The Sūtra Mode of Meditation

Meditation on emptiness, discussed most vividly in Sūtra systems, is a powerful technique for transforming the ideational structures that underlie afflictive emotions, and, as such, it is said to be the very life of the tantric meditation of imagining oneself to be a deity, an ideal being.

Therefore, both to communicate the importance of this facet of Sūtra meditation and to prepare the groundwork for an appreciation of tantric deity yoga, I will consider the Sūtra model of meditation on selflessness and subsequent reflection on appearances. To do this, I shall comment on the concise and lucid explanation of the perfection of wisdom in the Fifth Dalai Lama’s Sacred Word of Mañjushrī.a

Sūtra model of meditation on selflessness and subsequent illusory-like appearance The Fifth Dalai Lama presents the process of cultivating the perfection of wisdom in two parts: “the practice of the selflessness of persons and the practice of the selflessness of [other] phenomena.”b He frames both practices around four essential steps:

1. ascertaining what is being negated

a’jam dpal zhal lung. Nga-wang-lo-sang-gya-tso (ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, 1617-1682), Fifth Dalai Lama, Instruction on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, Sacred Word of Mañjushrī (byang chub lam gyi rim pa’i khrid yig ’jam pa’i dbyangs kyi zhal lung) (Thimphu: kun-bzang-stobs-rgyal, 1976), 182.5-210.6. For an English translation, see Jeffrey Hopkins, “Practice of Emptiness” (Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974).

Though not cited, Tsong-kha-pa’s five main texts on the Sūtra realization of emptiness form the background of the discussion. In order of composition these are his Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo), The Essence of Eloquence (legs bshad snying po), Explanation of (Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle”: Ocean of Reasoning (dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba’i rnam bshad rigs pa’i rgya mtsho), Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim ’bring), and Extensive Explanation of (Chandrakīrti’s) “Supplement to (Nāgārjuna’s) ‘Treatise on the Middle’”: Illumination of the Thought (dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal).

b An earlier form of this exposition of emptiness yoga, without the Fifth Dalai’s text, appeared as chapter four in my introduction to Tenzin Gyatso and Jeffrey Hopkins, The Kālachakra Tantra: Rite of Initiation for the Generation Stage (London:

2. ascertaining the entailment of emptiness

3. ascertaining that the object designated and its basis of designation are not inherently one

4. ascertaining that the object designated and its basis of designation are not inherently different.

First essential: ascertaining what is being negated

With respect to the selflessness of a person, specifically of oneself, the first step is to identify the way we innately misconceive the “I” to exist inherently. As the Fifth Dalai Lama says:

If both the self [that is the validly existent person] and [the self that is] the nonexistent object of negation are not intimately identified, it is like dispatching an army without knowing where the enemy is or like shooting an arrow without having sought out the target. If we do not have a fairly clear sense of an inherently existent “I,” we will mistake the refutation as negating the “I” itself rather than a specific reification of the “I.” Shāntideva’s Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says:a

Without contacting the superimposed existent, Its nonexistence cannot be apprehended. If an image of the object of negation does not appear well to the mind, the meaning of the selflessness that negates it cannot be ascertained.

In what represents a shift of emphasis from Indian Buddhism and earlier forms of Tibetan Buddhism, the Ge-luk-pa school makes a clear differentiation between the existent self and the nonexistent self as it is posited in each of the four major Buddhist schools of tenets—Great Exposition School, Sūtra School, Mind-Only School, and Middle Way School.b The earlier lack of central emphasis on explicit identification of an existent self or person may have led to difficulties in the positing of moral responsibility, and thus a new approach of emphasizing the positing of an existent self emerged. The resolution comes through assuming a dual meaning to the term

a byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ’jug pa, bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, IX.140. b bye brag smra ba, vaibhāṣika; mdo sde pa, sautrāntika; sems tsam pa, cittamātra; dbu ma pa, mādhyamika.

“self”—the first, existent one is the person or “I” and the second, nonexistent one is a reification, an exaggeration, of the ontological status of any object, the reification here being inherent existence.a As the Fifth Dalai Lama says:

Therefore, [when a selflessness of persons is presented, the word] “persons” refers to [nominally and validly existent] persons, that is, common beings, Superiors, and so forth within the six types of transmigrators [[[hell-beings]], hungry ghosts, animals, humans, demigods, and gods] and the three vehicles [Hearer,b Solitary Realizer,c and Bodhisattvad]. The person’s mode of abiding as if able to establish itself from its own side without being mentally imputed is called “self” or “inherent existence.”

This distinction is upheld through the observation that when the “I” is apprehended, there are basically three possibilities with respect to how it is being conceived in relation to the other meaning of “self,” inherent existence:

1. One may be conceiving the “I” to be inherently existent.

2. Or, if one has understood the view of the Middle Way School, one may conceive the “I” as only being nominally existent.

3. Or, whether one has understood the view of the Middle Way School or not, one may conceive the “I” without qualifying it with either inherent existence or an absence of inherent existence.

In this vein, the Fifth Dalai Lama says:

Furthermore, consciousnesses innately apprehending “I”— which conceive an “I,” or self, based on the [nominally existent] person—are of three types:

1. A conceptual consciousness [correctly] apprehending “I” that exists in a person who has generated the Middle Way view in his/her mental continuum. This consciousness [correctly] apprehends “I” taken to be qualified as being only designated in the context of its basis

a rang bzhin gyis yod pa, svabhāvasat. b nyan thos, śrāvaka.

c rang rgyal, pratyekabuddha. d byang chub sems dpa’. of designation [[[mind and body]]].

2. An actual innate [[[consciousness]] mis]apprehending “I” taken to be qualified as being inherently existent. It is to be overcome through its antidote here on this occasion [of the path of wisdom].

3. A conventional validly cognizing consciousness that establishes [the existence of ] “I.”

This consciousness exists [for example] in the continuums of those common beings whose mental continuums have not been affected by systems of tenets and who thus do not differentiate between nominal imputation and inherent existence. In this case, the “I” is not taken to be qualified as being either nominally imputed or inherently existent.

Though uneducated common beings do not propound either inherent existence or nominal imputation, the “I” appears to them to be inherently existent, and because they sometimes assent to that appearance—though without reasoning—they also have a conception of an inherently existent “I.” Also, they, like all other beings, even including those who have been educated in wrong systems of tenets, have consciousnesses that do

not engage in conceptions of inherent existence, such as when just conceiving of themselves without any particular attention. Therefore, it is not that all consciousnesses conceiving “I” in the continuum of a falsely educated person are wrong or that all consciousnesses conceiving “I” in the continuum of uneducated persons are right. Rather, both the uneducated and the falsely educated have the misconception of an inherently existent “I” as well as consciousnesses conceiving an “I” that is not qualified by being either nominally imputed or inherently existent.

