Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies
Illuminating Emptiness in a Twentieth-Century Tibetan Buddhist Classic
Bötryl
Translator's Introduction
Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies brings to light a number of significant philosophical and doctrinal issues in the Nyingma (raying ma) tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. In this text, Bötryl (bod sprul mdo sngags bstan pa'i nyi ma, 1898—1959) lays out a systematic exposition of Mipam's ('ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846—1912) voluminous writings on the Middle Way. While addressing a number of specific issues of Buddhist philosophy and doctrine, Bötryl situates Mipam's Nyingma views amidst a plurality of positions held by competing sects in Tibet. By juxtaposing opposing traditions, Bötryl's presentation helps his readers navigate the breadth and depth of the intricate world of Buddhist Tibet.
Bötryl considered his Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies to be a "meaning-commentary" (don 'grel) on Mipham's Beacon of Certainty.1 The Beacon of Certainty is a Tibetan classic of philosophical poetry that integrates the view of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen) with the Middle Way. Like the Beacon of Certainty, Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies presents a distinctively Nyingma view of the Middle Way, and addresses several key points of Buddhist philosophy—spanning both Sutra and Mantra.
Bötryls text offers a remarkable window into the dynamics of Tibetan scholarship by providing a catalogue of a wide range of views that are held within Tibetan traditions. His approach gives a clear picture of issues at stake that otherwise tend to be obscured when only a single tradition's interpretative system is presented. Moreover, looking at different traditions side-by-side reveals the considerable differences between various schools of Buddhist thought in Tibet. Scholarship in English has just begun to uncover the depth and range of competing voices within the different sectarian traditions in Tibet. In particular, the works of Jose Cabezon, Georges Dreyfus, and Jeffrey Hopkins have furthered our appreciation for the extent to which views differ among Tibetan monastic traditions.2 From the antirealist epistemological tradition of the Sakya (sa skya) to the "semirealist" Geluk {dge lugs)—and from the Middle Way of the Geluk to the "other-emptiness" of the Jonang (jo nang)—the gulf dividing Buddhist sects seems to be vast.
Although Botriil highlights the differences between distinct interpretations of Buddhist doctrine, he advocates a position that he calls "nonsectarian." His model for nonsectarianism is certainly not one that compromises distinctions between the traditions. Rather, by contrasting his own views with the claims of several different traditions, he represents his Nyingma tradition within a rich constellation of diverse views. Such a "nonsectarian" work thus involves an explicit intertextuality through which the author defines his own (sectarian) identity by means of explicitly drawing upon others' texts.
We should keep in mind that the term nonsectarian—particularly as it applies to a scholarly movement in Tibet that stems from the nineteenth century—is multivalent. It certainly does not refer to a single system of interpretation. Also, it need not mean that all traditions are necessarily taken as equal on all levels. Rather, a general characteristic of what it means to be "nonsectarian" in Tibet is a broad-based approach to Buddhist traditions that contrasts with a more insular model of scholarship that frames the boundaries of discourse within a narrowly delineated tradition of interpretation. Thus, we can understand what came to be known as the "nonsectarian movement" as a broad set of traditions, stemming from eastern Tibet in the nineteenth century, which developed a common interest in preserving a variety of Buddhist traditions as a response to the singular dominance of the Geluk school.
Like the primary target of Mipam's polemics, most of the positions Bötryl argues against are endorsed by followers of the Geluk tradition. Even so, he describes Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa bio bzang grags pa, 1357—1419), known as the founding father of the Geluk tradition, as like a second Buddha. This reveals an intricacy to his agenda that is easily overlooked in the polemical rhetoric. Botriil also distinguishes his Nyingma tradition's claims from Gorampa (go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429—1489) in the Sakya; the Eighth Karmapa Mikyo Dorje {mi bskyod rdo rje, 1507—1554) in the Kagyu (bka brgyud); and Taranatha (jo nang rje btsun ta ra na tha, 1575—1634) in the Jonang (however, he rarely mentions names). Some of the positions he argues against are also held by followers of the Nyingma tradition. Botriil aligns himself with the Nyingma tradition of Mipam, which he traces back through Lochen Dharmashri (lo chen dharmasri, 1654—1717), Longchenpa (klong chen rab 'byams, 1308-1364), and Rongzom (rang zom chos kyi bzang po, ca. eleventh century).
Bötryl contends that most monastic textbooks of other traditions offer merely a simple sketch of the claims of the Nyingma tradition, "merely the understood meanings of an old grandfather"3 as he puts it. He cites this as part of what inspired him to write the text. He writes in his autocommentary that he initially had no intention to write a commentary on his text, due to the fact that it might appear to be "perpetuating pointless attachment and aggression."4 He reportedly composed the root text while traveling in the summer,5 and later wrote the autocommentary at the request of his disciples while he was on an excursion doing village rituals.6 Both the root text and his autocommentary are translated below.
These two texts are an important source for understanding the contemporary traditions of scholarship within Tibetan monastic colleges. In his texts we can find a wide range of topics on complex points of Buddhist doctrine, which are clearly presented within a beautifully structured composition in verse and prose. Since Botriil's root text is an independent composition, not an exegesis on a single scripture, he does not have the constraints of Tibetan commentarial prose, and is thereby free to weave together the views of many texts and traditions. He composed the texts in the period immediately prior to the devastation of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet under Chinese Communism, and thus, his works offer us a window into Buddhism in Tibet at the end of an era. His work represents a golden age of Buddhist scholarship in eastern Tibet in the first half of the twentieth century.
chen rab 'byams, 1308-1364), and Rongzom (rang zom chos kyi bzang po, ca. eleventh century).
Bötryl contends that most monastic textbooks of other traditions offer merely a simple sketch of the claims of the Nyingma tradition, "merely the understood meanings of an old grandfather"3 as he puts it. He cites this as part of what inspired him to write the text. He writes in his autocommentary that he initially had no intention to write a commentary on his text, due to the fact that it might appear to be "perpetuating pointless attachment and aggression."4 He reportedly composed the root text while traveling in the summer,5 and later wrote the autocommentary at the request of his disciples while he was on an excursion doing village rituals.6 Both the root text and his autocommentary are translated below.
These two texts are an important source for understanding the contemporary traditions of scholarship within Tibetan monastic colleges. In his texts we can find a wide range of topics on complex points of Buddhist doctrine, which are clearly presented within a beautifully structured composition in verse and prose. Since Bötryl's root text is an independent composition, not an exegesis on a single scripture, he does not have the constraints of Tibetan commentarial prose, and is thereby free to weave together the views of many texts and traditions. He composed the texts in the period immediately prior to the devastation of Buddhist monasteries in Tibet under Chinese Communism, and thus, his works offer us a window into Buddhism in Tibet at the end of an era. His work represents a golden age of Buddhist scholarship in eastern Tibet in the first half of the twentieth century.
Bötryl's Works
Bötryl's writings should be seen in light of the development of monastic colleges in eastern Tibet in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a significant way, his texts are an extension of those of Mipam, the most influential figure in the Nyingma tradition of this era. Before Mipam, the Nyingma did not have their own authoritative corpus of commentaries on exoteric texts (i.e, sutra). Mipam made a robust contribution to his Nyingma tradition by providing commentaries of sutra topics (e.g., the Middle Way) based on the works of Longchenpa and Rongzom. His texts came to be used in the newly established monastic colleges across eastern Tibet.
It is significant that Botriil wrote two commentaries on the Abhisamayalamkara, an important treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom,'s Works
Bötryl's writings should be seen in light of the development of monastic colleges in eastern Tibet in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In a significant way, his texts are an extension of those of Mipam, the most influential figure in the Nyingma tradition of this era. Before Mipam, the Nyingma did not have their own authoritative corpus of commentaries on exoteric texts (i.e, sutra). Mipam made a robust contribution to his Nyingma tradition by providing commentaries of sutra topics (e.g., the Middle Way) based on the works of Longchenpa and Rongzom. His texts came to be used in the newly established monastic colleges across eastern Tibet.
