buddhist scholar, displayed

a great deal of familiarity with Buddhist thought and a thorough reading in Buddhist texts in his monumental Buddha Nature and Prajñā (佛性與般若).

Returning to the debate between Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili that began this paper, let us restate Xiong’s arguments. For Xiong, relying on permeation by hearing is good enough to lead to the rise of the bodhicitta. However, it is still not as good as “those who return to their

[original] own mind, where there are no [[[seeds]]] which are infused from the outside” (無資外 鑠 See page 1), and later, “How regrettable it is that he took the principle of *śrutavāsana as his starting point. This concept became entangled with the concept of the self, fame-seeking and confusion” (Lü and Xiong, 1984: 180) .

32 See “luckily we have the permeation of hearing [of the Pure Land teaching], [to encourage us] to do our best to cultivate its path (幸得聞熏．勉力修習). See http://www.amtb-la.org/jingzongrumen/jingtuwenda.htm

It is interesting to see the response of Lü Cheng. Lü replies with a surprised tone and says: “I realized from your letter that you are not satisfied with the notion of *śrutavāsanā. I am still not sure what exactly you mean by that. The Yogācārabhūmi śāstra says that habitual formation of one’s seeds are not more than supporting condition (adhipati-pratyaya). This is entirely different from an external infusion (外鑠)” (Lü and Xiong, 1984:169). I could not locate the passage mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi śāstra, but this idea is mirrored in the Cheng weishi lun passage quoted above. I suspect that Lü Cheng either attributed the Cheng weish ilun

passage to the Yogācārabhūmi or drew the conclusion from passages in the Yogācārabhūmi that discuss the origin of seeds as both internal and as a result of permeation.33 Lü, following the model we observed in the Cheng weishi lun, does not verify the importance of hearing. Instead

he is trying to suggest that the pure seeds are internal afterall, and that the external flow is only a supporting condition. Lü also blames Xiong for the fact that his view is “based on the concept of Nature as Awakened (性覺) (which is the opposite of Nature Quiescence 性寂). [This concept] sings the same tune as the apocryphal Chinese sūtras and śāstras, how can anyone judge Buddhism according to that?” (ibid.). This division between Nature as Awakened, or Awakened from Nature versus the Nature as Quiescence became a crucial hermeneutical distinction between Ouyang and Lü’s understandings of Buddhism vis-à-vis the mainstream Chinese Buddhist view represented here by Xiong Shili. Later, Xiong continues and writes to Lü, “I do not object to the notion of ample hearing or learning (bahuśruta), but we must first know the treasure of our own mind and then we [will

33 See for example《瑜伽師地論》卷 35〈1 種姓品〉：「云何種姓。謂略有二種。一本性住種姓。二習所成 種姓。本性住種姓者。謂諸菩薩六處殊勝有如是相。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得。是名性住種姓習所成種 姓者。謂先串習善根所得是名習所成種姓。此中義意二種皆取。又此種姓亦名種子亦名為界亦名為性。」 (CBETA, T30, no. 1579, p. 478, c12-18)

understand] that all phenomena are the manifestation of this mind. If one fails to have faith in the treasure of his own house, he [must] rely on external phenomenal habituation: This is what Mencius called a man that has abandoned his field to weed the field of another man” (Lü and Xiong, 1984: 182). In other words, the Buddhist teaching for Xiong can have a secondary role but the understanding that the real action happens in the mind must be established first. Xiong Shili’s student, the philosopher Mou Zongsan, also rejected the validity of external sources for the pure seeds. Interestingly, despite the fact that Mou could reject the

• śrutavāsanā based on his own teaching of immanent presence of ultimate value in every sentient being, his rejection of the notion of *śrutavāsanā was Buddhological in nature.

In his book, Buddha Nature and Prajñā, Mou dedicated a great deal of his discussion to Yogācāra thought, including two chapters that discuss Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha. In his treatment of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, one can see the thoroughness of his scholarship. For the

purpose of understanding the text, Mou read the Xuanzang and Paramārtha texts together with the two translations of Vasubandhu’s commentary and Yinshun’s commentary. In the chapter discussing the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Shelun School, Mou also treated the problem of the origin of the pure seeds at length. In his analysis he emphasized the compatibility between ālayavijñāna and the pure supramundane seeds. For Mou, like Xiong, the main source for learning about the seminal teaching—of what he later called the “Delusory Mind School” of Xuanzang (wangxin pai 妄心派) vis-à-vis Paramārtha’s “True-Mind School” (zhenxin pai真心派)—was the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Both of these seemed to ignore the Cheng weishi lun which, as we saw, offered a sort of middle path between the two extremes, suggesting that the pure seeds are within the ālayavijñāna already and that the *śrutavāsanā only serves as an auxiliary cause.