Still, neither the falsely educated nor the uneducated can distinguish between an imputedly existent “I” and an inherently existent “I.” Both must become educated in the Middle Way view of the absence of inherent existence and the presence of imputed existence in order to overcome their innate tendency to assent to the false appearance of the “I” as if inherently existent, existing from its own side, or existing under its own power. This is the immediate purpose of meditation on selflessness.

The first step in this meditation is to gain a clear sense of the reified status of the “I” as inherently existent. Even though such a misconception is subliminally always present, a condition of its obvious manifestation is required. Therefore, the meditator remembers a situation of false accusation that elicited a strong response or a situation of happiness that did the same, trying to watch the type of “I” that manifested and how the mind assented to its ever-soconcrete appearance. The Fifth Dalai Lama:

A tight, firm mind thinking “I” exists in our mental continuums on all occasions of sleep and waking. However, like a mirror and an image of your face [in that the presence of the mirror yields a clear image of the face], when you encounter conditions of happiness and suffering, the mind [misconceiving “I”] manifests very strongly, but on occasions when such conditions are not encountered, it is a little unclear. Nowadays when most instructors on the view— not having analyzed whether such is manifest or not— speak about practice, they rely on impoverished words such as just saying, “The way that a consciousness innately conceiving “I” conceives “I.” Such instruction does not at all get down to the essentials—like pointing an accusing finger at someone whose face is not well seen and saying, “This is yesterday’s thief So-and-So.”

Therefore, you first need a clear notion of pleasure or pain that someone else actually caused you. If not [occurring now], you should recall a former occurrence of such to the point where it appears clearly to your mind. For example, if someone [falsely] accused you of being a thief even though the thought “I robbed So-and-So” was not in your mind, you could have strong hatred for the person, thinking, “He accused me of such a theft!” At that time, this “I,” which is the object of the accusation of theft and which is held firmly and tightly in the center of the heart, seems even as if it can be seen with the eye and grasped with the hand.

Similarly, if another person caused you to achieve a desired aim and you reflect that such and such help was rendered, the “I” that is the object helped appears vibrantly from the center of the heart. In reliance on your cultivating either of these two modes, this manifest mind thinking “I” causes other coarse thoughts to become dormant. You should allow the consciousness innately conceiving “I” to increase in strength; then, analyze the way that the mind conceives “I.”

Since watchfulness itself tends to cause this gross level of misconception to disappear, the first essential is said to be very difficult to achieve. You have to learn how to let the mind operate in its usual egoistic way and at the same time watch it, keeping watchfulness at a minimum such that the usual conception of a concrete and pointoutable “I” is generated. The Fifth Dalai Lama compares this dual functioning of the mind to simultaneously watching the path and your companion when walking:

It is extremely difficult within a single consciousness to analyze both the conception of “I” and the way it is conceived [the first being identification of the “I” and the second being identification of its qualities of selfsufficiency and so forth]. If the force of the analytical consciousness is too strong, the strength of the mode of apprehension [of “I”] is destroyed and becomes unclear.

Question: How should [the analysis] be done?

Answer: Through the force of having cultivated calm abiding,a you have [gained an ability] to set [the mind] on any object of stabilizing or analytical meditation. Thus, in place of observing, for instance, the body of a Buddha, you should cause a manifest mind thinking “I” to appear. While the general consciousness remains on the “I” with distinct force, a corner of the mind should watch its mode of apprehension and analyze the way in which the “I” is being conceived. For instance, when you are walking with someone on a path, your eyes are mainly looking at the path, but with a corner of your eye you are watching your companion.

azhi gnas, śamatha. The techniques for cultivating calm abiding were explained earlier in the Fifth Dalai Lama’s text. For a detailed presentation see His Holiness the Dalai Lama, How to See Yourself As You Really Are, trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Atria Books/Simon and Schuster, 2006), 87-119; Gedün Lodrö, Calm Abiding and Special Insight, trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Hopkins (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1998), 11-213; Lati Rinbochay, Denma Lochö Rinbochay, Leah Zahler, and Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), 52-91; and Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, vol. 3, trans. and ed. Joshua W. C. Cutler and Guy Newland (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2002), 27-103.

The demand for watchfulness is mitigated by the need to allow what is usually unanalyzed to operate of its own accord; thus, the activity of introspection must be done subtly.

When success is gained, the meditator has found a sense of an inherently existent “I” that, far from seeming to be nonexistent, is totally convincing in its trueness. As the present Dalai Lama said while lecturing to Tibetan scholars in Dharmsala, India, in 1972, one has such strong belief in this reified “I” that upon identifying it, one has the feeling that if it is not true, nothing is. It would seem, therefore, that the first step in developing the view of the Middle Way is the stark and intimate recognition that for the meditator the opposite of that view is true.

Giving more detail about the sense of a concretely established “I,” the Fifth Dalai Lama says:

Previously, the “I” of the thought “I” seemed to exist in the center of the heart, but how it existed was not ascertained. From now on, a corner of awareness is to analyze it well. Sometimes it will seem to be in the context of the body; sometimes it will seem to be in the context of the mind; sometimes it will seem to be in the context of the other individual aggregates [[[feelings]], discriminations, and compositional factors] and so forth. At the end of the arising of such a variety of modes of appearance, you will come to identify an “I” that exists in its own right, that exists inherently, that from the start is self-established, existing undifferentiatedly with mind and body, which are also mixed like milk in water.

In the face of this particular consciousness, mind and body are not differentiated and the “I” is not differentiated from mind and body. However, the “I” is seen to be self-established, self-instituting, under its own power, existing in its own right. It is not that one has the sense that mind, body, and “I” cannot be differentiated; rather, for this particular consciousness, mind, body, and “I” simply are not differentiated. For instance, for a consciousness merely apprehending a particular city, say, Chicago, the ground, buildings, and people of that city are not differentiated. These are the bases of designation of Chicago, which seems inextricably blended with these and yet has its own thingness.

Recognition of such an appearance with respect to the “I” and recognition of your assent to this appearance constitute the first essential step in realizing selflessness, emptiness. With this identification, analysis can work on that object; without it, analysis is undirected.