It is significant that Bötryl wrote two commentaries on the Abhisamayalamkara, an important treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom, given that Mipam did not write a complete commentary on this text. By providing the Nyingma tradition with its own distinctive commentary on this central treatise, Botriil extended Mipham's project of producing distinctively Nyingma commentaries on important exoteric texts.
Bötryl's biography conveys that he wrote his Abhisamayalamkara commentaries inspired by a vision he had in a dream when he beheld Maitreya holding two mirrors, in which he saw the words of the root text and commentary.7 Here we are reminded that the tradition of revelation is not limited to the tantric tradition of treasure texts (gter ma) but is a characteristic of Mahayana in general.8 Unfortunately, it appears that Bötryl's Ornament of Maitreya's Viewpoint is no longer extant. His other commentary on the Abhisamayalamkara, the Words of Maitreya,9 has been recently republished in his Collected Works.
His two commentaries on Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara 10 are also currently unavailable, as is his Key to the Provisional and Definitive, a text he references in Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies. He additionally wrote a commentary on Aryadeva's Catuhsataka11 (another important Middle Way text for which Mipam wrote no commentary), as well as a commentary on a prayer to be born in the Buddha-field of Sukhavati, a short commentary on Mipham's Lion's Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature (entitled Notes on the Essential Points of [Mipam's] Exposition [of Buddha-Nature]™), and other short texts, including a beautiful devotional text that is a guru yoga for Rigzin Chatrak (rig 'dzin chos grags, 1595-1659), a prominent figure in the Drigung (bri gung) Kagyu lineage.15 These texts are included in his Collected Works, recently published in Sichuan.
Bötryl had many students in the course of his life who were among the most influential figures in the past generation of the Nyingma tradition. His students include Khenpo Chokhyap (chos dbyings khyab brdal, 1920—1997), Khenpo Dazer (Iza ba'i 'od zer, 1922-1990), Khenpo Petse (padma tshe dbang Ihun grub, 1931-2002), Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok ('jigs med phun tshogs, 1933-2004), and Tarthang Tulku (dar thang sprul sku kun dga' dge legs, 1935-) among several others. Khenpo Chokhyap, who was a prominent teacher in Tibet after the Cultural Revolution, studied with him for over ten years and remained in eastern Tibet. Khenpo Dazer, after fleeing for India in 1959, came to teach at the Ngagyur Nyingma Institute in India, which is the largest Nyingma monastic college in exile. He later returned to teach at the Sri Singha monastic college at Dzogchen monastery in Tibet.17 Khenpo Petse, apparently the first to compose a biography of Botriil,18 also taught at the Sri Singha monastic college and in India and Nepal, too.19 Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok founded Larung Gar (bla rung gar) in Serta (gser rta),
a thriving Buddhist community in eastern Tibet that is currently the largest monastic college in the world.20 Tarthang Tulku settled in the United States,21 and has been instrumental in publishing a number of Buddhist texts in Tibetan and English, including Tibetan editions of the root text and autocommentary of Bötryl's Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies.
Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies continues to be widely taught and studied in Nyingma monastic colleges across Tibet and India. In preparing my translation, I have had the fortune to consult an audio recording of a commentary on the text spoken by Bötryl's close student, Khenpo Chokhyap. Having access to Khenpo Chokhyap's commentary has given me a wonderful opportunity to delve deeply into this text, and the recording has been an invaluable source for identifying other traditions that Botriil frequently cites, but without mentioning names. Before turning to the contents of the text, I will offer an account of Bötryl's life.
Life of Bötryl
Typical of Tibetan biographical accounts, or hagiography (rnam thar), the events of Bötryl's life portrayed in his biography are embedded within a mythos of Buddhist culture in Tibet.22 In a land of divine intervention—of miracles, visions, and prophecies—no events are left to mere chance. In light of this, these accounts perhaps tell us more about the context of Bötryl's life than a rigidly "historical" list of names and dates. I will now present some of the important events in Bötryl's life as they are conveyed in his biography.
Bötryl was born in Dakpo in central Tibet in 1898. He was the oldest of four children and had two brothers and a sister. He was a remarkable child; there are even said to be handprints that he left in rocks while playing as a child, like impressions in the mud that can be seen today.
As a boy, Bötryl studied with his father, who was a tantric practitioner, at Benchok hermitage (ban cog ri khrod). From his father, he learned to read, and he also received empowerments, reading transmissions, and instructions. His father told him that he should go to Dome (mdo smad) to study, but his father did not have provisions to provide for him, such as food or a horse. Instead, his father gave him a skull cup and told him that if he did not lose it, he would not go without food and clothing.
When Bötryl was about fifteen, his father passed away, at which time auspicious signs of rainbow lights are said to have appeared in the sky. When his father was on his deathbed, he told his son that he should go to Kham (khams). Based on this—and the fact that from a young age, whenever he heard the name "Kham Dzogchen," he had a special feeling from the awakening of his predispositions—he felt compelled to go to Kham. He asked his mother for permission to go; however, she did not grant it. She told him that he would have to stay because she had a dream that she thought might be a bad sign: some riders (skya mi) had carried off a crystal stupa that she had in her hand.
Around the year 1916, he again asked his mother for permission to leave, this time for permission to go to nearby Lhasa on a pilgrimage. Instead of going to Lhasa, however, he secretly ran off to Kham with some pilgrims from there. At one point on the way to Kham, he stayed at an old woman's house. She told him not to stay long, but to go on quickly. She then gave him a big sack of dried meat to offer for teachings. When he later got to Kham, this offering for teachings turned out to be very beneficial. Later when he was staying in Drigung (bri gang), he thought that this old woman was probably a divine emanation.
He arrived at the Sri Singha monastic college at Dzogchen where he studied with Khenpo Thubten Nyendrak (mkhan chert thub bstan snyan grags) and Khenpo Genam (rfo ru mkhan po dge rnam) beginning with the Bodhicaryavatara. In his time there studying, he did not even take tea breaks; he just drank cold water mixed with roasted barley flour for both food and drink.28 Due to the fact that he was very young, and far away from his homeland, he could not provide provisions for his studies. He underwent incredible hardships reminiscent of the life story of Milarepa. Since he had ragged clothes, some shameless monks ridiculed him. However, when they got to the Wisdom Chapter of the Bodhicaryavatara, he was the most intelligent student, and the harassment stopped.30
He took full ordination from Abu Lhagong (a bu lha dgongs) and received the name "Thubten Shedrup Tosam Gyatso" (literally, "ocean of study, contemplation, explanation, and practice of the Buddha's teachings"). For his entire life, he upheld the foundation of the Vinaya discipline, such as not eating after noon.31 The Fifth Dzogchen Rinpoche, Thubten Chokyi Dorje, recognized him as an incarnation of a sacred being, and henceforth, everyone called him "Bdtrul" ("the incarnate lama from [central] Tibet"). He received many empowerments, reading transmissions, and instructions from Dzogchen Rinpoche—foremost of which he received was Longchenpa's compilation called Heart Essence in Four Parts (snying thig ya bzhi).
He had great confidence in Mipam's tradition, and decided that it was indispensable for him to meet a teacher who upheld Mipham's own tradition.33 Dzogchen Rinpoche told him that it would be good to go to Dzato (rdza stod), where Khenpo Kiinpel (kun bzang dpal Idan, 1870/2—1943) was staying.34 Khenpo Kiinpel, who taught at Gegong (dge gong) Monastery, was a direct disciple of both Peltryl (dpal sprul o rgyan chos kyi dbang po, 1808-1887) and Mipam.
Bontril went to meet Khenpo Kiinpel on a very auspicious occasion. He arrived carrying a sack, and Khenpo Kimpel recognized Bötryl as an incarnation of Peltrie. Previously, when Peltryl was about to die, Khenpo Kiinpel requested him to come back soon. He asked Peltryl how to find his reincarnation, but Peltrie replied that he was not going to have a reincarnation. He then told Khenpo Kiinpel that he need not look for his reincarnation, but said, "It is certain that a monk carrying a sack will arrive whom you think is me—claim him." This turned out to be Bötryl.