31 Unlike Xiong, who was less systematic and more “intuitive” in his opposition to

• śrutavāsanā, Mou was methodical in his approach—well versed in the text itself, the doctrines it discusses and the historical context. He argued, for example, that there is a substantial

difference between Xuanzang’s and Paramārtha’s understandings of the text. His own commentary showed comprehension of the issues involved, yet he is critical of the potential implication of *śrutavāsanā and its underlying presuppositions. First, Mou indicated that what Asaṅga outlined in his Mahāyānasaṃgraha is a gradual path (Mou, 1977:302), which in China has always been considered to be inferior to the sudden path. In addition, he claimed, the passage discussing permeation by hearing in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is emblematic of the Xuanzang School’s emphasis on the saṃsāric dimension, while downplaying and leaving underdeveloped the possibility of attainment of nirvāṇa and the understanding of it. Mou used the terms “phenomenal ontology” (執的存有 論), which refers to the Yogācārins. Chinese Buddhists generally put more emphasis on the nirvāṇic state and the way to achieve it, which he called “noumenal ontology” (無執的存有論). The so-called Yogācāra phenomenal ontology is problematic from Mou’s point of view, both from the perspective of his own Buddhist panjiao and from the perspective of his analysis of the Buddhist teaching. Mou said,

From the ‘nirvāṅic’ dimension (涅槃還滅) [[[Wikipedia:perspective|perspective]]], since this system emphasizes the correct permeation of hearing as an [external] object (客), i.e. an experiential phenomena, it is [in fact] an evidence that nirvāṇa is not a necessary possibility (無必然可能). The possibility of becoming a Buddha, is dependent on the predisposition of the person (gotra 種姓) for attaining Buddhahood, and is based on permeation by correct hearing. As for what kind of predisposition a person has, this is predetermined. In the same way the predisposition to attain Buddhaood is also accidental and [the teaching] cannot maintain its necessity, and cannot maintain the promise that all sentient beings will attain it. Therefore, this system upholds the goal of three vehicles (三乘究 竟). (Mou, 1977:430)

But even the prospect of attaining the fruits of one of the three vehicles is not guaranteed if the notion of *śrutavāsāna is taken seriously. Mou says: Because the establishment of correct permeation by hearing is dependent on ‘hearing the words of others,’ and one can either hear them or not, it is uncertain. Therefore, there is no certainty that even the fruits of the three vehicles would be attained. (Ibid.)

This is a very crucial point for Mou. While his view is close in nature to Xiong’s, he is more concerned with the universality of the Buddhist message that is hindered by the Yogācāra stance. It is this teaching, now preached by Ouyang, which endangers the universal message so vital for Mou’s own school of thought. For Mou, Tiantai stance was the pinnacle of Buddhist teaching. However, despite its promise, it failed to recognize the centrality of heaven and its moral law, being too committed to the Buddhist notion of emptiness. But what Tiantai thinkers such as Zhiyi did recognize is that the Buddhist fruits are omnipresent, and that they

are both universally immanent and applied. This view stands in direct opposition to the teaching of *śrutavāsanā. As in the case of Xiong Shili, Mou did not object to the hearing of the teaching. However, for Mou, the only way to make sense of the notion of *śrutavāsanā in the context of the universality of the Buddha’s message was to make it secondary—marginal even—in importance as compared to the “true and permanent mind” (zhenchang xin 真常心) or “the limitless mind” (wuxian xin 無限心). These two are Mou’s own terminology, but he stated that the Buddhist equivalent is the notion of tathāgatagarbha. The limitlessness of the mind is compromised in the case of the external pure object that is heard, therefore, and cannot be reconciled with the principle of tathāgatagarbha. Following the Tiantai panjiao system, Mou

said that failing to recognize the true and permanent mind relegates the Yogācāra teaching to the status of merely nascent Mahāyāna. Mou’s argument is more elaborate and includes an affirmation of the low place of Yogācāra in the Tiantai panjiao scheme. However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to understand his main contention against the notion of *srutavāsanā, which follows his view of Yogācāra as a whole. He summarized his view with the following statement, One can say, [as Zhiyi does], that the system of dependent origination from the ālaya (i.e. Yogācāra) is a skillful path that ‘stems from the notion of tathāgatagarbha’, and it is not the true meaning of ‘the Buddha nature, which is tathāgatabarbha and incalculable Buddhadharma.’ The [[[Yogācāra]] view], surely, has its value and it is a stage which those who study the Buddhist path must go through. But it cannot be said to be the path that will achieve the [[[Buddhist]]] goal. This is why I continue to study the tathāgatagarbha system i.e. that in which ‘the true mind is the subject (主) and illusory permeation is the external object (客). (Mou: 1977:431)