This is the first essential [in the cultivation of wisdom]— ascertaining the object negated [in the view of selflessness]. You should analyze until deep experience of it arises. Having generated such in your mental continuum, you thereby crystallize an identification of the “I” conceived by an inborn consciousness conceiving “I” as self-instituting and as having a relation with your own five aggregates like that of water put in water. If such an identification crystallizes, analysis alone will cause you to attain ascertainment [of the absence of its inherent existence]. If you do not identify such an “I,” analysis falls apart without ever getting started.

From the viewpoint of the scholar-practitioners of the Ge-luk-pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, most attempts to penetrate emptiness fail at this initial step, tending either to assume that the phenomenon itself is being refuted or that a superficial, philosophically constructed quality of the phenomenon, rather than one that is blended with the basic appearance of the object and is innately misconceived, is being refuted.

Second essential: ascertaining entailment of emptiness

Whereas in the first step the meditator allows an ordinary attitude to operate and attempts to watch it without interference, in the second step the meditator makes a non-ordinary, intellectual decision that must be brought gradually to the level of feeling. Here, you consider the number of possible relationships between a phenomenon designated and its basis of designation.

Phenomena designated are things such as a table, a body, a person, and a house. Their respective bases of designation are four legs and a top, five limbs (two arms, two legs, and a head) and a trunk, mind and body, and a number of rooms arranged in a certain shape. The meditator considers whether within the framework of inherent existence these two—phenomenon designated and basis of designation—must be either inherently the same or inherently different or whether there are other possibilities. If there seem to be other possibilities, can these be collapsed into the original two, being inherently the same or being inherently different?

Nāgārjuna lists five possibilities, and Chandrakīrti, two more beyond the five:

1. inherently the same

2. inherently different

3. the object designated (the “I”) inherently depends on the basis of designation (mind and body)

4. the basis of designation (mind and body) inherently depends on the object designated (the “I”)

5. the object designated (the “I”) possesses the basis of designation (mind and body) either as a different entity in the way a person owns a cow or as one entity in the way a tree possesses its core

6. the object designated (the “I”) is the special shape of the basis of designation (body)

7. the object designated (the “I”) is the collection of the bases of designation (mind and body).

The last five can be collapsed into the first two as refinements of them: The third and fourth are forms of difference; the first aspect of the fifth is a form of difference; the second, a form of sameness of entity; the sixth and seventh are variations of sameness. Hence, it is held that all possibilities of inherent existence can be collapsed into the original two.

Conventionally, however, it is said that the “I” and its basis of designation, mind and body, are different but not different entities and that they are the same entity but not the same. This is technically called being one entity and different isolates —essentially meaning that conceptuality can isolate the two within their being one entity. Why not consider this an eighth possibility?

The answer is that if the relationship of being one entity and different conceptually isolatable factors is within the context of inherent existence, then this possibility is internally contradictory, since within the context of inherent existence whatever is inherently the same is the same in all respects, making different isolates impossible. However, if the relationship of being one entity and different conceptually isolatable factors is within the context of conventional existence, then there is no need to include it here in this list of possibilities within inherent existence.

The list, therefore, does not include all possibilities for the mere existence of a phenomenon designated and its bases of designation because the examination here is concerned only with whether the “I” exists in the concrete manner it was seen to have during the first essential. If it does exist so concretely, one should be able to point concretely to it when examining it in relation to its basis of designation. As the Fifth Dalai Lama says:

Chandrakīrti’s Clear Words says:

Consider whether the object of the conception of self has the nature of the [[[mental]] and physical aggregates] or is something different from the aggregates.

The “I” appears as if established in the manner of being undifferentiable from the [[[mental]] and physical] aggregates which themselves are not differentiated [in the face of this particular consciousness]. However, though one thing such as a pot is not said to be separate or differentiable [from itself ], in this context [with respect to the “I”] there arise the aspects of a basis of designation and a phenomenon designated, that is, “aggregates” and “I” [just as a pot can be considered as a phenomenon designated and the bottom, belly, and top of the pot as its bases of designation.]

You should analyze whether the “I” that is inherently self-established in the context of the five aggregates has some way of existing other than a oneness with or separateness from the aggregates. Through taking other phenomena as examples, in the end you will realize that there is no third category [of existence]. The decision that [the “I” and the aggregates] are either one or different is the essential of ascertaining entailment. [If the “I” exists, it is either one with or separate from the aggregates. Being either of those pervades, or occurs with every instance of, an existent “I.”]

Since this decision—that inherent existence involves the necessity of the phenomenon designated being either one with or different from the basis of designation—is the anvil on which the sense of an inherently existent “I” will be pounded by the hammer of the subsequent reasoning, the second essential is not an airy decision to be taken lightly, despite its intellectual character. It must be brought to the level of feeling, this being done through considering that anything existent is either one or different. As the great eighteenthcentury Mongolian scholar Jang-kya Röl-pay-dor-jaya says in his Presentation of Tenets:b

You should consider whether this so-called person or self which is the basis of the conception thinking “I” is the same as your own [[[mental]] and physical] aggregates or different from them because, if it exists, it must be one of those two. For, in general it is seen in the world that if something is affirmed by the mind to have a counterpart, it is excluded from being without a counterpart; and, if something is affirmed as not having a counterpart, it is excluded from having a counterpart. Therefore, oneness and otherness are a mutually exclusive dichotomy.

A chair is one; a chair and a table are different; a chair and its parts are different; tables are different, and so forth. The yogi must decisively set standards that limit the possibilities so that the subsequent analysis can work, eventually causing disbelief in such an inherently existent “I.”

Upon coming to this decision of logical limitations, you begin to question a little the existence of the self-instituting “I” identified in the first essential. The Fifth Dalai Lama says:

a lcang skya rol pa’i rdo rje, 1717-1786. b

grub mtha’i rnam bzhag. The full title is: Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets: Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer’s Teaching (grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po’i mdzes rgyan) (Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970), 435.20-436.5. For an English translation of part of the chapter on the Consequence School with commentary, see Jeffrey Hopkins, Emptiness Yoga (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), 264 (see also previous chapter) and 389.

Previously, the I—the phenomenon designated in the context of the [[[mental]] and physical] aggregates which are the basis of designation—seemed to exist as if self-established and undifferentiable from the aggregates. Through having practiced this second essential, the former consciousness ascertaining [the appearance of “I”] cannot remain as it is, and there arises a little doubt about whether the “I” is the same as or different [from the aggregates.]

The late Geshe Rabten, a Ge-luk-pa scholar who served as abbot of a monastery in Switzerland, compared the effect of this step to having doubts about an old friend for the first time. The emotionally harrowing experience of challenging your own long believed status has begun.