Khenpo Kiinpel taught Botriil the texts of Longchenpa, Rongzom, Peltrie, and mainly those of Mipam. When Khenpo Kiinpel was dying, he told Bötryl to take over the responsibility of teaching at Gegong Monastery, which Bötryl did.
One day at Gegong Monastery, a strange bird perched on the roof of a house and made various sounds. The bird spoke in dakinl language—telling Botriil that his teacher from a previous life was in Dome, and that he should go there and "eliminate superimpositions regarding the instructions." He wondered which teacher was in Dome, and then realized that Choying Rangdrol (chos dbyings rang grol, 1872—1952) was teaching the Great Perfection there; so v prepared to leave for Serta in Dome.
He met Choying Rangdrol, and they compared experiences and had discussions about the Buddhist vehicles in general, and the Great Perfection in particular. There, Bötryl was able to "eliminate superimpositions regarding the quintessential instructions." Choying Rangdrol praised Botriil's knowledge of Mipham's tradition, and Bötryl stayed there for a few months teaching to the monastic community. He taught texts such as Mipam's Overview: Essential Nature of Luminous Clarity and Lion's Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature. Also, it was at this time that he wrote his Notes on the Essential Points of [Mipam's] Exposition [of Buddha-Nature], After he had accomplished the purpose of his visit, he went back to Gegong monastery. On the way back, he cried at the top of the mountain when Choying Rangdrol house was no longer in sight.
He continued to teach at Gegong monastery, giving empowerments, reading transmissions, and instructions on the Kalacakra and the Heart Essence in Four Parts, among others. He came a few times to the hermitage at Padma, at the request of Khenpo Petse, and also visited Katok (kah thog) monastery. He also visited Zhechen (zhe chen) monastery at the request of Shechen KongtruL (zhe chen kong sprul padma drimed, 1901-1960), and stayed at Zeichen teaching for some time.40
Bötryl also visited monasteries of other sectarian traditions in the direction of Sershiil (ser shut) monastery. He discussed philosophy with many renowned scholars in other traditions such as Litang Lekden (li thang legs Idem). He debated with many scholars about the fine points of scripture and philosophy; in the end, it is said that he left his opponents "with nothing to say."
After spending nearly thirty years in Kham, the Sixth Dzogchen Rinpoche, Jigdral Jangchup Dorjee ('jigs bral byang chub rdo rje, 1935— 1959), told Bötryl that his mother was sick, and that her doctor wanted to see him. Dzogchen Rinpoche told him that it would be good to go back to central Tibet soon. Since Bötryl's eyes were quite bad, he had previously wanted to go back to central Tibet to seek medical attention. He had asked Khenpo Thubten Nyendrak several times for a divination about his trip, but it had not turned out well. This time he asked again for a divination, and Khenpo Thubten Nyendrak said that this divination showed it to be a good time for him to go.
Around 1957, two years before the Tibetan uprising against the Chinese in Lhasa, he left for central Tibet with many monks and attendants. When he got to Drigung, Khenpo Ayang Tupten (a yang thub bstan), a student of the famed Khenpo Zhenga (mkhan po gzhan dga', 1871—1927), was teaching at the monastic college there. This Khenpo, along with the head monastic office at Drigung, requested Bötryl to stay there and teach. He declined, saying that he needed to go on to see his mother. However, it then snowed many times, making the road between Drigung and Dakpo treacherous. Seeing it as a sign that he should stay, he thought the snowfall was due to the miraculous power of Achi (a phyi), the Drigung protector deity.
He stayed at Drigung for a little over a year teaching at the Nyima Changra (nyi ma Icang ra) monastic college. While there, he had a vision of Achi and composed a ritual text for propitiating her.44 The next year, in 1958, he finally got on his horse and went to Dakpo to see his mother. When he arrived, however, his mother had already passed away. He performed the ritual offerings of the Peaceful and Wrathful (zhi khro) and gave teachings and empowerments there in his birthplace. He then returned to continue teaching at the monastic college at Drigung.
He had taught at Drigung for nearly three years when the uprising occurred in central Tibet in 1959. Many Tibetan lamas, such as his student Khenpo Dazer, who had accompanied him to central Tibet from Kham, left for India during this violent time. Bötryl fled northwest, toward Nakchu (nag chu), and stayed near Begu (be gu) monastery.46
He died in that year, in the morning of the full-moon day of the ninth lunar month. He passed away sitting in meditative posture, as if he had no sickness. When he died, some local people saw white lights and rainbow lights in the sky, and many other miraculous signs such as the red form of a bird flying toward the west.47
When we consider the details of Bötryls life, we may find ourselves struck by the fact that the philosophical rigor of such a scholar takes place in a world where rational philosophy and magic appear to coexist seamlessly. This is a striking feature of the rich culture of the Tibetans, the "civilized shamans,"48 where a sophisticated intellectual tradition is embodied within scholars who, along with rigorous rational analyses, participate in a richly mythic dimension of reality. We can see how Bötryls life is depicted against a backdrop of a divine landscape—a world seen to be alive and pregnant with symbolic meanings. This is not only evident in the way that others viewed him, but also in his own reflections on the events portrayed in his life story. We also find here a moving story of a man who underwent great hardships far from his homeland in order to study Buddhism. In any case, a tangible result of this remarkable individual's life is present in the texts he left behind.
Summary of Important Issues in Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies
The bulk of Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies is structured into three main sections: the ground, the path, and the fruition. The ground can be said to deal with ontology, what is; the path depicts the (apparent) process of transformation, how one becomes a Buddha; and the fruition concerns eschatology, the end result of a manifest Buddha. Or, as Bötryl states it: the ground is the unity of the two truths (relative and ultimate); the path is the unity of the two accumulations (merit and wisdom); and the fruition is the unity of the two exalted bodies (Form Bodies and Truth Body). I will briefly summarize some of the topics that he addresses in the text.
In one of the first sections of the text,Bötryl distinguishes the Mahayana from the Hinayana. He makes a distinction between the Mahayana and Hinayana by means of:
1. the view—whether or not it has perfected the twofold selflessness 2. the meditation—whether or not its method and insight are exceptional
3. the conduct—whether or not it is endowed with the six transcendent perfections, and
4. the fruition—whether or not it accomplishes the great awakening
Throughout his text, Bötryl primarily deals with distinctions in the view. In terms of the view, he distinguishes Mahayana from the Hinayana by means of the Mahayana realizing the view (1) clearly, (2) extensively, and (3) completely. He uses these same three elements to distinguish Sutra and Mantra: in Mantra, luminous clarity ('od gsal) is shown (1) clearly, (2) extensively, and (3) completely. However, in Sutra, it is merely shown (1) by means of a metaphor, (2) as a brief summary of the possession of Buddha-nature, and (3) as a mere luminous clarity that is the suchness of mind.
Early in the text, an important topic he discusses is valid cognition (tshad ma, pramana), the theory of knowledge. He states that different views and philosophies developed in Tibet because of the different presentations of valid cognition. Thus, valid cognition is the key factor by which he distinguishes the different views of Buddhist sects in Tibet.
Following Mipam, he delineates four valid cognitions: two that are ultimate and two that are conventional. The two ultimate valid cognitions are respectively based on (1) the uncategorized, or nonconceptual, ultimate (mam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam) and (2) the categorized, or conceptual, ultimate (mam grangs pa'i don dam). The categorized ultimate is an absence, the lack of true existence; in contrast, the uncategorized ultimate is beyond the mind and so is not even a negation. These two ultimate valid cognitions are particularly important in philosophical discourses pertaining to Sutra, and are also the primary means of distinguishing Svatantrika and Prasangika in this Nyingma tradition.