The problem in following such an interpretation of the Buddhist tradition is that it undermines the importance of the original teaching of the Buddha. Indeed, scholastic Buddhists direct their attack precisely at this point. There is a moment during the debate between Lü Cheng and Xiong Shili in which Lü asserted that some texts that Xiong relied on are apocryphal. In response, Xiong dismissed this by stating that this is a philological matter that he did not wish to discuss (Lü and Xiong, 1984: 183). When Lü accused Xiong of giving an incoherent account of the teachings, Xiong often resorted to intuition and to experience, using the rhetoric of the Chan School (see for example Lü and Xiong, 1984:190). Such tactics were viewed by scholastic Buddhists as emblematic of many of the problems with Chinese Buddhism and Chinese intellectuals in general. That is, there was too much unfounded metaphysical speculation. Marginalizing the doctrine was tantamount to allowing wrong interpretations based on questionable means of knowledge. It was this sort of deficiency that people like

Ouyang and Lü Cheng wished to correct.

6. Conclusions:

This paper addressed a large theme from a rather narrow perspective. The question at the heart of the paper concerned the nature of hearing and whether or not it is crucial for attaining the fruits of the Buddhist path. It is a question with high stakes and a remarkably complex history. To do justice to this complicated history is beyond the scope of this paper. Still, there is much to be learned from limiting the inquiry to a much humbler scope, by focusing on the question of hearing in East Asian Buddhism, especially given that this debate has particular relevance to twentieth century Chinese intellectuals. Why did the question of hearing, and more specifically the nature of the permeation of hearing, became a thorny issue in twentieth century debates among Chinese intellectuals? In my discussion, I showed how issues surrounding the problem of hearing are closely connected to the remarkable revival of Yogācāra Buddhism in modern China, and how hearing is discussed with a focus on the interesting notion of “permeation by hearing” or *śrutavāsanā, especially as it is outlined in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. We saw that underlying the meaning and validity of the term, there are larger questions are at stake, including hearing and its soteriological value, and the role of the Buddhist teaching. The controversial position outlined in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is that a mind that has been defiled for eons cannot enlighten itself. Some sort of external support from the purest realms is required. The nature of this support and the mechanics of its operation were hotly debated in the tradition. We saw from other texts, such as the Cheng weishi lun, that views concerning how the permeation by hearing operated varied and were highly contested.

However, regardless of how different thinkers understood the notion of *śrutavāsanā, none rejected it or saw it as problematic. It is only in East Asia that the notion of hearing became secondary in importance. Perhaps the most striking conclusion that arises from the difference between the positions of Xiong and Mou with respect to views expressed in earlier Yogācāra texts is that when Buddhism was transformed in East Asia, axiomatic views were challenged, ignored, or re contextualized. A case in point is the role and philosophical meaning of hearing, but this is only one example. The interesting issue for us is not that hearing the correct teaching is understood as fundamental to the Buddhist tradition, but that something that was taken for

granted in many Indian sources and preserved in Chinese translations became a contentious issue in East Asia. As shown, East Asian Buddhists usually did not reject the idea of permeation by hearing, but took it out of the Yogācāric context and infused it with their own doctrinal positions (either benjue in the case of Fazang, or Pure Land in the case of Yinguang). It was with modern Confucians such as Xiong and Mou that the debate emerged and that the problematic notion of *śrutavāsanā was clearly articulated. It should not surprise us that in the wake of the modern period old assumptions were reconsidered. As Buddhism became a world religion, new opportunities opened up for Buddhists from different traditions to exchange ideas with one another New texts and corrected editions that became available raised questions regarding the authenticity of East Asian traditions. Thinkers such as Ouyang and Lü Cheng are emblematic of a scholastic trend that—as is evident from Xiong’s criticism—was reactionary and controversial. The teaching of Yogācāra Buddhism saw a remarkable revival in the early decades of the twentieth century. There is no argument—the Yogācāra teaching has been most often the

36 occupation of a small yet influential intellectual circle. It never replaced the deeply rooted intellectual proclivities among Chinese Buddhists and non-Buddhist intellectuals, but the seeds of a more critical reading of the earlier Buddhist texts and the scholastic nature of the Yogācāra teaching continue to challenge old assumptions. We are wise to remember that these controversies took place only a couple of decades ago with the rise of the storm over Critical Buddhism in Japan. Surely, scholastic Buddhism and the East Asian Yogācārins have yet to say their final word.

Work Cited:

Primary Sources: • Xuanzang et al. Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論) T31. 1585

• Xuanzang (trans). Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) T30.1579

• Xuanzang (trans). Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra (攝大乘論本) T30.1579

• Paramārtha (ascribed trans). Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (大乘起信論) T.32.1666

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