Third essential: ascertaining that the “I” and the aggregates are not one

The next step is to use reasoning to determine whether the “I” and the mental and physical aggregates could be inherently the same or inherently different. Reasoning here is a matter not of cold deliberation or superficial summation but of using various approaches to find one that can shake yourself to your being. Since this is the case, the seeming simple-mindedness and rigidity of the reasonings suggested must be transcended through gaining intimate experience with them.

The Fifth Dalai Lama lays out a series of approaches through reasoning, rather than just one, on the principle that certain reasonings would not work for some people. The first is a challenge from common experience: If I am one with body, how could I speak of “my body”? If I am inherently one with mind, how could I speak of “my mind”? Should we also speak of body’s body? Or my I? He says:

However, it is not sufficient just to doubt whether [the “I” and the aggregates] are the same or different; a decision must be reached. Therefore, you should analyze [first] whether the “I” which is conceived by an innate [[[consciousness]]] conceiving true existence is one with body and mind. In that case, the “I” could not be anything but either one with the body or one with the mind. If the “I” were one with the body, it would not be sensible to say, “my body,” from the viewpoint of associating an attribute, body, with a base, “I.” Also, you would [absurdly] have to say, “my I,” or “the body’s body.” Generate ascertainment that it is the same also if the “I” were one with the mind.

This reasoning alone may cut through to the heart of the matter, but on the assumption that it may not be sufficient for some persons, the Fifth Dalai Lama continues with a citation from Nāgārjuna on the same reasoning:

If, having thought thus, [your attempt at understanding] is merely verbal and you do not gain strong conviction, contemplate the following. Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle says:

When it is taken that there is no self

Except the appropriated [[[aggregates]]],

The appropriated [[[aggregates]]] themselves are the self.

If so, your self is nonexistent.

Because the “I” and the aggregates would be inherently one, they would be one in all respects with utterly no division. Hence, the “I” and the aggregates would be none other than partless. Then you could not present—in the context of that partless unity—the two different things: the “I” that is the appropriator of the five aggregates and the “five aggregates” that are appropriated by it. In that case, an assertion of “my body” or “my aggregates” would be senseless.

Ge-luk-pa scholars do not hold that Nāgārjuna thought that beings commonly conceive the “I” to be one with body or one with mind. Rather, his thought is that if the “I” inherently exists, then oneness with its basis of designation would be one of two exhaustive possibilities. Nāgārjuna’s reference is not to ordinary misconception but to a consequence of inherent existence, such concreteness requiring a pointoutable identification under analysis.

The rules for inherent existence, therefore, are not the rules for mere existence. Within the context of inherent existence, sameness of entity requires utter oneness in all respects. Thus, the issue that is central to evaluating the soundness of this reasoning is not whether beings ordinarily conceive of such oneness (since it is not claimed that we do), but whether the logical rules that have been formulated for the concrete, pointoutable existence identified in ordinary experience in the first step are appropriate.

More reasonings

The Fifth Dalai Lama continues with permutations of the same reasoning; the mere presence of the reasoning is clearly not expected to be convincing. For these further reasonings to work, the meditator needs to believe in rebirth. They are: If the “I” and the body are one, after death when the body is burned, the “I” also would absurdly be burned. Or, just as the “I” transmigrates to the next life, so the body also would absurdly have to transmigrate. Or, just as the body does not transmigrate, so the “I” also would absurdly not transmigrate.

From meditating on such reasonings, you might come to think that probably the “I” is not the same as the body but is perhaps one with the mind, in which case you are asked to consider the following fallacies: Since it is obvious that the suffering of cold arises when the “I” is without clothes and it is obvious that the sufferings of hunger and thirst arise when the “I” lacks food and drink, these would—if the “I” were merely mental—be mental in origin, in which case one could not posit a reason why the same suffering would not be experienced in a life in a Formless Realm. Also, since the mind would be one with the “I,” it would absurdly still have to make use of gross forms such as food and clothing which do not exist in the Formless Realm. About these, the Fifth Dalai Lama says:

If this also does not get to the heart of the matter, think:

Because the “I” and the body are one, after death when the body is burned, the “I” would also be burned. Or, just as the “I” transmigrates to the next life, so the body also would have to transmigrate. Or, just as the body does not transmigrate, so the “I” also would not transmigrate. Consider the application of such fallacies.

Through having meditated thus, you come to think, “The ‘I’ is probably not the same as the body.” Then, if you think, “The ‘I’ is probably one with the mind,” consider this fallacy:

The suffering of cold arises when the “I” is without clothes, and the sufferings of hunger and thirst arise when the “I” lacks food and drink. Therefore, if after death the mind were born in a Formless Realm, then because the mind would be one with the “I,” it would still have to make use of gross forms such as food and clothing.

If those absurd permutations of oneness do not clinch the matter, reflecting on a few more reasonings may allow you to reach a conclusion. First, the selves would have to be as many as mind and body, that is to say, two; or, put another way, the selves would have to be as many as the five aggregates (forms, feelings, discriminations, compositional factors, and consciousnesses), five.

The above modes of reasoning are suitable and easy for beginners to develop. However, if you have been disciplined through discriminating wisdom, a little more elaboration will decide the matter. Therefore, consider the fallacy of the selves becoming many. Chandrakīrti’s Supplement to

(Nāgārjuna’s) “Treatise on the Middle” says:

If the self were the aggregates, then Because they are many, there would be many selves.

Just as the aggregates are five, so the “I” would also become five, or just as the “I” is no more than one, so the aggregates could not be five. This reasoning may seem extraordinarily simple-minded, but the requirements of such pointoutable, analytically findable existence—not the requirements of mere existence—are the anvil. The meditator is attempting through this analysis, not to describe how she or he ordinarily conceives such an inherently existent “I,” but to subject it to the hammering of reasoning based on consequences of such inherent existence. Because the ordinary sense of concrete selfhood is the object on which the analysis is working, the experience is fraught with emotion.

The second additional reasoning revolves around entailment that the “I” would have inherently existent production and disintegration, in which case it would be discontinuous. The Fifth Dalai Lama’s very brief description of this reasoning comes to life when teamed with the fourth reasoning below:

Similarly, Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle says,b “If the self were the aggregates, it would have production and disintegration.” Because the five aggregates would be inherently produced and would inherently disintegrate, you would have to assert that the “I” also is produced and disintegrates in that way.

The third additional reasoning also depends upon a belief in rebirth; for me, it reflects the type of reasoning in reverse that many use against rebirth. Its concern is not explicitly with the “I” and the mental and physical aggregates that are its bases of designation but the relationship between the “I” of this life and the “I” of the last life. It is: If they were one, then the sufferings of the former life would absurdly have to be present in this life.