The two conventional valid cognitions are: (1) confined perception (t shirt thong) and (2) pure vision (dag gzigs). Confined perception is the domain of ordinary modes of being in the world. The domain of pure vision, on the other hand, pertains to an undistorted reality of authentic experience—the culminant experience of postmeditation. The conventional valid cognition of pure vision is particularly important in tantra, as the means to legitimate a divine reality.
In contrast to pure vision, confined perception concerns ordinary experiences of the world, those which are distorted and dualistic. While
there is a degree of validity to ordinary experience, like seeing a rope in front of you as a rope and not a snake, in the end even our ordinary perceptions of a rope do not remain valid. That is, an ordinary experience of the world (for example, as a separate self interacting with an external world) is only true as long as we sustain the working assumptions of samsara—namely, ignorance. When our ignorant perspective, our "confined perception," gives way to a divine world of pure vision, the ordinary world will no longer be ordinary or valid for us; rather, we will inhabit a world that is divine, a world that is pure. Botriil describes the conventional valid cognition of confined perception as that which is laid out in the works of Dharmakirti (600-660), who had articulated a sophisticated system of knowledge in his texts on valid cognition. The conventional valid cognition of pure vision, on the other hand, he says is found in such texts as the Uttaratantra, and in tantras such as the Guln/agarbhatantra.
The fourfold scheme of valid cognition adds a second tier to each of the Buddhist two truths; thus, there are two tiers of the two truths. The second tier plays an important part in his comprehensive interpretation of Buddhism—an interpretation that integrates valid cognition, the Middle Way, and tantra. Incorporating the discourse of tantra within a comprehensive theory of knowledge is an important part of his exegesis, and is a principal factor that distinguishes the Nyingma view.
We can see how this comprehensive approach to truth plays out in his interpretation of Candrakirti (600—650), the definitive voice of Prasangika-Madhyamaka in Tibet. Bötryl points out that ChandrakIrti's explicit characterization of the two truths—the ultimate as "the object of authentic seeing" and the relative as "false-seeings"49—is incomplete.
Table 1. Two Truths and Four Valid Cognitions
Valid Cognition Type Domain of Observation Primary Associations Conventional confined perception way things appear Sutra (Dharmakirti) pure vision Mantra (Guhyagarbha Tantra') Ultimate way things are uncategorized Prasangika (Candrakirti) categorized Svatantrika
He says so because this characterization only encompasses the ordinary way that non-Buddhas understand, not the extraordinary way of the Buddha's wisdom. That is, in contrast to ordinary beings, Buddhas fully know both truths simultaneously, without separating meditative equipoise and postmeditation. For this reason, in the way Bötryl characterizes the ultimate truth, he says that the ultimate is beyond the domain of the distorted mind, but not beyond the domain of undistorted wisdom. Also, he defines the relative truth as the domain of mind in general—undivided into mind and wisdom, because both confused sentient beings and enlightened Buddhas perceive the relative truth (by mind and wisdom respectively).
Here we can see the importance of distinguishing between truth from (1) a Buddha-centric presentation, which emphasizes reality as known by a Buddha, and (2) a sentient being-centric presentation, which emphasizes reality as seen by benighted sentient beings. Bötryl wants an interpretation that accounts for both, and the two tiers of the two truths provide him with a perspectival means to do so. The integration of different perspectives on truth—the Buddha's, bodhisattvas', and sentient beings'—is a central issue that confronts all commentators who seek to articulate a unified and consistent Buddhist tradition. Significantly, the distinctive ways these perspectives are weighted is a primary factor that distinguishes the different Buddhist sects in Tibet. As such, rather than a radical disparity between traditions, as is often conveyed in the polemics of sectarian rhetoric, the distinctions between the sects in Tibet can be seen as one of emphasis—an emphasis on a certain perspective, or a particular aspect, of a Buddhist worldview.
In solely a sentient being-centric discourse, there is a danger of confining reality to mistaken perceptions—as inescapably caught up in a self-spun web of conceptual constructs. An appeal to a Buddha Centric presentation supplements this. However, a presentation that solely describes reality in terms of a Buddha's experience, without reference to a world as perceived by sentient beings, loses grounding in an inconceivable realm without any verifiable criteria for truth. Bötryl, following Mipam, seeks to forge a middle way between these two polarities. An important means for doing this is through a presentation of the two truths, and in this particular case, two models of the two truths. His presentation of the two truths is found in the first major section of the text: the ground.
Ground: The Unity of the Two Truths
Bötryl discusses the two truths in the section on the ground of the Middle Way, which is the longest section of the book comprising nearly one half of the entire text. The central topic of this section is a twofold delineation of the two truths into (1) the two truths as appearance/emptiness (snang stong bden gnyis) and (2) the two truths as authentic/inauthentic experience (gnas snang bden gnyis). The former scheme delineates ultimate truth in terms of the mode of reality (gnas tshul)—the way things are—as known by ultimate valid cognition. The latter scheme delineates ultimate truth in terms of the mode of appearance (snang tshul)—the way things appear—as known by conventional valid cognition. This twofold delineation of the two truths, which follows Mipham's presentation, is an important means by which Botriil offers a unified interpretation of Buddhist doctrine.
Bötryl states that the first two-truth model (appearance/emptiness) is the one found in the middle wheel of sutra and in Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara—the doctrines that treat the explicit teaching of emptiness. The second two-truth model (authentic/inauthentic experience) is the one found in the last wheel of sutra and in the Uttaratantra—the doctrines that deal with the explicit teaching of the appearing aspect of Buddha-nature. The harmony between the Madhyamakavatara and the Uttaratantra, as non contradictory texts, is an important theme in this section on the ground. A central issue at stake here is the relationship between emptiness and Buddha-nature.
Based upon these two models of the two truths, Botriil argues that there are two criteria for delineating the definitive and provisional meanings. Distinguishing the category of "the definitive meaning," as opposed to "provisional meanings," is a common means for Buddhists to distinguish what is really true from what is merely provisionally, or heuristically true. According to Bötryl, emptiness alone is the ultimate according to the appearance/emptiness model of the two truths, while anything that appears is a provisional meaning. However, according to the authentic/inauthentic experience model, pure appearances—deities, mandalas, etc.—of authentic experience are the ultimate and thus the definitive meaning. In this way, he says that the middle wheel (emphasizing emptiness) and the last wheel (emphasizing appearance, or clarity) are both the definitive meaning.
Botriil cites a delineation of the definitive meaning from middle wheel sutras, such as the Samadhiraja Sutra, in accord with Chandrakirti's statement in his Madhyamakavatara:
Whatever sutras have a meaning that does not explain thusness,
Know these to explain the relative, what is provisional.
Know those that have the meaning of emptiness as the definitive meaning. Candrakirti delineates the sutras that mainly express the topic of emptiness as the definitive meaning, and sutras that mainly express the topic of the relative truth as provisional meanings. Bötryl accepts this delineation and argues that just because appearances are provisional meanings according to this division, it does not follow that all appearances—pillars, pots, the presence of wisdom, etc.—are necessarily nonexistent conventionally.
In another delineation of the definitive meaning, he cites Buddha nature Sutras of the last wheel, such as the Dharani Varadaraja. These sutras treat the sequence of the three wheels of doctrine as a hierarchy, likened to the process of cleansing a jewel using progressively refined means. In this delineation, understanding emptiness in the middle wheel is seen as a step toward understanding the more complete representation of Buddha-nature in the last wheel. In this way, Buddha-nature is positioned as the most comprehensive disclosure of ultimate truth in sutras.
Although he accepts sutras of the last wheel as the definitive meaning, he makes a distinction within it. He separates the sutras of the last wheel into those of (1) Mind-Only and (2) Middle Way. He states that the Mind-Only refers to the four Mind-Only Sutras,51 such as the Samdhinirmocana—the tradition of vast activity—in which the definitive meaning is accepted as:
• sutras that teach three consummate vehicles, and
• sutras that mainly teach the three natures in the Mind-Only tradition.