The “I” of the former birth and the “I” of this life can be only either one or different. If one, through the force of their being inherently one, the sufferings of the “I” in the former life as an animal—such as stupidity and enslavement for others’ use—would also be experienced on the occasion of the “I” being a human in this birth. Also the human pleasures of this life would have been experienced as an animal in the former life. Contemplate such consequences.

The last additional reasoning expands on the fault of discontinuity between lives, suggested earlier in the second reasoning but not pursued. If they were different, which by the rules of inherent existence would make them totally, unrelatedly different, remembrance of former lives would become impossible. Moral retribution would be impossible. Undeserved suffering would be experienced.

Such difference would make a mere-I, the agent that travels from lifetime to lifetime, engaging in actions and experiencing their effects, impossible. The Fifth Dalai Lama says:

Similarly, Chandrakīrti’s Supplement says:

Whatever are inherently separate are not Suitable to be included in one continuum.

If the “I” of the former life and the “I” of the next life were inherently different, they would be totally, unrelatedly different. Thereby it would be impossible to remember, “I was born in such and such a former birth,” just as Devadatta does not remember that he was born in a former birth as [his contemporary] Yajñadatta.

Furthermore, your accumulating actions for birth in a happy transmigration would be wasted because another would enjoy the fruition of the effects in a life of high status, and you yourself would not experience it. Why? The agent of the actions and the experiencer of the effects would not be included into the single base of a mere-I [that is to say, a nominally existent “I”] and would be unrelated. Therefore, if an action accumulated in a former life brought help or harm in this life, you would be meeting with [the effects of ] actions not done [by yourself ]. If help and harm did not arise [from deeds done], there would be no sense in abandoning ill deeds and adopting virtues in this life because their effects would not ripen for the future “I.”

Through contemplating such, you will gain ascertainment with respect to the third essential: ascertaining a lack of true oneness [of the “I” and the aggregates].

Oneness of the “I” and its bases of designation—the mental and physical aggregates—is impossible. Fourth essential: ascertaining that the “I” and the aggregates are not inherently different

The meditator has been so disturbed by the analysis of oneness that he or she is ready to assume difference. However, the rules of inherent existence call for the different to be unrelatedly different, again the assumption being not that persons ordinarily consider the “I” and its bases of designation to be unrelatedly different but that within the context of inherent existence, that is, of such pointoutable, solid existence, difference necessitates unrelatedness. The Fifth Dalai Lama says:

Now, you might think that the “I” and the five aggregates cannot be anything but different. Chandrakīrti’s Supplement says: There is no self other than the aggregates because,

Apart from the aggregates, its conception does not exist.

The inherently different must be unrelated. Therefore, just as within the aggregates you can identify each individually—“This is the aggregate of form,” and so forth—so after clearing away the five aggregates, you would have to be able to identify the “I:” “This is the ‘I.’” However, no matter how finely you analyze, such an “I” is not at all to be found.

Many forms of Hinduism are seeking to find the self or ultimate reality that is left over when all else is removed; therefore, they would loudly exclaim the contrary: Something is found separate from mind and body. But would this be the “I” that goes to the store? Would this be the “I” that desires? Hates?

Still, the question is not easy to settle, and it does not appear that easy answers are wanted. Rather, the Fifth Dalai Lama emphasizes that deeply felt conviction is needed:

It is not sufficient that the mode of non-finding be just a repetition of the impoverished phrase, “Not found.” For example, when an ox is lost, one does not take as true the mere phrase, “It is not in such and such an area.” Rather, it is through searching for it in the highland, midland, and lowland of the area that one firmly decides that it cannot be found. Here also, through meditating until a decision is reached, you gain conviction. You have to bring the analysis to the point where there is an impressive non-finding.

Realization of selflessness

With such conviction, the decision reached is that the “I” cannot be found under analysis. The decision is not superficially intellectual but a startling discovery of a vacuity upon having sought such an “I.” This vacuity shows not that the “I” does not exist, but that it does not inherently exist as it was identified as seeming to in the first essential. This unfindability is emptiness itself, and realization of it is realization of emptiness, selflessness.

Incontrovertible inferential understanding, though not of the level of direct perception or even of special insight, has great impact. For a beginner it generates a sense of deprivation, but for an experienced meditator it generates a sense of discovery, or recovery, of what was lost. The Fifth Dalai Lama conveys this with examples:

When the “I,” which previous to now seemed to be perceivable by the eye and graspable by the hand as truly existent, is not found and is just vacuous, this is said to be the initial finding of the view of the Middle Way.

Moreover, as was explained before on the occasion of calm abiding, you should practice—with the wisdom arisen from thinking—what was found initially by the wisdom arisen from hearing, and eventually you will attain the wisdom arisen from meditation. Therefore, this initial generation of the Middle Way view is not actual special insight; however, like a moon on the second day of the month, it is a slight finding of the view. At that time, if you have no predispositions for emptiness from a former life, it seems that a thing that was in the hand has suddenly been lost. If you have predispositions, it seems that a lost jewel that had been in the hand has suddenly been found.

The perception of this vacuity, the absence of inherent existence, carries emotional force—first of loss, since our emotions are built on a false sense of concreteness, and then of discovery of a lost treasure that makes everything possible. From a similar point of view, the emptiness of the mind is called the Buddha nature, or Buddha lineage, since, like a valuable jewel, it is what allows for development of the marvelous qualities of Buddhahood. However, unless the meditator has predispositions from practice in a former life, the first experience of emptiness is one of loss; later, its fecundity and dynamism become apparent.

Space-like meditative equipoise

The realization of the absence of inherent existence needs to be increased through a process of alternating analytical meditation and stabilizing meditation. If the meditator has developed the power of concentration of the level of calm abiding, the analysis of the status of the “I” can be done within the context of this highly stable mind. However, too much analysis will induce excitement, reducing stabilization, and too much stabilization will induce an inability to analyze. Thus, analytical and stabilizing meditation must be alternated until the two are in such harmony that analysis itself induces even greater stabilization which, in turn, enhances analysis. At the point of harmony and mutual support between analysis and stabilization, special insight, which is necessarily a union of calm abiding and special insight, is achieved.

Leading to this state are several levels or stages; the Fifth Dalai Lama speaks of these with the technical vocabulary of the Buddhist delineation of the stages of meditation:

After having settled the analysis of the four essentials through hearing and thinking, there arises during meditation distinct ascertainment that the “I”—as apprehended by the conceptual consciousness that conceives of “I” tightly, so tightly, in the center of the heart—does not inherently exist in the context of the mental and physical aggregates. When such ascertainment has arisen, the absence of inherent existence of the “I” is the actual object of meditation, and thus, retaining mindfulness of it, you should not forget it. Also, through introspection you should distinguish whether conceptuality conceiving an inherently existent “I” is interrupting or not. If it becomes necessary to revivify [[[realization]] of ] the mode of the absence of inherent existence of the “I,” then by means of a little analysis you should set [again] in meditative equipoise, thinking, “It does not exist that way.”

At this time, due to the force of past great familiarity with the conception of self [that is, inherent existence], the mind conceiving [an inherently existent] “I” is stronger and more frequent [than the realization of selflessness] even though you forcibly practice in accordance with [the initial among] the nine states of mind of calm abiding.a Therefore, the thought that the “I” does not truly exist comes only at intervals. Then, when you gradually become

familiar [with selflessness], the conception of inherent existence [only] occasionally interrupts the consciousness of the view that the “I” does not truly exist. Then, just after the generation of a thought conceiving true existence, it can be overcome through just a little mindfulness; thereby, [the realization of selflessness] becomes uninterrupted. Then, in accordance with the ninth state of mind [preceding] calm abiding you no longer rely on any application [of antidotes to laxity and excitement] and relax the exertion [of introspection]; your meditation becomes a similitude—or small portion—of a union of calm abiding and special insight.

The four levels of increasingly steady realization correspond to four levels in the development of calm abiding called the four mental engagementsb—forcible, interrupted, uninterrupted, and spontaneous engagement. Even though the meditator has previously passed through these four levels in developing calm abiding, at that time they were merely in the context of stabilizing, or fixating, meditation, and thus now that analytical mediation has been introduced, another progression through versions of these four (not as gross as before) must be made.

At the point when meditators have not yet reached the level of special insight but are close to it, they attain a similitude of special insight and a space-like meditative equipoise.

Now you have one-pointed uninterrupted meditative equipoise on a nonaffirming negative.c This negative of the object negated [in the view of selflessness] is like, for example, the fact that “space” is posited as simply the absence of its object negated—obstructive contact—in the context of the clear appearance between things. This

a

For a discussion of the nine levels leading to calm abiding see Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, 80-86. b yid byed bzhi, catvāramanaskāra.

c med dgag, prasajyapratiṣedha.

meditative equipoise [on the absence of inherent existence] is the actual way to sustain a space-like meditative equipoise. Just this is identified as the non-mindfulness of nonconceptuality that occurs when calm abiding is induced by the strength of analysis itself.

This meditative equipoise is called “space-like” because just as uncompounded spacea is a mere absence—a mere negative—of obstructive contact, so emptiness is a mere absence, a mere negative, of inherent existence. Such steady reflection on emptiness, therefore, is called space-like meditative equipoise. Brought to the level of direct perception, it serves as the antidote to both the artificially acquired and innate afflictive emotions (though not all at once, except in Highest Yoga Mantrab).

Through prolonged training, the meditator develops a harmonious working of stabilizing and analytical meditation with the one increasing the other, such that the pliancy initially attained with mere calm abiding is exceeded by that induced by analysis at the level of special insight. The Fifth Dalai Lama describes the progression:

At the point of nonapplication [when it no longer is necessary to apply the antidotes to laxity and excitement], a similitude of special insight is attained. Through meditation within sustaining its continuum you attain a superior pliancy, a serviceability of body and mind induced by analytical meditation. It greatly exceeds the bliss of physical pliancy induced earlier at the time of calm abiding through the power of meditative equipoise. When this superior pliancy is attained, actual special insight is attained, and thus you have gained a path consciousness that is an actual union of calm abiding and special insight. The Fourth Paṇ-chen Lama, Lo-sang-pel-den-ten-pay-nyi-ma c describes the mind of space-like meditative equipoise from two points of view, in terms of appearance and in terms of

a ’dus ma byas kyi nam mkha’, asaṃskṛtākāśa. b sngags bla med, anuttarayogamantra. c

blo bzang dpal ldan bstan pa’i nyi ma, 1781-1852/4. See Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Cutting Through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1990), 98.

ascertainment. To that consciousness only an immaculate vacuity— an absence of inherent existence—appears, and that consciousness ascertains (that is, understands, comprehends, and realizes) the absence of inherent existence of the “I.” Although reasoning has led to this state, the mind is not now reasoning; it is experiencing the fruit of reasoning in a state of continuous, one-pointed ascertainment of emptiness; the only thing appearing is an utter vacuity—an absence—of inherent existence. The Fourth Paṇ-chen Lama says:

At that time you should sustain single-mindedly the following two facets of understanding emptiness. From the point of view of ascertainment, firm definite knowledge determines that the “I” does not inherently exist. Second, from the point of view of appearance there is an utter, clear vacuity that is only the absence of what is negated, that is, the true existence of “I.” Sustaining these two single-mindedly is how to sustain the space-like meditative equipoise.

There is controversy within Ge-luk-pa over whether in an earlier stage the object being ascertained as empty of inherent existence appears to an inferential consciousness realizing emptiness; however, most monastic textbooks hold that even on that level all that appears is a vacuity, the non-finding of the object under such analysis. In any case, all agree that in space-like meditative equipoise only an immaculate vacuity that is a negative of inherent existence appears—nothing else. What is ascertained is also an absence of inherent existence. The same is also true for direct realization of emptiness, though any sense of duality, knower and known, has vanished.

Appearances subsequent to meditative equipoise

When the state of one-pointed concentration on selflessness is left, that is, when the meditator takes to mind any object other than emptiness, the object is viewed as like an illusion, appearing one way but existing another. Just as a magician’s illusory elephant appears to be an elephant but in fact is not, so forms, sounds, and so forth appear to exist inherently but are understood as not existing inherently. The meaning of being like an illusion is not that the “I” or forms, sounds, and so forth appear to exist but actually do not; rather, their mode of existence appears to be concrete but is understood not to be so. The same is true for the “I.” The Fifth Dalai Lama addresses this issue directly:

Question: Through having practiced the space-like meditative equipoise, what occurs after equipoise? Answer: The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra says:a

Like a mirage, a city of Scent-Eaters, A magician’s illusions, and dreams,

Meditation on signs is empty of inherent existence. Know all phenomena to be like that. After meditative equipoise, the appearance of a merely nominal “I” remaining after the negation of the object of negation should be like a magician’s illusion.