In contrast, the Middle Way in the last wheel refers to the ten Buddha-Nature Sutras,52 such as the Dharani Varadaraja—the tradition of profound view—in which the definitive meaning is accepted as:
• sutras that teach a single consummate vehicle, and
• sutras that mainly teach Buddha-nature.
In the Middle Way Sutras of the last wheel, Buddha-nature—the unity of appearance and emptiness—is the definitive meaning.
Bötryl cites the Uttaratantra, which is a commentary on the Buddha Nature Sutras of the last wheel, to support that ultimate truth is not only a mere emptiness:
The basic element (khams') is empty of those adventitious [[[phenomena]]] that have the character of separability, But not empty of the unexcelled qualities that have the character of inseparability.53
He explains that the first line refers to the relative, and the second refers to the ultimate. Distorted phenomena, which are adventitious and separable from the nature of reality, are empty; they are the relative truth. The ultimate truth, however, is not empty of those qualities that are inseparable from the nature of reality.
In addition to the above stanza from the Uttaratantra, another source commonly cited to support the interpretation of the empty quality of Buddha-nature is found in Chandrakirti's auto commentary on the Madhyamakavatara (VI.95). In this citation, originally found in the Lankavatara sutra, Mahamati asks the Buddha how Buddha-nature is different from the Self proclaimed by non-Buddhists, and the Buddha answers as follows:
Mahamati, my Buddha-nature teaching is not similar to the non-Buddhists' declaration of Self. Mahamati, the Tathagatas, Arhats, and completely perfect Buddhas teach Buddha-nature as the meaning of the words: emptiness, the authentic limit, nirvana, non-arising, wishlessness, etc. For the sake of immature beings who are frightened by selflessness, they teach by means of Buddha-nature.54
Bötryl states that from the empty aspect, Buddha-nature is not like the Self of the non-Buddhists because it is inseparable from the great emptiness distinguished by the "three gates of liberation" (i.e., empty essence, signless cause, wishless effect). He says that from the aspect of appearance, Buddha-nature is not without qualities because it has a nature with the qualities of luminous clarity, distinguished by knowledge, love, and powers.
Thus, Buddha-nature is not like the Self of the non-Buddhists due to its empty aspect. The emphasis on the empty aspect of Buddha-nature reflects the ultimate in the two truths of appearance/emptiness, which Bötryl delineates as the manner that Candrakirti posits the two truths, in accord with the middle wheel. The unity of the empty and appearing aspects of reality, known in authentic experience, reflects the ultimate in the two truths of authentic/inauthentic experience, which he delineates as the manner that the two truths are posited in the Uttaratantra, in accord with the last wheel. In this way, he integrates Chandrakirti's treatment of Buddha-nature in the Madhyamakavatara (which emphasizes the empty aspect) with the description from the Uttaratantra (which emphasizes the aspect of appearance).
Moreover, Bötryl regards both the Madhyamakavatara and Uttaratantra as expounding the view of Prasangika-Madhyamaka. He states that a unique quality of Prasangika-Madhyamaka is this noncontradiction, or unity, of (1) the empty essence and (2) the nature of clarity. This unity, described as "compassionate resonance" (thugs rje), reflects the characteristic triad of the Great Perfection: empty essence (ago bo stong pa), natural clarity (rang bzhin gsol ba), and all-pervasive compassionate resonance (thugs rje kunkhyab). As with Mipam, Bötryl's interpretation of the exoteric scriptures of Sutra is infused with the esoteric view of the Great Perfection. He also echoes the Great Perfection in his explanation of a verse from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras:
The nature of mind is luminous clarity.
He states that the first line shows the empty essence and the second line shows the nature of clarity. Bötryl presents luminous clarity—the unity of appearance and emptiness—as the common subject matter of Sutra and Mantra. In this way, his presentation of the unity of the two truths functions to synthesize Sutra and Mantra.
Another way he shows the continuity between Sutra and Mantra is by including both within a single integrated system. He states that the hierarchy of views in both cases of Sutra and Mantra—in the philosophies (grub mtha') and vehicles (theg pa)—is based on the manner of ascertaining the view, gradually or instantaneously. The higher views are distinguished from the lower views due to their being less gradual. Such an integration of Sutra and Mantra, and attributing Mantra with a higher view than Sutra, is a principal feature of Bötryl's Nyingma view.
Distinguishing the Middle Way View
Bötryl notably distinguishes his Nyingma view from (1) a view that considers the last wheel to be a provisional meaning and the Buddha-nature to be a mere absence—like the mainstream Geluk presentation of Prasangika; and (2) a view of "other-emptiness" that considers Buddha-nature taught in the last wheel to be truly established, while rejecting Prasangika as inferior to the Great Middle Way—like the teachings of the Jonang school. By doing so, he makes an interpretative move similar to the one made by the fourteenth-century Sakya scholar Gorampa in his text with a similar title, Distinguishing the Views.56 In Distinguishing the Views, Gorampa places his own Sakya view, which he aligns with "the proponents of the freedom from extremes as the Middle Way," in contrast to the two extremes of "the proponents of eternalism as the Middle Way" of the Jonang and "the proponents of annihilationism as the Middle Way" of the Geluk.
An important way that Botriil distinguishes the Nyingma tradition from these two traditions is through his characterization of emptiness. In Dolpopa's Jonang tradition, there is a distinction between "other-emptiness" and "self-emptiness" and a preference for "other-emptiness"—ultimate reality that is empty of relative phenomena. Ultimate reality is pure and unchanging in the Jonang tradition; it is "empty" only in the sense that it lacks all that is other—all the impure and impermanent phenomena that comprise relative reality. In contrast, the Geluk tradition following Tsongkhapa criticizes the Jonang. Proponents of the Geluk tradition consistently argue that the ultimate truth is necessarily a mere absence. According to a Geluk interpretation, emptiness is not an ultimate metaphysical presence that is above and beyond phenomenal reality; rather, emptiness means simply the absence of inherent existence in any particular phenomenon.
A third meaning of emptiness is articulated in the Nyingma tradition that Botriil represents. According to Bötryl, emptiness is an inconceivable unity of appearance and emptiness. In this way, emptiness is represented in these three traditions as respectively (1) a real presence (Jonang), (2) an absence (Geluk), and (3) a nonconceptual unity (Nyingma).
Following Mipam, Botriil expresses a unique quality of Nyingma exegesis by not taking an either/or position on either of the dichotomies of: (1) emptiness in the middle wheel versus Buddha-nature in the last wheel, and (2) Prasangika versus the "Great Middle Way" of other-emptiness. Rather, he integrates the two sides of these dichotomies into a tradition that he calls the "Great Prasangika" (that 'gyur chen po). His depiction of the "Great Prasangika" and his treatment of the Prasangika-Svatantrika distinction are important topics in this section on the ground.
Distinguishing Prasangika and Svatantrika
In his characterization of Prasangika, Bötryl notably rejects Tsongkhapa's eight unique features of Prasangika and distances himself from the more radical Svatantrika-Prasangika distinction that Tsongkhapa made. Bötryl depicts how Svatantrika represent the empty nature of reality through qualifying the negation of phenomena, such that a negation of phenomenon is held to refer to its ultimate status, not its conventional existence. Indeed, he says that to negate appearances when the two truths are divided would be to overextend the object of negation (dgag bya), which is an extreme view of annihilationism. Nevertheless, he says that the unique Prasangika arguments negate appearances directly, without qualification. Thus, in establishing the nature of reality, Prasarigikas cut straight to the empty nature of everything. In contrast, he depicts the process of coming to know reality for Svatantrikas as gradual.
Botriil presents the main object of negation for Svatantrikas as true existence, not appearances. In this way, the Svatantrikas divide the two truths and their discourse distinguishes between the ultimately nonexistent and the conventionally existent. Also, they establish their claims of conventional existence and ultimate nonexistence through autonomous arguments (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, svatantra prayoga). Whereas the object of negation for a Svatantrika is merely true existence, the object of negation for a Prasangika is any conceptual reference. Consequently, the Prasarigika's object of negation (i.e., all extremes) is more comprehensive than the Svatantrika primary object of negation (i.e., extreme of existence).