The Fifth Dalai Lama proceeds to point out that mere realization that a magician’s illusions or dream objects are not real does not constitute realizing phenomena to be like a magician’s illusions, nor does realization of phenomena as like illusions mean that one merely desists from identifying appearances: Its mode of appearance in this system is not the realization

a

ting nge ’dzin rgyal po’i mdo, samādhirājasūtra, stanza IX.11; Toh. 127, sde dge edition, mdo sde, vol. da, 26a.6; Sanskrit and Tibetan texts and English translation in Cristoph Cüppers, The IXth Chapter of the Samādhirājasūtra: A Text-critical Contribution to the Study of Mahāyāna Sūtras, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 41 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990), 27: yathaiva gandharvapuraṃ marīcikā yathaiva māyā supinaṃ yathaiva / svabhāvaśūnyā tu nimittabhāvanā tathopamāṃ jānatha sarvadharmān //. The Tibetan is on 28, and an English translation on 93-94.

The Four Interwoven Annotations on (Tsong-kha-pa’s) “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path” (674.5) explains this stanza in detail: With respect to how all phenomena are signless, the King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra gives examples. Just as there is no water in a mirage but it appears to be water and just as a city of Scent-Eaters does not exist as the actualities of a city and so forth but appears to be a city and so forth and just

as a magician’s emanations do not exist as horses, elephants, and so forth but appear to be horses, elephants, and so forth and just as in a dream there are no men, women, and so forth but there appear to be (that is to say, just as mirages and so forth appear to be water and so on but are empty of water and so on), so forms and so forth, which are like signs of capacity to appear and manifest, are meditated on—that is to say, adhered to by way of taking them to mind—as manifestly evident (mngon rtags), are empty of inherent existence, and adherers to them are also empty of inherent existence. Know that this mode of emptiness is to be applied to all phenomena.

of the untruth of illusory horses and elephants or of appearances in dreams. If that were the case, even magicians and mature people who know language would know the Middle Way mode of illusory appearance. Also, the illusions referred to on this occasion are not the shimmering ephemeral appearancesa—unidentified as being this and not that—which occur from having practiced analysis of the view.

Question: Then, what is needed?

Answer: Realizing that horses and elephants manifested by a magician are not horses and elephants does not damage the inherent existence of horses and elephants. The glorious Dharmakīrti in his Commentary on (Dignāga’s) “Compilation of Valid Cognition” says:b

Without refuting their objects, they cannot be abandoned.

Desire, hatred, and so forth which are related to [[[perception]] Of ] good qualities and defects [beyond what is actually there] Are abandoned by way of not seeing those in the object, not by an external means.

[To overcome an afflictive emotion] it is not sufficient to [try to] pull it out like a thorn; the misconceived object must be refuted.

It is undeniable that illusory horses and elephants are seen by an eye consciousness due to its being affected by a superficial cause of error [a magician’s spell]. However, even mature worldly beings know that such horses and elephants do not exist as perceived. Just so, horses and elephants also undeniably appear to a conventional consciousness [to exist inherently] due to a deep cause of error

[namely, the predispositions established by ignorance], but

a snang ba ban bun. b

tshad ma rnam ’grel, pramāṇavārttika, stanza II.222-II.223ab; Toh. 4210, sde dge edition, tshad ma, vol. ce, 116a.3; Yūsho Miyasaka, “Pramāṇavarttika-kārikā: Sanskrit and Tibetan,” Indo Koten Kenkyu (Acta Indologica) 2 (1971-1772): 32-33: adūṣite ’sya viṣaye na śakyaṃ tasya varjanaṃ / prahāṇir icchādveṣāder guṇadoṣānubandhinaḥ // tayor adṛṣṭir viṣaye na tu bāhyeṣu yaḥ kramaḥ /.

you must know that from the viewpoint of their own entities they are empty of inherent existence, like illusions. The essential point is that the meditator first must realize that these objects do not inherently exist; there is no other method for inducing realization that phenomena are like illusions.

Tsong-kha-pa makes this point in his Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path:a

Question: What has to be done for the meaning of illusion to dawn unerringly?

Answer: For example, in dependence on the eye consciousness seeing illusory horses and elephants [conjured by a magician] and the mental consciousness ascertaining the nonexistence of those horses and elephants in accordance with how they appear, one generates ascertainment that the appearance of horses and elephants is an illusory, or false, appearance. Similarly, in dependence on the two— undeniable appearance of persons and so forth to a conventional consciousness and ascertainment of them by a rational consciousnessb as empty of nature, that is, establishment by way of their own nature—one generates ascertainment of persons as illusory, or false, appearances. Due to this fact:

• when in meditative equipoise one has become successful at meditating on space-like emptiness, [[[realizing]] that] the target aimed at by the apprehension of signs [that is, inherent existence,] does not exist, not even a particle, • then upon rising from [this meditative realization], when one views the dawning of objects, an illusory-like emptiness dawns subsequent to meditative equipoise.

a

lam rim ’bring / skyes bu gsum gyis nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba’i byang chub lam gyi rim pa bring po sa bcad kha skong dang bcas pa / lam rim chung ngu; see Jeffrey Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2008), 83. For Robert Thurman’s translation of this passage see his “The Middle Transcendent Insight” in Life and Teachings of Tsong Khapa, Robert A. F. Thurman, ed. (Dharmsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1982), 141. b rigs shes.

In that way, through analyzing phenomena frequently with the reasoning analyzing whether they are established by way of their own nature or not, strong ascertainment with respect to the absence of inherent existence is generated, and when, after that, one views the dawning of appearances, they dawn as like illusions. There is no separate way of delineating illusory-like emptiness. Realization of the emptiness of inherent existence is the only method for gaining the subsequent realization that phenomena are like illusions.

The Fourth Paṇ-chen Lama speaks similarly but also addresses the issue of the substance of the appearances that are left over. He calls for viewing them as the sport of emptiness:b

Subsequent to meditative equipoise, all phenomena—the “I” and so forth—should be meditated on as the sport [of emptiness] like a magician’s illusions. In other words, rely on developing a strong conviction of truthlessness [that is to say, the knowledge that phenomena do not inherently exist] during meditative equipoise and afterwards learn to view all that appears, even though appearing [to exist inherently], as the sport [of emptiness] like a magician’s illusions, truthless and false.

Since the emptiness of inherent existence makes appearance possible, phenomena are, in a sense, the sport of emptiness. It may even be said that their basic substance is emptiness. However, emptiness is a nonaffirming negative, a mere absence or mere elimination of inherent existence, which does not imply anything in place of inherent existence even though it is compatible with dependently arisen phenomena. Hence, emptiness is not a positive substance giving rise to phenomena, even if it is their ground.

The vocabulary of sport or play is reminiscent of various Hindu identifications of phenomena as the sport of God. Emptiness is what makes cause and effect possible; the emptiness of the mind is called the Buddha nature, the causal lineage of Buddhahood, even though it is not itself an actual cause. As the mere negative of inherent existence, it makes enlightenment possible.

Summation of the sūtra model of meditation on selflessness and appearance

Including the steps of setting the basic motivation for meditation as well as the subsequent state of realizing appearances to be like illusions, the Sūtra process of meditating on the selflessness of the person is in seven movements:

preliminary: adjustment of motivation by taking refuge and developing an altruistic intention to become enlightened

1. ascertaining what is being negated—inherent existence 2. ascertaining entailment of emptiness 3. ascertaining that the “I” and the aggregates are not inherently the same 4. ascertaining that the “I” and the aggregates are not inherently different 5. realizing the absence of inherent existence of the “I” in spacelike meditative equipoise

concluding: emerging from space-like meditative equipoise and viewing all phenomena as like a magician’s illusions. All activities are to be done within realization that phenomena are like illusions, understanding that space-like meditative equipoise negates only a false sense of inherent existence and not the very existence of objects. Tsong-kha-pa’s Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path emphasizes this practical point:

Consequently, even when engaging in the class of behavioral practices, such as prostration, circumambulation, and so forth, you should do them within being affected by the force of analytical ascertainment as [explained] above and thereby train in illusory-like appearance. They should be done within this. Through having become proficient in this, even by merely becoming mindful of the view those will dawn as like illusions. It is important to understand that space-like meditative equipoise reveals only the nature of phenomena and negates only a false sense of inherent existence and not the very existence of objects.

The Fifth Dalai Lama stresses this point:

Also, it is known that a lion manifested by a magician does not exist in fact, but through having manifestly seen an illusory lion kill an illusory elephant, utter certainty that an illusory lion killed an illusory elephant is induced. Just so, a person, who does not inherently exist but appears [to exist inherently] like an illusion, accumulates wholesome and unwholesome actions and experiences their fruition. My lama said that inducement of deep conviction about this is a distinguishing feature of this [[[Middle Way]]] doctrine. When inherently existent horses and elephants are refuted by reasoning, for such a

conventional consciousness the apprehension of horses and elephants as being established as their own reality is mistaken, like apprehending illusory horses and elephants [as real]. However, from the viewpoint of a worldly consciousness, a consciousness that apprehends horses and elephants as established as [their own] reality is nonmistaken, and a consciousness that apprehends illusory horses and elephants is mistaken. It is with such fine distinctions that the example of magician’s illusions is drawn.

If, having thought that horses and elephants are not inherently existent, you take horses and elephants and illusory horses and elephants to be similar even conventionally, then you would contradict the meaning of Chandrakīrti

Supplement which says:

Those objects realized by the world And apprehended with the six unimpaired senses Are true from [the viewpoint of ] just the world. You would be deprecating conventionalities.

Mañjushrī told the Foremost Lama [[[Tsong-kha-pa]]] that it was necessary to value the varieties of appearances. His thought was based on a qualm that in the future trainees who did not understand such an essential would fall into a view of nihilism. Thus, many modes of establishing the existence of appearances are [presented] in Tsong-kha-pa’s great and small expositions of the Stages of the Path and in his commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Middle and Chandrakīrti’s Supplement. However, the lion of proponents, the translator Tak-tsang [criticizes Tsong-kha-pa] saying, “Upon analyzing with many forms of reasoning, he asserts that impure mistaken appearances are validly established.” [This criticism] is seen to arise from the same source of error.

The change from the historically earlier model of merely refuting self without emphasizing the distinction between a self that validly and effectively exists to refuting a meaning of self that is explicitly limited to a reification of inherent existence with a validly established effective self left over is justified in moral terms. For delimiting the object of negation in emptiness allows for a basis for agency of deeds and a continuity of experience of their fruitions within a context, not just of worldly renown, but of valid establishment. The change is also given the authority of the god of wisdom, Mañjushrī, who is said to have been Tsong-kha-pa’s supra-human teacher and who advised him to maintain valid establishment of appearances.b That the physical manifestation of the wisdom of all Buddhas prompted this move in Tsong-kha-pa’s thought makes the point that this shift of emphasis is a return to a basic undying truth and not a new creation.

Comments

The Sūtra model of meditation on selflessness and subsequent relation with appearance is built around an analytical search for the seemingly concrete existence of an object, such as oneself, the existence of which has hitherto been largely uncontested. Though the mode of search is analytical, the examination of the object is intensely emotional since emotions such as desire and hatred are built on a perceived status of objects that is now being challenged. The analysis is neither cold nor superficially intellectual but an expression of

the intellect in the midst of the clatter of emotional rearrangement and unreasoned re-assertion of the concrete findability of the object. The analysis is by no means a rote runthrough of a prescribed ritual, nor is it merely aimed at refuting other philosophical systems; rather, it is aimed at the heart of one’s emotional and intellectual life, at the ideational underpinnings of our self-conceptions, our relations with others, our conceptions of subject and object, and our ideologies.

At the end of successful analysis, what is experienced is merely a non-finding—a void, a vacuity—of the object in which one originally so intensely believed. That very object, in all of its seeming concreteness, has literally disappeared from mind; the very type of awareness that believed in it has now sought for it according to rules of analysis that have been seen to be not just appropriate but binding. It has not found this object, even though so many emotions have been built in dependence on its seemingly verifiable status. The experience of not finding this previously reliable underpinning is earth-shattering.

The meditator does not immediately rush back to perception of appearances but remains with this vacuity, a mere absence of such an inherently existent object, appreciating its implications, letting the ramifications of the analytical unfindability of object affect her mind, letting it undermine the emotional frameworks of countless lives in a round of suffering induced by ignorance of this fact. After such immersion, the

meditator again returns to the world of appearance, at which point objects dawn as like a magician’s illusions, seeming to exist in their own right but known to be empty of such concrete existence. The world—oneself, others, and objects such as chairs and tables—is seen in a new way, falsely seeming to have a status that it actually does not have, but now unmasked.

But what do objects appear from? What is their substance? What is its relation to one’s own mind? These are issues that the tantric model of meditation goes on to face, not so much through conceptual presentation but through a mode of experiencing objects after realizing emptiness that bridges the gap between emptiness and appearance in an even more vivid way. Let us turn to the Mantra model of meditating on emptiness and subsequent relation with appearance.