While Svatantrika separate the two truths, the two truths are not separated in the discourse that defines the Prasarigikas. The unique discourse of Prasarigikas—which emphasizes the way things are in meditative equipoise—has no claims and uses consequences to negate wrong views. Tire difference between Svatantrika and Prasangika, however, is not simply in logical form (i.e., autonomous arguments vs. consequences) but involves an emphasis on a distinctive view.
Moreover, what is established (bsgrub bya) for the Svatantrika is the categorized ultimate, an absence of true existence, whereas what is established for the Prasarigikas is the uncategorized ultimate. Bötryl's statements that Prasarigikas have something to establish contrast with other prominent figures in his tradition, who distinguish Prasangika by stating that the Prasarigikas only negate, but do not establish a freedom from constructs.58 In any case, Bötryl states that there is no referent object established for the Prasarigikas.
Bötryl not only distinguishes Prasangika in terms of ultimate emptiness, but also in terms of relative appearance. He makes a distinction between the way the relative truth is asserted in the traditions of (1) Mind-Only, (2) Yogacara-Madhyamaka (Santaraksita), and (3) Prasangika-Madhyamaka. He says that appearances are held to be mind in the Mind-Only tradition, and that the mind is conceived as truly established. In Yogacara-Madhyamaka, the conventional mode of reality (tha snyad gnas tshul) is mind, but that mind is not held to be ultimately real. In Prasangika, the appearances of relative truth are "merely self-appearance" (rang snang tsam).
There is no reality behind conventional appearances to ground reality in the Prasangika tradition. In contrast to the way that conventional reality is presented in the Mind-Only and Yogacara-Madhyamaka traditions, "merely self-appearance" seems to be the concise and comprehensive delineation of conventional truth in the context of what is a uniquely Prasangika account of conventional reality. We are not given an elaborate discussion of conventional truth beyond this—perhaps necessarily so—because when we engage in discourses that theorize about reality, we are no longer in the domain of Prasangika as it is defined: namely, within the domain of discourse that accords with the uncategorized ultimate, the "content" of nonconceptual meditative equipoise. Nevertheless, he explains that Prasangikas do make a distinction between what is correct and mistaken from merely a conventional perspective, and that self-appearance is constituted by mind. Yet significantly for Bötryl's Nyingma tradition, the unique arguments of Prasangika function to undermine the substantialist and discursive presumptions that system-building discourses such as Yogacara involve.
Bötryl further argues against substantialist explanations of causality in the Prasangika tradition such as the "entity of disintegration" (zhig pa dngos po) set forth by Tsongkhapa among his eight distinguishing features of Prasangika. In contrast, Botriil argues that the causality of dependently-arisen appearances just is; it cannot be conceived. The law of karma cannot be fully known, except by a Buddha.
Valid Cognition
As we saw above, valid cognition and the Middle Way are brought together within the two tiers of the two truths: the two ultimate and two conventional valid cognitions. The categories of valid cognition also come into play within Bötryl's threefold presentation of appearance and emptiness. He respectively delineates three types of appearance and emptiness and shows how each is validly known. Drawing from valid cognition's dichotomy of nonconceptual perception and conceptual inference—and supplementing what is unknowable (by ordinary means) as a third—he delineates three types of appearances:
• appearances that are manifest, which are known through valid cognitions of sense-faculty direct perceptions, appearances that are hidden objects, which are known by inference, and
• appearances that are extremely hidden, such as the causal processes of karma, which are known through valid testimony (e.g., scripture).
He makes a parallel division regarding emptiness, making a threefold distinction in terms of emptiness and delineating how each is respectively known:
• emptiness that is manifest, which is known in meditative equipoise through a Sublime One's yogic direct perception,
• emptiness that is hidden, which is known by the valid cognition that examines the categorized ultimate, and
• emptiness that is extremely hidden, which is known by the valid cognition that examines the uncategorized ultimate.
These three emptinesses can be seen to respectively correspond to other-emptiness (the Jonang), emptiness of true existence (the Geluk), and self-emptiness (the Great Prasangika of Nyingma).
Moreover, these three interpretations of emptiness are reflected in Botrul's delineation of three types of Middle Way traditions based on how the object of negation is identified: (1) other-emptiness (Jonang/ Yogacara), (2) emptiness of true existence (Geluk/Svatantrika), and (3) self-emptiness (Nyingma/Prasangika). He states that the primary object of negation in "other-emptiness" is inauthentic experience, the primary object of negation for the Svatantrika is true existence, and the primary object of negation in "self-emptiness" (Prasangika) is any conceptual reference. Accordingly, he says that the two truths can be said to be (1) "different in the sense of negating that they are one," in the context of other-emptiness ; (2) "the same with different contradistinctions," in the contexts of Svatantrika discourse; and (3) "neither one nor many," in Prasangika discourse. In this way, he outlines three different approaches to emptiness in the Middle Way.
Reflections on the Ground
Despite the differences on the surface between these three traditions' discourses on emptiness, it would be a mistake to accept their often polemical rhetoric at face value. In fact, we find a lot in common within their interpretations. Aside from a varied degree of emphasis upon certain aspects of a Buddhist worldview, we do not necessarily find a substantial difference between the Jonang, Geluk, and Nyingma interpretations of emptiness. We can see this when we look beyond the language of self-emptiness and other-emptiness to see that all three traditions accept a fundamental appearance/reality distinction—the Buddhist doctrine of two truths—whereby it is held that
(1) phenomena do not exist in the way they appear to an ordinary being, (in which case appearances do not accord with reality,) and
(2) appearance and reality accord without conflict in the undistorted perception of a Buddha.
Also, all three traditions accept that: (1) the undistorted perception of ultimate truth is not the distorted appearance of relative truth (other-emptiness), (2) relative phenomena are not found when their ultimate nature is analyzed (emptiness of true existence), and (3) emptiness in essence is inexpressible (the uncategorized ultimate of Prasangika). Furthermore, in none of these traditions is emptiness the utter negation of everything—it is not utter nihilism because some type of presence remains. The nature and content of what remains may be where the more significant distinctions are found among these traditions, but such a discussion here would be a digression. The important point here is that while there are clearly distinctions among the views of these traditions to be acknowledged (and thus a distinctive Nyingma view to be sustained), at the same time, Bötryl configures the views of these different traditions in an ecumenical way, such that each has a legitimate place as an authentic representation of Buddhist truth. This is the key to the "non-sectarian" identity of this sectarian text.
Before moving on to the second main section of the text, the path, I should mention one more issue that Botriil presents in the middle of this section on the two truths. In between his discussion of the ultimate and the relative truths, he presents an appended discussion of the legitimacy of the Nyingma tradition. He first addresses the Nyingma tradition as a legitimate path of liberation. Then he defends the legitimacy of the Nyingma tradition's vows of individual liberation. The fact that he places this appended defense of the Nyingma in between his discussion of the two truths is telling: it suggests that the Nyingma is the "middle way" between (1) those in the early generation (and the Jonang), who prioritize the ultimate truth and (2) those in the later generation (the Geluk), who prioritize the relative truth.60 With this defense, we are reminded that one of Bötryl's central concerns is to show the authenticity of the Nyingma tradition. Path: The Unity of the Two Accumulations
Presentations of the path play an important role in sustaining the narrative structure of a Buddhist worldview. The principal feature of Bötryl's structure of the path is a narrative of discovery—a path that is the discovery of the unity of the ground and the fruition of Buddhahood. While the preceding section on the ground depicts the integration of the two truths, the section on the path deals with an integration of the two accumulations, merit and wisdom. Also, while the section on the ground primarily relies on the Madhyamakavatara and the Uttaratantra as the primary textual sources, this section additionally draws from the Abhisamayalamkara. Following Mipham, Bötryl seeks to integrate the disparate presentations of the path as laid out in various ways in different Buddhist shastras.
His section on the path is comprised within two main headings: "abandonment" and "realization." In the first section, he discusses what is abandoned, which corresponds to the truth of cessation. He also explains at what stage on the path the various obscurations are abandoned. In the next section, he discusses the antidote, the truth of the path that brings forth realization.
What is abandoned is twofold: the afflictive obscurations (nyon sgrib) and cognitive obscurations (shes sgrib). He delineates these two obscurations in terms of cause, essence, and function:
• The cause of the afflictive obscurations is the apprehension of a self of persons; the cause of the cognitive obscurations is the apprehension of a self of phenomena.
• The essence of afflictive obscurations is the afflictive emotions—such as miserliness, anger, and desire; the essence of cognitive obscurations is the "concepts of the three spheres" (agent, object, action).
• The function of afflictive obscurations is to obstruct liberation; the function of cognitive obscurations is to obstruct omniscience.
In his discussion of cognitive obscurations, Bötryl delineates three types of conceptuality: (1) concepts of true existence, (2) concepts of reified signs, or objectification, and (3) concepts that are mere dualistic appearances. Each one is progressively more subtle: he states that the first is manifest for ordinary beings, the second is manifest in the post meditations of bodhisattvas on the "impure grounds" (grounds 1—7), and the third is sometimes manifest for bodhisattvas on the "pure grounds" (grounds 8—10). He also mentions five types of "non conceptuality" from the Dharma Dharmata Vibhaga, which are distinguished from the genuine non conceptuality of nonconceptual wisdom:
[[[Nonconceptual wisdom]]] has the character of being free from the five types: (1) mental non-engagement, (2) complete transcendence, (3) quietism, (4) essential meaning, and (5) premeditated signs.61
In contrast to these five, nonconceptual wisdom realizes the uncategorized ultimate. It is significant that Botriil argues that the uncategorized ultimate is a uniquely Mahayana realization. He says that the realization that the Mahayana shares with the Hinayana is merely that of the categorized ultimate. In this way, he shows a distinction between (1) the Hinayana realization of the Auditors and Self-Realized Ones and (2) the Mahayana realization of the bodhisattvas. By doing so, he directly opposes another one of Tsongkhapa's eight distinguishing features of Prasangika—namely, that Auditors and Self-Realized Ones realize the selflessness of phenomena (to the extent that bodhisattvas do).
We saw above how Bötryl associates Prasangika discourse with the uncategorized ultimate, the content of meditative equipoise. In this section of the path, he not only describes meditative equipoise in terms of the object (the uncategorized ultimate), but also in terms of the subject (wisdom). For his Nyingma tradition, this distinction between the subjectivity of conceptual consciousness and nonconceptual wisdom is paramount.
In contrast to an apprehension by consciousness, he states that there is no representational mode of apprehension (mm pa'i 'dzin sdangs) at the time of wisdom's meditative equipoise—during which there is no conceptual apprehension, not even the apprehension of an object's lack of intrinsic existence. Thus, actual meditative equipoise is completely nonconceptual. Also, he explains that meditative equipoise is always without appearance; consequently, if there is an appearance, it is necessarily post meditation. In this way, meditative equipoise is the accumulation of wisdom without appearance; whereas merit, which is with appearance, is to be accumulated in post meditation. Thereby, the path is the unity of the two accumulations of merit and wisdom.
Near the end of his lengthy explanation of various details of the path, he makes a distinction between two types of purity: (1) naturally abiding purity (rang bzhin mam dag) and (2) purity that is freed from the adventitious defilements (gio bur bral dag). Naturally abiding purity is the innate nature of a Buddha within the minds of all sentient beings. This is the principal element in his presentation of the path as a narrative of discovery. From the aspect of this naturally abiding purity, there is no difference between sentient beings and Buddhas. However, there is a difference in the second purity. The purity that is freed from the adventitious defilements is the purity that is exclusive to Buddhas. Such purity is actualized only when all of the cognitive and afflictive obscurations have been completely abandoned.
Fruition: The Unity of the Two Exalted Bodies
In the section on fruition, Botriil presents the unity of the two exalted bodies—the Truth Body and the Form Bodies. A key point to this section is the distinction between two types of fruition: (1) a freed effect (bral 'bras) and (2) a ripened effect (mam smin 'bras). A freed effect is the result of removing something that was obscuring what was already there, like the sun freed from clouds. Such an effect is due to the naturally abiding purity. A ripened effect is a transformation, like a seed transforming into a sprout.
He states that transformation of a sentient being into a Buddha is merely apparent, according to the mode of appearance. In the reality of the way things are, there is no distinction between a Buddha and a sentient being. Consequently, in the way that things appear, a being is newly transformed into a Buddha; yet in the way that things really are, beings discover the Buddha that has always already been their nature from the beginning. In concluding this section on the fruition, Bötryl describes the "three mysteries" of a Buddha—the exalted body, speech, and mind—in a final delineation of the way Buddhas appear to sentient beings and the way they are in a Buddha's own perception.
Note on the Translation
The verses of Bötryl's original composition are offered in the first section as a stand-alone translation, followed by the verses interspersed with his autocommentary that he later wrote. The verses are terse and difficult to penetrate without his commentary, but since this text was originally a stand-alone composition, there is a beauty and integrity to it that tends to get lost when it is only read along with the commentary. Yet the commentary is indispensable to fully probe the layers of meaning and structure of the "root text," so I advise the reader to begin by reading the verses with the commentary (where you will also find my annotations), and later return to the following section and read the verses alone. In any case, feel free to flip back and forth between these forms of text, as I have done many times. I have consulted five editions of the Tibetan texts: a manuscript published by Mewa Khenpo Thubten (rme ba mkhan po thub bstan, 1928-2000), who was one of Bötryl's students; another edition published in Sichuan, China;62 the edition published in his Collected Works;63 and two editions published by Tarthang Tulku.64
My interpretation of this text is due in no small measure to Khenpo Katyayana, who taught me the entire text at the Ngagyur Nyingma Institute in the summer of 2004. The audio recording of Khenpo Chokhyap's oral commentary has also been an invaluable reference. In addition to identifying the targets of Bötryl's critiques, it has helped me more fully appreciate the lively flavor of this text. One of Khenpo Chokhyap's students, Khenpo Champa Lodro, also helped me to appreciate several key points of this text. I also wish to thank him for giving me a photograph of his teacher and Bötryl's student, Khenpo Chokhyap, to print in this book. Another of Khenpo Chokhyap's students, Khenpo Tsiilnam at the Sherabling monastic college in Bir, India, was most helpful in answering many of the questions I had after I had completed the initial draft of the translation in the summer of 2005. I wish to thank Khenpo Konchok Monlam, too, for giving me a picture of Bötryl to print in this book, a photograph that he got from his teacher and Bötryl's student, Mewa Khenpo Thubten. I also owe a special thanks to Khenpo Tsultrim Lodro, who answered several of my questions at Larung Gar in Serta. Several other Tibetan scholars have assisted me in interpreting this text, too many to mention by name. Others who gave me valuable feedback were Ryan Conlon, Cortland Dahl, Eric Lochner, Derek Maher, Michele Martin, Arthur McKeown, Krim Natirbov, Charlie Orzech, Gillian Parrish, Nathaniel Rich, Jann Ronis, Raul Schiappapietra, and Gail Stenstad. This translation is dedicated to all my teachers, and to anyone who is navigating a middle way between a narrow-minded absolutism and spineless relativism. It is my sincere wish that this translation serve to sharpen our swords of insight in a blaze that brings both clarity and warmth, not fan the destructive flames of sectarian animosity.
Notes
Translator's Introduction
1. Bötryl, Ornament of Manjiighosa's Viewpoint: An Explanation of the Words and Meanings of "Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies: A Lamp of Essential Points" (Ita grub shan 'byed gnad kyi sgron me'i tshig don mam bshad 'jam dbyangs dgongs rgyan), 63. For a study and translation of Mipam's text, see John Pettit, Mipham's Beacon of Certainty.
2. In particular, I have in mind here Georges Dreyfus's Recognizing Reality, which contrasts Sakya and Geluk traditions of epistemology; and his more recent The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk, in which he contrasts Geluk and Nyingma approaches to monastic education. Jeffrey Hopkins's recent works, including Reflections on Reality, compare Jonang and Geluk interpretations of the Middle Way. Also, Jose Cabezon recent translation of Gorampa's Igo rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) Distinguishing the Views—which notably has a similar title as Bötryl's present work—situates a Sakya interpretation of the Middle Way in contrast to Geluk and Jonang interpretations. See Jose Cabezon and Geshe Lobsang Dargey, Freedom from Extremes: Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness.
3. Bötryl, Ornament of Manjiighosa's Viewpoint, 299.
4. Ibid., 299.
5. Thubten Tsultrim Namdak (thub bstan tshul khrim mam dag), Nourishment for Faith: A Short Hagiography of Botriil (rje kun gzigs bod sprul bstan pa'i nyi ma'i mam thar bsdus pa dad pa'i gsos sman), in Bötryl, Collected Works, vol. 1, 24.
6. Khenpo Tsultrim Lodro told me that Botriil wrote the commentary on a trip doing village rituals (grong chog) and that this is the reason why there are not many citations in the text (Bötryl did not have his books with him).
7. Thubten Tsultrim Namdak, Nourishment for Faith, 23.
8. The Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, for example, is an example of an early "treasure text" that was believed to have been hidden and later revealed when the time was right.
9. Bötryl, Words of Maitreya: An Explanation of the Meaning of the Words of the Abhisamayalamkara (sher phyin mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig don mam par bshad pa ma pham zhal lung), in Bötryl, Collected Works, vol. 2.
10. Words of Candrakirti (zla ba'i zhal lung) and Ornament of Candrakirti (zla ba'i dgongs rgyan).
11. Bötryl, Ornament of Master Nagarjuna"s Viewpoint (klu dbang dgongs rgyan), Bötryl, Collected Works, vol. 3, 3-229.
12. Bötryl, The Fast Path to Great Bliss: An Instruction Manual on the Prayer for the Pure Field of Sukhavati (mam dag bde chen zhing smon gyi khrid yig bde chen myur lam), in Bötryl, Collected Works, vol. 3, 232-84.
13. Mipham, Lion's Roar: Exposition of Buddha-Nature (bde gshegs snying po'i stong thun chen mo seng ge'i nga ro), in Collected Works, vol. 4 (pa), 563-607; English translation in Douglas Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-Nature, 147-80.
14. Bötryl, Notes on the Essential Points of [Mipam's] Exposition [of Buddha-Nature] (stong thun gnad kyi zin thun), in Bötryl, Collected Works, vol. 1, 261-74; English translation in Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha-Nature, 181-89.
15. Bötryl, Rousing Swift Blessings: A Guru Yoga for the Glorious Teacher Rigzin Chbdrak (dpal Idan bla ma chos kyi grags pa'i bla ma'i mal 'byor byin rlabs myur 'jug), in Bötryl, Collected Works, vol. 3, 297-300.
16. Bötryl, Collected Works (bod sprul mdo sngags bstan pa'i m/i ma'i gsung 'bum), vols. 1-3.
17. Nyoshul Khenpo (smyo shul mkhan po 'jam dbyangs rdo rje, 1931-1999), Garland of Lapis: History of the Great Perfection (rang bzhin rdzogs pa chen po'i chos 'byung rig 'dzin brgyud pa'i mam thar ngo mtshar nor bu baidurya'i phreng ba), vol. 2, 356.2-357.5.
18. Tarthang Tulku also wrote a very brief biographical sketch of Bötryl (misspelled as sPos-pa sPrul-sku) in his Lineage of Diamond Light: Crystal Mirror, vol. 5, 305-306.
19. Nyoshul Khenpo, Garland of Lapis, vol. 2, 359.6-360.4.
20. When I stayed at Larung Gar in the summer of 2006, the population there was around ten thousand. For further information on Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok and Larung Gar, see David Germano, "Re-membering the Dismembered Body of Tibet," in Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet, ed. Melvyn Goldstein and Matthew Kapstein, 53-94.
21. For a brief sketch of Tarthang Tulku's activities in the United States, see Charles Prebish, Luminous Passage: The Practice and Study of Buddhism in America, 43.
22. I mainly draw from Thubten Tsultrim Namdak's Nourishment for Faith. Other sources for Bötryl's life can be found in Khenpo Petse (padma tshe dbang Ihun grub, 1931-2002), A Short Biography of Bötryl (bod sprul sku'i mam thar nyung bsdus), published in Ita grub shan 'byed rtsa 'grel (Sichuan: Nationalities Press, 1996); Nyoshul Khenpo, Garland of Lapis, vol. 2, 354.4-357.5; Tenzin Lungtok Nyima (bstan 'dzin lung rtogs nyi ma), The Great History of Dzogchen (snga 'gyur rdzogs chen chos 'byung chen mo), 715-18.
23. dwags po. Presently known as the district of Gyatsa (rgya tshwa) in the region of Lhokha (Iho kha).
24. Thubten Tsultrim Namdak, Nourishment for Faith
25. Ibid., 5-6.
26. Ibid., 7.
27. Ibid., 7-8.
28. Ibid., 8-9.
29. Khenpo Petse, A Short Biography of Bötryl, 1.
30. Tupten Tsultrim Namdak, Nourishment for Faith, 9.
31. Ibid., 41.
32. Ibid., 9-11.
33. Khenpo Petse, A Short Biography of Botriil, 2.
34. Tupten Tsultrim Namdak, Nourishment for Faith, 12.
35. Ibid., 13-14.
36. Ibid., 14.
37. Ibid., 15-16. For a short biography of Choying Rangdrol, written by someone who met him, see Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles, 260-65.
38. Mipam, Overview: Essential Nature of Luminous Clarity {spyi don 'od gsal snying po), 381-605; English translation in Dharmachakra Translation Committee, trans., Luminous Essence: A Guide to the Guhyagarbha Tantra.
39. Thubten Tsultrim Namdak, Nourishment for Faith, 17-19.
40. Ibid., 19-21.
41. Ibid., 21-22.
42. Ibid., 25.
43. Ibid., 26-27.
44. This text apparently is no longer extant; it is not in his Collected Works.
45. Ibid., 27.
46. Ibid., 28-29.
47. Ibid., 30-31.
48. I borrow this term from Geoffrey Samuel's book Civilized Shamans (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).
49. Candrakirti, Madhyamakavatara VI.23: "That which is the object of authentic seeing is thusness; false seeings are relative truths" {yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid del mthong ba rdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsung). Published with autocommentary in Autocommentary of the Madhyamakavatara {dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rang 'grel), 104.
50. Candrakirti, Madhyamakavatara VI.97.
51. KongtruL {kong sprul bio gros mtha yas, 1813-1899) identifies the four Mind-Only Sutras as: the Lankavatara Sutra, Samdhinirmocana Sutra, Avatamsaka Sutra, and Gandavyuha. KongtruL says that these are renowned as four "Mind-Only Sutras," but also are definitive meaning sutras. See KongtruL, Roar of the Non-Returning Lion: Commentary on the Uttaratantra {theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos snying po'i don mngon sum lam gyi bshad srol dang sbyar ba'i mam par 'grel pa phyir mi Idog pa seng ge'i nga ro), 6; see also Shenpen Hookham, The Buddha Within, 266-67.
52. In his Granting Request, Dolpopa lists the ten Buddha-Nature Sutras as follows: the Tathagatagarbha Sutra, the Avikalpapravesadharani, the Srimala Devi Simhanada Sutra, the Mahabheriharakaparivartasutra, the Angulimala Sutta,
